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Abstract
Side and covert channels (referred to collectively as illicit channels) are an insidious affliction
of high security systems brought about by the unwanted and unregulated sharing of state
amongst processes.
Illicit channels can be effectively broken through isolation, which limits the degree by
which processes can interact. The drawback of using isolation as a general mitigation against
illicit channels is that it can be very wasteful when employed naïvely. In particular, per-
manently isolating every tenant of a public cloud service to its own separate machine would
completely undermine the economics of cloud computing, as it would remove the advantages
of consolidation.
On closer inspection, it transpires that only a subset of a tenant’s activities are sufficiently
security sensitive to merit strong isolation. Moreover, it is not generally necessary to maintain
isolation indefinitely, nor is it given that isolation must always be procured at the machine
level.
This work builds on these observations by exploring a fine-grained and hierarchical model
of isolation, where fractions of a machine can be isolated dynamically using migration. Using
different units of isolation allows a system to isolate processes from each other with a min-
imum of over-allocated resources, and having a dynamic and reconfigurable model enables
isolation to be procured on-demand. The model is then realised as an implemented frame-
work that allows the fine-grained provisioning of units of computation, managing migrations
at the core, virtual CPU, process group, process/container and virtual machine level. Use of
this framework is demonstrated in detecting and mitigating a machine-wide covert channel,
and in implementing a multi-level moving target defence.
Finally, this work describes the extension of post-copy live migration mechanisms to allow
temporary virtual machine migration. This adds the ability to isolate a virtual machine on a
short term basis, which subsequently allows migrations to happen at a higher frequency and
with fewer redundant memory transfers, and also creates the opportunity of time-sharing a
particular physical machine’s features amongst a set of tenants’ virtual machines.
v
vi
Zusammenfassung
Seitenkanäle und versteckte Kanäle stellen insbesonders für sicherheitssensible Systeme ein
großes Problem dar. Sie entstehen, da Prozesse unbeabsichtigt Informationen über ihren Zu-
stand teilen.
Solche Kanäle kann man mittels Isolation vermeiden, da dadurch der Grad, mit dem
Prozesse interagieren können, eingeschränkt wird. Der Nachteil der Isolation ist allerdings,
dass sie äußerst ressourcenintensiv ist. Dies gilt besonders dann, wenn man jeden Anwender
einer Cloud permanent von allen anderen Anwendern isoliert, seine Anwendungen also auf
einer getrennten Maschine ausführt.
Bei genauerer Betrachtung zeigt sich, dass nur ein Teil der Prozesse eines Anwenders so
sicherheitssensibel sind, dass eine totale Isolation sinnvoll ist. Außerdem ist es nur selten
nötig, Anwendungen zu jedem Zeitpunkt zu isolieren.
Die vorliegende Dissertation baut auf diesen Beobachtungen auf und stellt ein feingra-
nulares, hierarchisches Modell für die Isolation vor. Das Modell ist in der Lage, Teile einer
Maschine mittels Migration dynamisch zu isolieren. Dies erlaubt die Isolation unterschiedli-
cher Prozesse voneinander, ohne dass Ressourcen verschwendet werden, sowie das Starten
des Migrationsprozesses auf Abruf. Das Modell wurde in einem Rahmenwerk implementiert,
das die Migration von Prozessorkernen, virtuellen Prozessoren, Prozessgruppen, Containern
sowie kompletten virtuellen Maschinen erlaubt. Der Nutzen des Rahmenwerks wird anhand
der Erkennung und Beseitigung eines systemweiten versteckten Kanals sowie der Implemen-
tierung einer mehrstufigen Verteidigung gegen solche Kanäle gezeigt.
Abschließend beschreibt diese Dissertation eine Erweiterung zu Post-Copy Live Migration,
welche das temporäre Migrieren virtueller Maschinen zum Ziel hat. Dies erlaubt es, virtuelle
Maschinen kurzzeitig zu isolieren, wodurch eine höhere Frequenz von Migrationsvorgängen
bei gleichzeitig geringerer Speicherauslastung erzielt wird. Dadurch wird ermöglicht, dass
spezielle Funktionen einer physischen Maschine von allen Anwendern beliebig genutzt wer-
den.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
SECURITY IS THE PRODUCT OF MANY FACTORS. A fundamental determinant of aprocess’ security is the location and environment in which it runs. This has
become increasingly evident with the advent of cloud computing, where consolida-
tion is rampant, and tenants may unwittingly share hardware with hostile processes.
New models and mechanisms must be developed to efficiently manage the scarce
luxury of isolation and prevent attacks on processes through their environment.
1.1 Introduction
The security of a process is strongly affected by the environment within which it executes,
as many of the security guarantees offered by an application depend on the validity of as-
sumptions on the underlying infrastructure. For example, while the ciphertext produced
by an encryption algorithm may be proven resilient to an attack carried out by an external
observer, the same cannot always be said when faced with an attacker that can see the en-
cryption operation’s internal and intermediate states. More generally, a process’ security may
be subverted if its internal state can be directly observed or indirectly inferred by an attacker.
The question of how one may limit the visibility of an entity’s internal state from an out-
side observer has historically been referred to as the confinement problem [Lam73]. Typically,
attempts at confining processes to their environment are conducted through a combination
of hardware and the operating system, which enforces strict partitions through many mech-
anisms, including memory protection and CPU scheduling policies.
1.1.1 Problem Definition
In simple terms, the problem with confinements is that they can leak. Many confinements are
either intrinsically imperfect or can be sabotaged to reveal their internal state. For example,
an attacker may exploit a memory leak to learn the memory contents of a victim process,
or to escape a virtual machine confinement. Alternatively, an attacker may compromise a
virtual machine monitor to intercept commands as they are issued by processes to their un-
derlying hardware. The latter is difficult for a common attacker to carry out, as it would
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
require integral and systematic changes to the virtualisation platform, which would be tricky
to perform without the direct assistance of the infrastructure’s owner. Beyond the difficulty of
their execution, such brazen attempts at infiltration carry several drawbacks for an attacker.
For instance, they lack an element of plausible deniability, being unambiguous in their pur-
pose. Similarly, a noisy or high-profile attack calls attention to itself more readily, and can
lead to the creation of patches that neutralise it. This places the durability of the exploit into
question, and potentially bounds the period of time over which data can be acquired.
In the previous attack scenarios, the underlying assumption is that confinements are im-
penetrable and opaque, necessitating the creation of explicit mechanisms for publicising their
internal state. Yet when considering real-world systems, one quickly finds that the confine-
ment problem has never been truly and comprehensively solved. The actions performed by a
process will often produce a deluge of non-functional side-effects, which may be observable
by other processes that share the same infrastructure. In some cases, these side-effects can
be correlated, with a high degree of certainty, to the internal operations being carried out by
the process. For instance, rather than install a key logger, a process may attempt to record a
user’s input indirectly by correlating keystrokes to measurable CPU activity bursts, and com-
paring the durations between bursts to models of people’s typing behaviours and patterns.
While this approach may appear tortuous and error-prone, it carries one distinct advantage
over a key logger, namely that it only uses innate characteristics of the system as it executes
within its normal parameters. This foregoes the need to directly interfere with the system
being attacked.
In general, one can learn the internal state of a confinement in two ways. The first is by
forming an overt channel with a process in the outside world, this being any of the stand-
ard communication channels such as sockets, files or shared memory. The second and more
underhanded option is through a side-channel. To slightly paraphrase Lampson [Lam73],
a side-channel is formed when information is sent over a medium that was not designed
for communication. This includes a wide range of phenomena. For example, side-channels
that infer a target process’ instruction stream by measuring the variation of a system’s power
consumption over time have been demonstrated, with different instructions having differ-
ent signatures on power consumption. Side-channels are more than mere curiosities, and
in some instances present the best-known method for subverting a system’s security. For
example, side-channels have allowed the deduction of secret keys in otherwise opaque em-
bedded systems performing encryptions, as well as keys used by remote servers.
Related to side-channels are covert channels, where one process intentionally forms a
side-channel with another process in an effort to transfer data through an unmonitored in-
terface [Tir07]. For example, two processes may exchange a stream of bits by modulating
accesses to a hard disk, encoding information in the disk’s observable seek time. Unlike
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side-channels, covert channels imply a degree of conspiracy, as both endpoints are actively
trying to communicate with each other. This makes covert channels simpler to implement
than side-channels, as processes can modulate an agreed-upon shared resource using a pre-
determined transfer protocol. The difference between covert channels and side-channels lies
primarily in their intent, rather than mechanism. Throughout this document, covert channels
and side-channels will be collectively referred to as illicit channels.
1.1.1.1 Co-Location and Isolation
In its simplest interpretation, location affects security in that running a process within a com-
promised execution environment places it in jeopardy. In the case of illicit channels, location
takes on a more literal meaning, with the physical location at which a process executes being
a critical factor in the viability of a channel.
Imperfections in confinements are the root causes of illicit channels, yet they only mani-
fest into a security concern when coupled with co-location. Consider, for example, the key
logging attack described earlier. While the process may be leaking information through the
CPU utilisation rates, this is of no consequence if the attacker exists outside of that machine,
as it cannot observe the phenomenon. Thus, the attacker must be co-located with the victim
process though the medium over which the confinement leaks.
More precisely, illicit channels are contingent on the relative position of the victim and
attacker processes within an infrastructure. For example, a side-channel that measures the
CPU activity of a victim process by observing its own scheduling behaviour must necessarily
share the same scheduler, and by association, the same pool of CPU cores. This channel
cannot be formed across processes executing on different machines, as their schedulers are
disjoint, and the scope of the scheduler’s effects at the victim do not carry over onto those
of the second machine. Instead, one would have to extend the side-channel to correlate CPU
usage with effects that can be observed remotely. For instance, if the victim process is a server,
an attacker on a different machine may infer the victim’s CPU usage by generating requests
and measuring their response times, yet even such an attack would require co-location at the
network level.
1.1.2 Risk
Illicit channels have a number of features that can make them particularly dangerous in the
context of security, which can be summarised as follows.
Ubiquity The potential for forming illicit channels within a system is high, given that a
typical system will leak in different ways. This becomes a problem when coupled with
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modern computer systems, which co-locate many processes with different origins over
shared infrastructures.
Stealth Illicit channels are often built using effects that are abstracted away during the secur-
ity analysis of a system, and are not properly encompassed by systems’ security policies.
For example, program analysis techniques may attempt to prove a program’s absence of
data leaks by focusing on its data structures and language-level program flow, whereas
a holistic approach would also demand attention to secondary effects such as power
consumption and instructions’ running times.
The subtlety by which certain leaks occur, coupled with the lack of adequate safeguards
against an attack, gives an attacker an edge over conventional attacks, which, while
often effective, are well-characterised, conspicuous, and actively guarded against. This
element of stealth can also allow attacks to execute over a long period of time before it
is discovered, facilitating longitudinal data collection.
Versatility Illicit channels have the ability to expose elements of a process’ internal state that
could not be retrieved through more traditional attacks.
One area that carries the threat of illicit channels is cloud computing. At its heart, a public
cloud service is an assembly of processes belonging to mutually-distrusting tenants executing
over a shared physical infrastructure. Various mechanisms, notably virtualisation, attempt to
confine tenants’ behaviours, restricting the degree to which they can interfere with other co-
located tenants. Nevertheless, virtual machine confinements are not always perfect, and may
admit the creation of illicit channels. This is not to say that the problem of illicit channels is
unique to the cloud or other large infrastructures. Smart phones, for example, are excellent
candidates for illicit channel attacks, and covert channels can subvert the information flow
policies of a phone’s operating system to leak private information [Cha+15; CQM14].
1.2 State of the Art of Mitigations
Mitigations focus on removing the information content of the phenomenon with which the
channel is being formed, effectively isolating the communicating parties. Isolation can either
be procured synthetically by adding noise to the channel or regularising a system’s behaviour
(soft isolation), or by eliminating the pre-requisite co-location between the parties (hard
isolation) [VRS14].
1.2.1 Limits of Isolation
Soft isolation often incurs an ongoing performance overhead, with some fraction of the ma-
chine’s capacity committed to maintaining the isolation. Hard isolation is an appealing ap-
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proach to mitigating illicit channels, as it can comprehensively eliminate entire classes of
attacks. The problem with hard isolation is that it can leave hardware underutilised by limit-
ing multiprogramming, as it places restrictions on co-location.
The cloud computing scenario is one of the most compelling examples of a system that
would benefit from strong isolation guarantees, yet the aims of the stakeholders in a public
cloud are at odds with each other. This is because a cloud provider aims to maximise profits
by consolidating as many tenants as possible on a minimum of machines, whereas a security-
conscious tenant would ideally execute in isolation. Clouds also present individual tenants
with a limited view of their surroundings, making it harder for a given tenant to identify a
co-resident attacker.
1.3 Proposed Solution
Permanently isolating tenants within a cloud would wreak havoc on the economics of cloud
computing, yet in general, only a subset of a tenant’s activities in the cloud are sufficiently
security sensitive to warrant complete isolation. Similarly, partial isolation is sufficient for
eliminating certain illicit channels, and isolating tenants to their own private machine may be
unnecessary. Moreover, machine-level isolation would not necessarily suffice for mitigating
channels internal to a tenant’s own virtual machine. One would thus benefit from a more
nuanced and fine-grained approach to isolation and co-location elimination. To illustrate,
consider the following scenario:
Example 1. A virtual machine A is suspected to contain a process that launches a cache-
timing attack during the execution of a specific section of code in process PV in virtual ma-
chine V. Such an attack can be foiled at different granularities. For instance, starting from
the coarsest level, one may break co-location
i) at the machine level, by placing A and V on separate physical machines,
ii) at the virtualisation level, by forbidding A and V from being co-scheduled on the same
core, or
iii) at the process and virtualisation level, by forbidding the execution of PV alongside any
process in A.
1.3.1 Objective
The objective of this work is twofold. First, this work will study the decomposition and
modelling of confinements into finer-grained hierarchies of co-located confinements. For
example, several physical machines may exist on a network, thus acting as confinements
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within the network confinement layer. These machines may, in turn, contain sets of virtual
machine confinements existing at the virtualisation layer, which could be further decomposed
into cores, processes and threads.
The second aspect of this work is to investigate the elimination of co-location by recon-
figuring, or migrating, confinements at different levels of the hierarchy. The effectiveness
of a migration in procuring isolation depends on three characteristics, or traits, by which a
migration’s destination differs from its source. These are passive, active, and context traits,
defined as follows.
Passive traits are architectural properties inherent to a system that are functionally transpar-
ent to processes, yet produce an observable phenomenon. For example, while programs
can be written independently of a processor’s cache inclusivity model (Section 2.5.1),
certain attacks will only work on inclusive caches [Liu+15].
Active traits are machine capabilities that a program must make use of explicitly. These in-
clude special-purpose hardware confinements and CPU instruction-set extensions, such
as AES-NI [Gue10], or, more recently, the MPX [Int15b] and SGX [BPH14] extensions.
A system may also have software-based active traits, such as cache-conscious memory
allocators [KPMR12].
Context traits are aspects of a machine that vary depending on its runtime configuration
and its state in relation to its environment. For example, a machine hosting a single
virtual machine will have a temporary context trait of isolation, guaranteeing that the
tenant is executing alone.
A dynamic and migration-based solution to illicit channels is based on migrating a vulner-
able confinement to a target whose traits disallow the channel in question. Such an approach
to co-location elimination becomes even more relevant when one considers that typical cloud
infrastructures have multitudes of confinements with different traits, and isolation can be pro-
cured on-demand through reconfiguration. By combining a finer-grained model of computer
systems with methods for migrating confinements at various granularities, one can compre-
hensively reason about and efficiently manage spatial and temporal isolation. In this context,
spatial isolation refers to the separation of entities that exist at the same time using phys-
ical boundaries, such as through partitioning. Temporal isolation concerns the separation of
entities in time, or equivalently, the use of time-sharing. As will be seen, temporal isolation
can go beyond simply forbidding the simultaneous scheduling of entities. For example, it
can require the modification of scheduling policies to change the order of scheduling, or the
introduction of minimum quanta sizes.
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1.3.2 Advantages of a Dynamic Approach
Given that a cloud consists of a network of machines with varying traits, one can foil illicit
channels by executing tenants’ tasks on machines whose traits guarantee a corresponding
level of security. This requires some form of distributed computing. One option is to pre-
partition a program [Cho+09; Pat+14; Zhe+03] and map the resulting fragments onto dif-
ferent machines. Similarly, a program can be designed to outsource computations [Qia+15].
Pre-partitioning carries a number of drawbacks, foremost of which is that one must know
in advance both when isolation will be required, as well as the location at which the task
should execute. This could potentially leave the designated target underutilised, as it must
preserve the traits required by the security-sensitive task for as long as the task may require
isolation. Alternatively, a system would have to employ a high degree of replication in order
to guarantee that a suitable destination is available at all times.
Contrast this with a migration-based approach to distributed computing. Migration, as
opposed to pre-partitioning programs or using replication, avoids the substantial complexities
brought about by the introduction of multiple program counters, as there will only be a single
definitive live version of each confinement. In addition, a migration target can be chosen
dynamically at runtime without the need of elaborate initialisation and coordination routines.
This also greatly reduces the need to reserve destination confinements in anticipation of an
isolation requirement, and leads to a higher degree of multiplexing of traits (where a machine
with a given trait can be time-shared amongst multiple entities).
Migration can often be applied transparently to arbitrary workloads without having to
modify the tenants’ applications, which are not always simple to decompose. It also avoids
the complexities of aggregating results, as there will only be a single active instance of the
confinement in question. Moreover, a dynamic approach can react to any context trait, and
a migration can be triggered at any time, whereas partitioning can only transfer control
to a remote server at pre-defined points. This is particularly useful in the case of cloud
infrastructures, where workloads are not generally known in advance, and vary dynamically.
The main criticism of migration lies in its associated overhead, yet as will be seen during
this work, localised migrations of small confinements can be performed at high frequencies
and with very low costs. Similarly, this work investigates methods of reducing the cost of
migrating large confinements, particularly virtual machines, to the minimum required by a
mitigation.
1.3.3 Claims
In summary, this work presents and supports the following claims.
Claim 1 The problem of illicit channels is fundamentally one of co-location, and can be
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modelled as such.
Claim 2 Containments can be modified efficiently through scheduling and migration at vari-
ous granularities.
Claim 3 The impact of migrating large confinements such as virtual machines can be reduced
using partial or temporary migrations.
1.4 Document Structure
The following is a brief description of this document’s structure and the major themes and
aims of each chapter.
Chapter 2 is an inquiry into existing attacks and mitigations at each level. Currently, se-
curity is provided through several piecemeal mechanisms that typically guard against very
specific instances of attacks, and cannot always be scaled or adapted to cover complete
classes of attacks. Knowledge of attack vectors and mitigation techniques aids in deriving
a more general approach to managing each confinement’s locality, as well as in extracting the
hierarchical structure of confinements.
Chapter 3 describes a formal model for defining the hierarchical nature of confinements
and their movement. The model supports a unified representation and treatment of co-
location and migration at each level of the hierarchy, allowing attacks and mitigations to
be modelled uniformly. Use of the model is demonstrated using several examples of known
attacks and mitigations.
Chapter 4 details the creation and implementation of a framework, dubbed SAFEHAVEN,
that allows the creation, management and deployment of mitigations throughout the confine-
ment hierarchy. The framework is applied to two case studies, namely in coordinating virtual
machine migration to eliminate a covert channel, and in developing a multi-level moving
target defence. The results of the case studies also form the basis of comparisons between
the performance of migration mechanisms at the different levels of the hierarchy.
Chapter 5 builds on the migration mechanisms explored in the previous chapter, and de-
scribes the extension of post-copy virtual machine live migration to support the temporary
relocation of virtual machines. This allows tasks to be isolated for a period that is shorter
than the duration of a full migration whilst retaining the convenience of operating at the
granularity of virtual machines.
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Chapter 6 reviews the results obtained throughout the course of this work, discusses related
and future work, and ends the document with concluding remarks.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
WHILE EACH ILLICIT CHANNEL may at first appear to have its own unique mech-anism of action, further investigation reveals that one may still classify chan-
nels on the basis of their scope, or medium through which they communicate. Know-
ing the scope of an illicit channel is crucial when adopting a partitioning-based
mitigation strategy, as it defines the conditions for isolation with respect to that
channel.
2.1 Introduction
The genealogy of modern illicit channels can be traced back many decades [Gli93; Lam73],
with illicit channels being a persistent and pervasive threat to computer systems. Initially
confined to high-security or military settings, the study of illicit channels has been drawn into
the limelight due to a number of technological [Ris+09] and political [Nsa] developments.
In the former case, the paradigm of cloud computing has led users of computer systems to,
at least partially, relinquish direct control over their activities by moving their computations
from self-owned machines to shared public infrastructures. While the scale and business
model may be different, the cloud topology harks back to the days of big iron and main-
frames, with a dose of replication and other mechanisms designed to improve resilience. The
fundamental problem remains the same, namely that a user’s tasks are submitted to the great
beyond, with limited assurances on the behaviour and intent of those that are sharing the
user’s infrastructure, as well as an implied trust in the cloud provider (the latter problem
meriting its own investigation outside of this work).
On the smaller end of the spectrum lies another technological development, namely the
rise of smart phones and their rampant and widespread adoption. While not directly ad-
dressed in this work, illicit channels afflict smart phones in ways similar to the cloud scenario.
The fundamental difference is that rather than having multiple adversarial tenants sharing an
infrastructure, smart phones have multiple apps with different origins sharing a device. This
opens the avenue for collusion between apps in an effort to subvert the operating system’s
access control policies and leak sensitive information [Cha+15].
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Politics has served as a driving force in illicit channel research and development due to
channels’ ability to capture and transfer information that could otherwise not be obtained, as
well as their capacity for stealth. This makes them a lucrative apparatus for espionage.
These drivers have led to the emergence of many different types of illicit channels, at-
tacking different elements of programs and hardware. Unlike overt communication channels
such as sockets and IPCs, illicit channels lack a well-defined and auditable interface, and must
be identified and regulated using additional security mechanisms. To better understand illicit
channels and how they operate, this chapter analyses the many types and forms of channels,
and attempts to identify and extract their commonalities. These are then used to construct a
comprehensive strategy to counteracting illicit channels.
Chapter Outline
This chapter is structured as follows:
Section 2.2 demonstrates the core elements of illicit channels through an experiment, where
the mapping of hardware threads to cores is deduced via an illicit channel.
Section 2.3 identifies the primary stakeholders and scenarios where illicit channels consti-
tute a threat.
Section 2.4 broadly describes the common classes of attacks and mitigations.
Section 2.5 is an in-depth investigation into specific known instances of attacks, and their
mitigations, ordered by the medium through which the channels concerned are formed.
Section 2.6 concludes this chapter.
2.2 A Simple Side-Channel
To better motivate the discussion, the following section describes the construction of a simple,
yet complete, side-channel attack. The side-channel under consideration is designed to infer
the cache hierarchy of a given CPU. Knowing the cache structure of a system is the first step
in carrying out subsequent cache-level attacks [OST06; Per05].
2.2.1 Scenario
Modern multi-core CPUs generally have a hierarchical cache structure, with multiple cache
levels. Cores within a CPU package will often share specific cache levels.
Consider the Intel i7-2640M CPU (INTEL-MT in Table 4.2), which consists of a two-core
package, with two hardware threads (HT, or hyperthreads [Int16b]) to each core, as illus-
trated in Figure 2.1. In the case of this particular architecture, each core has its own L1
12
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HT:0 HT:1 HT:2 HT:3
L1:0 L1:1
L2:0 L2:1
L3:0
Figure 2.1: Cache hierarchy for CPU with simultaneous multithreading.
and L2 caches, and both cores share a unified L3 cache. This cache structure intertwines
the hardware threads of each core into pairs that operate within a shared L1 and L2 local-
ity, meaning that processes assigned to the same core may perform cache-level side-channel
attacks over these levels, in addition to the package-wide L3 cache.
Knowledge of the mapping between hardware threads and caches (or by implication,
cores) aids an attacker in determining the viability of an attack at the L1 and L2 cache
levels, yet the mapping varies between architectures. Furthermore, operating systems com-
monly represent hardware threads as full-blown cores, hiding the groupings of hardware
threads into physical cores. In addition, the introduction of virtualisation, with its abstrac-
tion of virtual CPUs, can further obfuscate the relation between computational cores and
caches. Thus, an attacker would benefit from a dynamic method of deducing core-to-cache
assignments.
Outside of the context of security, Klug et al. [Klu+11] proposed a system to automat-
ically optimise the distribution of processes to cores. Within their work, they identified a
phenomenon that enables one to discern the topology of a CPU package, namely the prin-
ciple that cache contention leads to an observable delay in the servicing of memory modific-
ation operations, and that the delay varies depending on the cache level at which contention
occurs. Since on-chip coherency updates are faster than off-chip updates, one can deduce
whether threads are running over a shared cache by timing repeated memory operations on
a shared variable.
2.2.2 Experiment
The observation of different timing behaviours for identical operations on different cache-
levels is conducive to the formation of a side-channel for determining core-to-cache pinnings,
the results of which can then be used for subsequent illicit-channel attacks.
This side-channel was confirmed by the author of this document through the design and
implementation of an experiment, which was carried out as follows. To determine the effects
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of cache contention, two pthreads were started, with each pthread executing an identical
workload: incrementing and retrieving a shared counter in a tight loop for a large and fixed
number of iterations. The total time taken for both threads to execute was recorded. If the
hypothesis were true, then one would expect the experiment to have taken longer when the
threads were executing on different cores, due to the off-core cache invalidations incurred.
2.2.3 Result
Table 2.1 presents the total time observed when running the aforementioned workloads using
different thread-to-processor pinnings. As mentioned previously, the operating system rep-
resents each hardware thread as a core. Consequently, the CPU was abstracted as a four-core
package.
THREAD 0
Core 0 1 2 3
T
H
R
E
A
D
1 0 1.15 1.00 2.52 2.52
1 1.00 1.15 2.51 2.52
2 2.51 2.52 1.16 1.00
3 2.52 2.52 1.03 1.15
Table 2.1: Total time (normalised) for both threads to complete, expressed as a multiple of
the shortest observed time.
Total execution times are represented as multiples of the minimum observed running
time, which was obtained when the threads were placed onto core pairs 〈0, 1〉 and 〈2, 3〉.
Conversely, the worst execution times were observed when mapping to one core from each
of the previous pairs, that is, when mapping to 〈0, 2〉, 〈0, 3〉, 〈1, 2〉 or 〈1, 3〉. These timings
strongly suggested that cores {0, 1} are actually hardware threads within the same core,
as are cores {2, 3}. This hypothesis was verified by using the operating system’s official
reporting mechanisms (as will be discussed in Chapter 4), as well as by comparing with the
CPU topology generated using hwloc [Bro+10].
As an aside, perhaps paradoxically, one finds that it is quicker to schedule two threads to
the same single hardware thread than it is to place each workload on a different hardware
thread in a different core. This is because the time spent performing the actual increment
operation is far shorter than the time spent resolving cache invalidations. Consequently,
scheduling to the same hardware thread is only ≈ 1.15 times slower than the optimum run-
ning time, as opposed to ≈ 2.52 times when running on different cores.
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2.3 Attacker Model
The side-channel presented in Section 2.2 illustrates the fundamental characteristics and
components of effective illicit channels.
The first is that an effective channel has a defined purpose, meaning that useful conclu-
sions can be drawn by observing the respective phenomenon.
Next is that a channel has two or more endpoints, typically an attacker and a victim in the
case of a side-channel, and that channels have a range (or scope) within which the endpoints
must exist. In the described example, the endpoints are the incrementing threads, both of
which had access to the same observations. Since the threads were co-operating, the example
could be classified as a covert channel. Co-operation generally leads to covert channels being
simpler to construct than side-channels.
The range, or scope, of a channel depends on the architectural element being attacked,
and the mechanism of attack used. As will be seen in Section 2.5, confinements can be broken
at different levels of a system architecture, such as the cache level (L1 [OST06], L2 [Xu+11]
and L3 [YF14]), virtual machine level [Ris+09], system level [AKS07; WXW12], or network
level [CBS04], through various forms of attack.
Finally, an illicit channel has a mechanism of action, the choice of which depends on the
purpose of the attack and the location of the attacker relative to its victim (the scope).
2.3.1 Attack Orchestration
The origins of an illicit channel attack will vary depending on the actors involved. These,
in turn, depend on the infrastructure being considered, and who controls the individual
elements of the infrastructure.
Figure 2.2 summarises the relationship between the number of separate execution envir-
onments and the number of owners (or tenants) that have a stake within the environments,
describing the common forms of deployments that result from combining the two variables.
These topologies, and the threat of illicit channels to them, are described as follows.
One environment, one owner is a typical workstation or smart phone whereby there is a
single operating system environment running over a machine owned by a single ten-
ant. The primary attack vector arises from compromised processes or installed mal-
ware. Apart from the risk of side-channels, smart phones carry the risk of collusion
between apps, which may form covert channels to circumvent the limitations imposed
by permission systems, thereby leaking sensitive data [Cha+14; Mar+12].
Many environments, one owner refers to a network of machines owned by the same entity,
such as an organisation. In this case, the primary risk originates from the use of illicit
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Figure 2.2: Common system topologies and their relation to the number of distinct owners
and environments under their control.
channels to bypass data protection policies.
One environment, many owners as in the case of Software-as-a-Service or Platform-as-a-
Service clouds. These carry the risk of espionage [Zha+14], and the methods available
to an attacker vary depending on the control afforded by the cloud service.
Many environments, many owners as in the case of Infrastructure-as-a-Service clouds. Ch-
annels are again focused on espionage, yet the set of mechanisms at an attacker’s dis-
posal are different than the previous scenario. For example, side-channels in the cloud
have enabled the inference of tenants’ infrastructure and activity [Her+13; Ris+09],
and memory contents.
While the principles explored in this work can be applied to all four scenarios, the in-
vestigation will focus on the mitigation of illicit channels in the latter. This is because it is
effectively a superset, being susceptible to all of the attacks in the previous scenarios, in ad-
dition to attacks that can originate from outside of the victim’s environment. Furthermore,
the cloud infrastructures associated with IaaS are often large, and consequently lend them-
selves to the use of isolation and partitioning as a general mitigation strategy. In contrast,
while partitioning can be applied to single-environment scenarios, these lack the wealth of
distinct locations to which attackers can be banished, or within which potential victims can
be isolated.
This work assumes a benign cloud provider that, at a minimum, will not actively try to
sabotage a tenant’s security, and would at best assist in the process of procuring isolation. A
cloud provider is practically omnipotent, and can effectively mislead or deceive its tenants
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in a multitude of ways, especially by intercepting instruction streams and providing false
assurances of isolation to tenants. Conversely, a cloud provider can help a tenant procure
isolation faster and with less waste if it can guarantee or enforce conditions on its hardware.
For example, if a cloud provider can assure a tenant that it has sole ownership over its cores,
then the tenant can procure core-level isolation for its processes without having to migrate
to a different machine. A higher degree of co-operation between tenants and their cloud
provider thus corresponds to more efficient and secure mitigations.
2.4 General Attack and Mitigation Strategies
The task of addressing illicit channels may at first seem daunting when one considers the
sheer number of physical side-effects that processes have on their environment during their
execution, and that each of these side-effects can potentially be correlated with the process’
internal state. This problem is further elaborated when compounded with concerns of im-
plicit data and control flows, where an observable system effect can be directly related to a
program’s data or execution.
On further analysis, one finds that not all channels are created equal, as they vary in their
resilience, robustness, bitrate, practicality, and ultimately, utility. For example, an attacker
may find that a side-channel that detects the presence of co-resident virtual machines on a
public cloud [Ris+09] without distinguishing between tenants is of limited use, given that
co-residency can effectively be assumed. Similarly, the cache-hierarchy distinguishing side-
channel described in Section 2.2 may prove useless for an attack on a system whose virtual
CPU cores are partitioned over disjoint caches. Thus, out of the set of potential phenomena
that leak state, only a subset can be used to form viable illicit channels.
Finally, while the set of observable phenomena may be large, the techniques used to build
the known illicit channels can be grouped into families of general strategies. The following
section provides an overview of the general classes of attacks that have been observed, and
the general forms of the defences that can be employed against them.
2.4.1 Attack Types
Attacks are characterised by type (side or covert), scope, bandwidth and feasibility. In terms
of mechanism, illicit channels can be broadly categorised into three [VRS14] attack classes,
as follows:
Time-driven attacks rely on measuring variations in the aggregate execution time of opera-
tions. These can be categorised into two types of attacks [KPMR12], namely:
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• passive attacks, where the attacker cannot execute its code in the victim’s environ-
ment, and
• active attacks, where the attacker can invoke or direct routines on the victim’s
machine.
Trace-driven attacks are based on analysing the transformation of the system’s state as it
evolves over a series of operations. This can be further subdivided into two attack
classes [KPMR12], namely:
• synchronous attacks that allow for some degree of direct interaction with the victim
process, such as the external triggering encryption operations, and
• asynchronous attacks that are carried out over shared hardware without directly
exercising control over the victim process.
Access-driven attacks are possible when an attacker is co-located with a victim, and can
detect and correlate the effects of a system’s internal state to that of the victim.
Control flow can affect a program’s timing characteristics, making possible attacks on
mechanisms such as branch prediction [AKS07]. Similarly, data flow dependencies may ex-
pose timing channels through several avenues, including short-circuit expression evaluation,
thread contention, and load bypassing [Cop+09].
2.4.2 Defences
Mitigations can broadly be categorised as being passive, reactive or architectural.
Passive countermeasures attempt to break locality sharing through an indiscriminate pro-
cess. For example, disallowing multiple hardware threads from executing concurrently will
eliminate a class of attacks [OST06] at the cost of performance. Alternatively, one can use
a scheduling policy that only co-schedules processes belonging to the same entity [KPMR12;
WL06] or coalition of virtual machines [Sai+05]. Scheduling policies can also be altered to
limit their preemption rate, restricting the granularity of cache-level attacks [VRS14]. Other
countermeasures include periodically flushing lower-level caches [ZR13], changing event re-
lease rates [AZM10a], and intercepting potentially dangerous operations (such as atomic
instructions) through the hypervisor [SXZ13].
Reactive countermeasures attempt to detect and mitigate attacks as they emerge. Frame-
works for distributed event monitoring [Mdh+13] can be fed events generated via introspec-
tion [DG+13], or can ensure that communication complies with a defined information flow
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policy [Sai+05], possibly with notions of risk [JSS07]. Event-driven frameworks using profil-
ing from different system levels to direct virtual machine migration have also been employed
in the context of load-balancing [Woo+07].
Architectural mitigations may either refer to changes in hardware or to the way in which
it is used. A notable example is Intel’s introduction of specialised AES instructions, which
insulate the operations’ internal state from external caches. The problem with relying on
hardware solutions is that it takes time for them to permeate into the mainstream, and
that it would be unrealistic to expect every confinement-sensitive algorithm to be implemen-
ted in hardware [KPMR12]. Other solutions include randomly permuting memory place-
ment [WL06], using oblivious data structures to hide memory accesses [GO96], rewriting
programs to remove timing variations [Aga00; Cop+09], reducing the precision of system
clocks [Hu91; OST06] or normalising timings [LGR13], locking regions of cache to specific
processes by avoiding shared cache indices [KPMR12] and by partitioning virtual machines
entirely through hardware [Kel+10].
2.4.2.1 Confinement Types
Illicit channels occur either at the software or hardware level [Hu91], the former being a
product of the algorithms used, and the latter emerging from the characteristics of a system’s
hardware. When reviewing the body of known attacks and mitigations, it becomes apparent
that there are variations in the efficacy and generality of the established countermeasures
combating attacks. In the case of hardware-based channels, these factors are strongly affected
by the class of mitigation used, specifically, whether an approach uses a soft or hard isolation
technique [VRS14] to separate an attacker from its victim.
Hard isolation entails that co-locations are broken by placing the parties involved at distinct
and separate physical hardware locations, whereas
Soft isolation mimics the existence of a plurality of distinct hardware locations by arbit-
rating access to resources, hiding their hardware characteristics and reducing a given
channel’s information content.
Hard isolation places a strong physical boundary between an attacker and a victim,
through what are generally passive elements of a system. For example, the effects of a process
on a cache’s access times may be hidden from an attacker by placing the latter on a different
core that makes use of a different cache hierarchy [OST06]. Conversely, a soft isolation tech-
nique allows hardware to be shared between the attacker and victim processes, but will try
to extinguish the effect over which a given channel hinges. For example, to counteract the
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aforementioned cache-based timing channel using soft isolation, a victim process could at-
tempt to flush its caches using a linear scan prior to its descheduling [OST06], thus masking
the access pattern.
Soft isolations are typically only guaranteed with respect to one defined system attribute,
and are upheld through active and ongoing processes, or through changes in policy. To
elaborate on the previous example, a linear scan may be effective in breaking a cache-based
side-channel, but may leave other core-level illicit channels intact. In contrast, migrating a
process to a different core will automatically break all subsequent core-level attacks, bar any
channels that can be formed using residual effects at the origin produced by its execution
prior to migration. In this regard, hard isolation is more comprehensive, but is limited by
capacity [LGR13].
Other than their generally narrow scope, soft isolations may require an upkeep, that is
they can incur an overhead or lead to lower performance. In the case of the cache-timing ob-
fuscation process, these overheads manifest themselves in the running time of the cleansing
process itself, as well as the negation of the advantages of caching due to the forced eviction
of memory.
In some cases, soft isolations have been improved or superseded by extensions to hard-
ware, which serve to reduce the methods’ speeds or strengthen the degree of isolation offered.
For example, early implementations of x86 virtualisation incurred an ongoing and signific-
ant overhead due to dynamic binary rewriting [AA06], which has nowadays been drastically
reduced through the adoption of hardware-assisted virtualisation. Similarly, software-based
approaches to securing AES introduced overheads [OST06] that have been largely elimin-
ated through the implementation of the cryptographic operations as a special hardware-level
confinement [Gue10].
2.4.2.2 The Soft/Hard Isolation Trade-off
In the absence of special hardware-level confinements, one must choose between using a
(potentially) inefficient soft isolation or dedicating computational capacity to a task, the size
of which depends on the scope of the attack. Consider the case of the clflush instruction,
which flushes all cached versions of a given cache line. This instruction has been demon-
strated to be an effective enabler of several cache-level side-channel attacks [YF14; Zha+14],
due to its ability to flush all instances of a given cacheline from within a cache hierarchy
whilst also avoiding many of the complications of mapping memory addresses to cachelines
that an attacker would otherwise face.
Disabling the instruction would be a crude, yet effective, method for impeding such
attacks. While clflush is an unprivileged instruction that does not generate a hardware
trap [Zha+14], closer inspection of its semantics shows that its execution depends upon a
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clflush flag within the machine’s cpuid register being asserted [Int15a]. This register is
normally immutable, yet a virtual machine would, at least in principle, be able to assign
any arbitrary value to its virtualised counterpart [Lib]. Unfortunately, hardware-assisted vir-
tualisation, such as that used by KVM [Kvma], bypasses the virtualised cpuid register, and
QEMU will only consult the register when using a translation-based virtualisation method that
foregoes hardware acceleration. While this was empirically proven by the author of this
document to be effective in disabling clflush (an invalid opcode exception was thrown on
invoking it during a test), a translation-based VCPU is substantially slower than its KVM equi-
valent, leading to a continuous overhead.
Given that a special-purpose CPU confinement that limits the use of clflush does not
momentarily exist, and that the L3 cache can lead to a machine-wide attack, an approach
based on hard isolation would have to commission an entire machine to the process in ques-
tion. As will be seen in Section 3.4, the notion of an upkeep cannot be directly carried over
into the realm of hard isolation, as the ongoing computational cost of maintaining passive
structural elements such as caches and cores is low. Instead, the primary concern is one of
utilisation, where overhead is considered in terms of the computational capacity that is left
unused during the fulfilment of an isolation requirement.
2.5 A Scope-Based Taxonomy
It is instructive to analyse specific instances of illicit channels and attempt to extract their
commonalities. Consider the side-channel described in Section 2.2. The channel involves a
set of participating parties (the attacker and victim thread), a mechanism (the timing chan-
nel), and scope (core or package-level visibility of timing effects).
The received wisdom is to categorise channels on the basis of their mechanism of action,
yet this is of limited use when considering a partitioning approach to dissolving channels. In-
stead, the following exposition attempts to group channels by their scope, that is the medium
through which the channel is formed.
2.5.1 Caches
Caches are a pragmatic solution to reducing the average time taken to perform memory oper-
ations. They exploit the common observation that real-world data often exhibits temporal and
spatial locality [Ken86], where related data elements often appear close to each other within
memory (for example, in the case of consecutive elements in an array), and are typically
accessed within similar time frames.
When a processor attempts to access a memory location, it first checks for the element’s
presence in cache (a cache hit), with absence (a cache miss) triggering a fetch operation
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from main memory, which is slower to service. This idiosyncrasy forms the fundamental
principle with which many cache-level illicit channel attacks operate. For the purposes of
understanding cache-based illicit channel attacks, one must grasp a few additional concepts,
namely:
Cache lines The aforementioned principle of locality of reference, coupled with the bus
widths of modern architectures, have led to the adoption of cache lines as minimum data
transfer units. Thus, when requesting a byte of data from main memory, the system loads
a block of N consecutive bytes into cache with a single fetch operation (N is determined by
the architecture. For example, an Intel i7-4790 CPU uses 64-byte cache lines). This places a
practical limit on the resolution with which an access-based side-channel can deduce memory
access patterns, as adjacent addresses will produce the same side-effect on memory access
times [MKS12].
Hierarchy Modern CPUs commonly employ a hierarchical cache architecture with multiple
cache levels [Int16b], such as the one illustrated in Figure 2.1. Cache levels are typically
denoted as Ln, n being the level in question, and lower values of n denoting smaller but
faster caches. The level of a cache can be seen as indicating its proximity to a core, with
data to be used by a core filtering down the hierarchy. Certain cache levels may be shared
by multiple cores or hardware threads [URv03]. For example, the aforementioned CPU has
a per-core L1 and L2 cache, and an L3 cache common to all cores [Int16b]. The cache level
affects the scope of an attack [Xu+11], and determines whether an illicit channel is confined
to the same core, or can be formed amongst processes running on separate cores.
Inclusivity A cache hierarchy can be inclusive or exclusive. In the former case, the presence
of a data element in a lower cache level implies that it is also cached within the higher levels.
Thus, for example, if data is contained in L1, then it must also exist in L2. Conversely, an
exclusive cache guarantees that a given data element will always be in at most one cache.
Several cache-level attacks can only be carried out reliably on inclusive architectures. Inclus-
ivity varies by hardware vendor and architecture, with most recent CPU architectures from
Intel being inclusive, and AMD’s offerings being exclusive [Ore+15].
Eviction and associativity As caches are smaller than main memory, it follows from the
pigeon-hole principle that multiple cache lines in main memory are competing for room in
cache. The system is thus faced with the problem of deciding which cache line should be
evicted in favour of any new data that is being requested.
Caches typically exhibit cache inertia, meaning that a cache line is only evicted when an
attempt is made to load a new line into it. Often, the policy for choosing between lines in a
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cache line set is a variant of the least recently used (LRU) policy [AR14], where the first line
to be removed is that which has not been accessed the longest [KPMR12].
A related concept is that of associativity, which refers to the number of separate locations
within a cache to which a given block of main memory can be mapped. The degree of
associativity can vary between caching levels [Int16b]. Associativity can increase the noise of
an illicit channel by introducing collisions between elements in main memory and obfuscating
the memory eviction patterns [MKS12].
Prefetching Contemporary architectures may employ additional optimisations such as pre-
fetching [Int16b], which attempts to pre-load multiple cache lines based on the predicted
memory access patterns. Prefetching may inadvertently hinder the establishment of illicit
channels due to the additional noise and loss in accuracy when deriving a memory access
map [MKS12].
2.5.1.1 Attacks
Interest in the field of illicit channels has been recently rekindled though a seminal work
that detailed a series of methods designed to infer AES encryption keys through cache-level
attacks [OST06]. The methods described the exploitation of a feature of many implementa-
tions of AES algorithms, namely that they use lookup tables, with elements of the key being
used as an index value for the initial round. By triggering an encryption via a known plain-
text and observing the algorithm’s memory access patterns, one could subsequently derive
the key being applied.
Although much of the research in cache-level illicit channels is focused on their use
in breaking cryptographic algorithms and stealing keys, in general, any algorithm whose
memory access pattern depends on confidential information is at risk of leaking sensitive
information through cache-based side channels [KPMR12; Zha+14].
A defining feature of cache-level channels is that they can achieve high bandwidths due to
the speed of memory operations and the frequency at which they can be performed [Xu+11].
This can be contrasted with communication via hard-disk access modulation [LMS14], which
is inherently slower. Fast channels may be facilitated further with the presence of accur-
ate real-time counters, although timing information can also be acquired through alternate
means [OST06].
Cache-level attacks are intimately related to the architecture being attacked. For example,
certain synchronous attacks may only be viable on chip multiprocessors [OST06; Per05].
Passive timing attacks are difficult in the context of cache-level illicit channels due to an
inability to control the victim process’ cache evictions directly. A lack of probes further com-
plicates the formation of an illicit channel due to the lack of local timing information. These
23
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
result in increased noise, which may in certain cases be reduced through statistical meth-
ods and multiple sampling techniques. In contrast, active attacks afford a greater degree of
control over cache evictions, and result in heightened bitrates.
Trace-driven cache attacks analyse memory access patterns [KPMR12; NS07]. Attacks
such as PRIME+PROBE [OST06] are also active, as they require the direct manipulation, or
priming, of the victim’s cache. Synchronous trace-driven attacks allow for some degree of
direct interaction with the victim process, such as by triggering encryption operations. Con-
versely, asynchronous attacks are performed on shared hardware without relying on control
over the victim process [OST06]. Such attacks often rely on an attacker’s ability to execute
code during a sensitive process, recovering information on the process’ intermediate stages.
Asynchronous attacks on single-threaded systems have been demonstrated, with attackers
relying on knowledge of the underlying process scheduling algorithm to execute their code
at the appropriate stages [KPMR12].
2.5.1.2 Mitigations
The following is an overview of the several soft and hard isolation-based mitigations that
have been proposed for combating cache-level illicit channels.
Data Structures and Memory Layouts An elementary mitigation against cache-based at-
tacks would be to not use the cache, that is, to remove operations on main memory, ren-
dering attacks through cache profiling irrelevant. In the case of securing AES, accesses to
cache may be removed by replacing table lookups with computations, at the cost of perform-
ance [OST06]. A slightly more permissive approach is to use registers as caches, keeping
values local to the core, yet registers tend to be very finite, and their number and width var-
ies by architecture. Similarly, attacks may be partly mitigated by compressing lookup tables
and shrinking their memory footprint. This increases the odds that memory segment will
be accessed completely, rendering traces less informative. This approach is based on prob-
ability, and would merely slow down an attack. In addition, it is not very effective against
asynchronous attacks [OST06].
Rather than modify the underlying data structures, one may opt to change (or fuzz) the
access method. For example, modifying every table lookup operation to always scan lin-
early through the entire table would obfuscate the relevant element’s index [Pag02]. As an
optimisation, one can read a single element from each cache-line block, reducing the num-
ber of reads that must be performed to normalise the entire cache. This must be employed
with some caution, as certain architectures exhibit timing differences when accessing values
within the same block [Cop+09]. Fuzzing can also be used to add random delays to sensit-
ive operations, or to normalise operations to some maximal value, although this would slow
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down the process to its worst-case execution time. Reducing the resolution of the system’s
clock can also hinder tracing [LGR13], yet an attacking process may acquire similar timing
information through alternative means, such as by executing a separate timer thread with an
internal counter [OST06].
Hardware A simple method of hindering several fast attacks is to disable simultaneous
multithreading (SMT), disallowing multiple hardware threads from executing concurrently
over the same low-level cache and limiting the resolution of synchronous attacks [OST06].
Hardware threads typically share a great degree of state, including caches. By removing
concurrency, one removes the risk of having an attacker’s thread executing in parallel with
the sensitive process on the same core. This comes at the cost of computing capacity, and
thus, performance.1
On certain architectures, there exists the option of disabling caches entirely, with reads
and writes being committed directly to memory. This drastic course of action would negate
the benefits of caching. A less aggressive alternative, available on some architectures, is to
place caches in a no-fill mode, where reads are performed from cache, but subsequent cache
evictions are disabled. Thus, in the context of AES, one could load the lookup tables into
cache and enter no-fill mode, preserving the speed-up associated with caching during reads
whilst stopping external processes from forcing cache evictions. This would require support
from the kernel, as well as a way of marking privileged processes. [OST06]
Finally, extensions to a machine’s active traits (Section 1.3.1), such as the AES-NI [Gue10]
extensions, can counteract algorithm-specific illicit-channels by creating special-purpose ha-
rdware confinements.
Operating System Support Rather than permanently disabling SMT, a security-sensitive
process may opt to temporarily disable SMT at runtime. This would require support at the
machine level. Alternatively, an operating system may leave the hardware thread active, yet
opt to never schedule processes to it, effectively achieving an equivalent result (a similar
concept will be explored in Section 4.2.3). The problem with such an approach is that it
could lead to the enabling of denial-of-service attacks, especially if processes are able to
disable SMT directly through system calls [OST06].
A more relaxed and less debilitating alternative is gang scheduling, where only threads
from the same originating process are ever co-scheduled [KPMR12], allowing processes to
make use of multithreading. Under the assumption that a process will not attempt to attack
itself, such a policy would not present a higher risk to the process.
1Disabling hyperthreading was once common amongst cloud providers [WXW12] for a variety of reasons,
chiefly related to power efficiency and bean counting, although Amazon EC2 has recently foregone this prac-
tice [Ama15].
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Rather than addressing the problem as one of scheduling, one can also attempt to tackle
the root cause of the attacks, namely the cache behaviour itself. Operating systems can be
extended to partition memory into non-interfering sets using page colouring [Erl07]. This
service can be offered by the operating system in the form of a dynamic call that allocates
regions of stealth memory dynamically using page table alerts, automatically flushing cache-
lines between context switches amongst processes owned by different entities.
2.5.2 Operating System Environments and Machines
Operating systems and physical machines necessarily carry within them an abundance of
state. A core activity of operating systems is to limit any given process’ view of this global
state, yet some sharing will invariably remain.
2.5.2.1 Attacks
Modern operating systems provide processes with many facilities, including memory mapped
I/O and hardware access, as well as metrics such as a process’ CPU or memory consump-
tion. These are all potentially subject to illicit channel attacks. For example, meta-data
attacks [Smi+06] can be used to conduct industrial espionage using tools as basic as ps. The
types of meta-data attacks available vary based on the operating system’s process-facing in-
terface. Thus, for example, an attack with which one can infer a process’ GUI state may only
work on certain mobile devices [CQM14], as desktop-class operating systems may lack the
analogous metric or process behaviour.
Beyond meta-data attacks, a process can have measurable and observable effects on a ma-
chine’s subsystems. For example, a program’s control flow directly affects mechanisms such
as branch prediction, which in turn affects computation times. Consequently, branch predic-
tion has been used to extract bits of a private cryptographic key within a single encryption by
observing the timing effects of the instruction pipeline [AKS07].
Similarly, a program’s data flow can influence timing by creating data dependencies
between instructions, or by changing a program’s execution time in the case of instructions
whose execution varies based on its operands’ values (such as certain implementations of DIV
on Intel processors that use early exit). Data flow dependencies also arise between registers
and memory. For example, storing and loading values to the same location would cause an
out-of-order processor to assume the existence of a data dependency between the elements.
Load bypassing, especially implementations which only consider parts of the address of the
location being loaded, induce further irregularities in memory operation times. Contention
between threads also leads to inter-thread timing dependencies. [Cop+09]
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2.5.2.2 Mitigations
Sandboxing Sandboxing, in its most general sense, refers to the encapsulation of a process
within some form of restricted or seemingly isolated environment. Process containers [Lxc]
have emerged as a robust mechanism for isolation, being particularly effective in the elimin-
ation of meta-data attacks through their use of namespaces. The applicability of containers
depends on how a deployment is structured, and for maximum effect requires the processes
being contained to be decoupled from each other. Note that moving a process to a completely
different operating system and machine and letting it execute on its own could be seen as an
extreme form of sandboxing.
Combined operating system and hardware support may also allow a process to efficiently
move regions of memory to different addresses. As trace-driven attacks profile specific re-
gions in memory, the system would complicate data acquisition by migrating the sensitive
region on each access. Migration could, for example, be implemented through dynamic page
tables, or by using multiple copies of pages and alternating accesses. Alternatively, the sys-
tem may permute memory elements within the sensitive section itself. Unfortunately, these
approaches require a significant degree of hardware support, and tend to be very application-
specific. [OST06].
Program Transformation Control-flow illicit channel attacks can be neutralised by elimin-
ating the unbalances brought about by program branching. One option is to transformation
a program and to render it compliant with the program counter security model [Cop+09].
The program counter security model considers an attack where the only information
leaked is the program counter’s values during execution [Mol+06], from which an attacker
can then determine which branches were taken, and consequently how conditional expres-
sions were evaluated. If the branches of a conditional statement took different times to
execute, and the condition depends on a secret key, then one may be able to infer knowledge
about the key through a timing attack. Conversely, a timing attack will not work if the pro-
gram’s control flow does not depend on a secret key and if execution time is only dependent
on control flow.
Coppens et al. [Cop+09] achieve this through if-conversions, where the branches of a key-
dependent if are modified so as to reduce the variance in the execution times of branches,
as well as in branch prediction. The core of the construction relies on predicating each
instruction in a branch. A fully predicated instruction set, such as that of the EPIC architec-
ture [SRM00], readily accommodates such transformations. However, the x86 architecture
only has predicated MOV instructions, making the transformation less straightforward. The ap-
proach should only be applied to secret keys, which are delineated using pragma directives,
so as to minimise unnecessary overheads [Cop+09]. Their approach used LLVM to ensure
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that the transformation happened beyond the optimisation stage, which would undermine
the conversion.
Beyond the complication of having to tag the security sensitive elements of a program, the
method has a drawback in that it must be revised with each processor generation, as micro-
architectures, and consequently timing behaviours, can change [Cop+09]. Performance can
also be impacted, particularly in the case of loops with terminating conditions that depend
on a secret value, as these necessitate iterating up to the loops’ upperbounds.
Other application-specific program transformations exist. For example, with algorithmic
masking, one may obfuscate data-dependent operations by applying random transformations
to sensitive data. An alternative heuristic is to add noise via spurious memory accesses, such
as by running several dummy encryptions in parallel with the true encryption. [OST06]
2.5.3 Virtual Machines and Mixed-Level Attacks
Cloud computing presents a somewhat curious security landscape, as it potentially places
rivals on a shared platform, as opposed to the comparative safety of an enterprise’s internal
network. This creates an atypical attack surface, with attacks being launched horizontally
across environments, rather than from within a victim’s server environment.
Virtualisation is very commonly used to confine the activities of individual tenants and
limit interference. While the coarse-grained nature of virtualisation and developments in
computer architecture (such as per-core caches, complex memory prefetching protocols and
hardware-implemented AES instructions) have complicated the task of reliably forming cer-
tain types of side-channels across virtualised platforms [MKS12], breaches are still repor-
ted [Ira+14; YF14; Zha+12a]. In addition, virtualisation can enable new classes of illicit
channels that act directly on the virtualisation platform itself.
2.5.3.1 Attacks
Cloud providers generally provide tenants with an abstracted view of the infrastructure over
which they are executing. Thus, while data centres may correspond to broad geographical
locations, tenants are not given the precise location at which their virtual machines execute.
Nevertheless, certain indicators may allow a virtual machine to extract information about
its underlying infrastructure. For example, attacks have managed to co-locate specific vir-
tual machine instances within the Amazon EC2 cloud via a series of heuristics and side-
channels [Ris+09]. As EC2 is based on Xen [Bar+03b], co-location was verified by com-
paring the dom0 IP address visible to each machine, and further reaffirmed using hard-disk
based covert channels. Additional methods for confirming co-location were also identified,
including the use of network-based side-channels and by timing the response times of com-
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munication over external interfaces. The risk introduced by being able to reliably co-locate
virtual machines with targets is that it enables the deployment of subsequent attacks.
Other attacks may be used to detect the rate of web traffic on an adversary’s machine, aid-
ing espionage [Ris+09]. By probing the virtual machine’s load whilst subjecting the victim
to input, one may infer a correlation between computational load and traffic. Load meas-
urements can also potentially be used to record keystroke timings from interactive secure
shell sessions. Combined with keyboard usage models, one could determine the input with
varying degrees of uncertainty based on the fingers’ travel times. Admittedly, this attack was
demonstrated under laboratory conditions, and may not necessarily be feasible in a cloud
setting due to the associated noise [Ris+09].
Covert channels in the cloud can be used to clandestinely export data from one tenant’s
machine to another’s [WXW12]. Knowledge of the underling scheduling algorithm can used
to form a channel by modulating the time for which a machine [OO10] or process [Hu92] is
scheduled. For example, two co-located virtual machines may communicate via load-based
channels, such as through the Covert Channels using CPU loads between Virtual machines
(CCCV) scheme [OO10]. CCCV games the Xen scheduler by encoding a message through the
modulation of a process’ CPU load. A second process executing at the corresponding target
can infer the message based on the length of the scheduling quantum allocated to it. For
multi-core architectures, the sender and receiver endpoints may deploy multiple communic-
ating processes, in an attempt to land a pair of sending and receiving processes on the same
core, relaying a message between groups.
A similar covert channel can be formed by having the sender process invalidate cache
lines, making a measurable impact on the receiver’s memory access times [Xu+11]. The
magnitude of the performance impact can be directly controlled by the number of cache lines
that the sender invalidates, allowing more complex encodings. Other covert channels may
attempt to attack the system’s data bus to modulate memory access times [WXW12].
An advantage of load-based side channels is that they do not require any elevated priv-
ileges on the system, as load can be modulated by changing the volume of computations. In
addition, loads can be very easily and finely controlled, with synchronisation being simpler to
achieve, especially when compared to side-channels formed through other mechanisms such
as page-fault rates [OO10].
Finally, one potential source of illicit channels endemic to virtualisation is memory de-
duplication [HPSP10]. Since tenants often have significant portions of their environment in
common, deduplication can tangibly reduce memory consumption, yet it also enables attack-
ers to infer memory contents of their co-located tenants by checking for collisions.
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2.5.3.2 Mitigations
Isolation The most direct way of combating attacks crossing virtual machines is to isolate
each tenant to its own physical machine [LGR13; MSR15; Ris+09]. The principal criticism
against such an approach is that it is, in the general case, wasteful.
As a compromise, a mitigation may opt to periodically isolate different tenants on a tem-
porary basis, yet one must decide when isolation should be employed. For example, a virtual
machine may be temporarily migrated in response to a perceived attack, such as on detecting
suspicious cache activity [Zha+11].
The approach becomes harder to apply when adversarial behaviours are either inad-
equately characterised, or cannot be efficiently detected. One option is to periodically migrate
virtual machines indiscriminately as part of a moving target defence [MSR15]. Using virtual
machine migration and game theory, a fair scheme was developed that denies malicious vir-
tual machines enough time to conduct an attack through continuous migration [Zha+12b].
This scheme considers the scenario where a secret value is split amongst a set of M virtual
machines, each of which privately stores its part of the secret. The original secret value can-
not be inferred from a single virtual machine’s private store, and can only be reconstructed
by combining k machines’ values, k being a constant chosen when the secret was split. Given
that the secret has been split amongstM virtual machines, a malicious virtual machine would
have to compromise k machines2.
To offset the penalty of virtual machine migration, the scheme uses game theory to de-
termine an incentive that is given to tenants that opt into performing a migration. The scheme
relies on a number of assumptions, namely that the migration operations are secure and in-
cur a constant cost, and that the cloud provider has the capacity to hand out the promised
rewards. [Zha+12b]
While periodic migration may obfuscate attacks, a malicious virtual machine may still
be able to predict tenant placement given enough time. From a performance perspective,
migrations should ideally occur infrequently, yet the longer a virtual machine lingers at a
single location, the greater the chances of information leakage. Thus, the system must be
able to determine an optimal interval for migrations which is shorter than the attacker’s
setup time.
Finally, certain high-frequency and high-resolution attacks can be foiled by simply setting
a lower-bound on the minimum scheduling quanta’s size [VRS14]. While this soft isolation
2Secrets are split using Shamir’s secret sharing [Sha79] technique (a threshold scheme). A polynomial f(x) of
degree k − 1 is first defined with random coefficients with the secret to be shared appearing in the polynomial
as the constant term. The polynomial is then evaluated for each integer i ∈ [1,M ], with each virtual machine
i being given the point (i, f(i)). Given k points, one can then reconstruct the polynomial f(x), recovering the
constant term.
30
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
approach does not completely nullify illicit channels, it can greatly diminish the information
content of many incarnations of cross-VM cache attacks.
Hardware partitioning One approach to reducing potential avenues of attack on the virtu-
alisation platform is to make it smaller and use strict hardware partitioning. NoHype [Kel+10]
is an extreme expression of this principle, whereby virtualisation is performed entirely in
hardware, bar the use of a cloud manager to handle administrative tasks for cloud deploy-
ments.
Mediation to resources in NoHype must be done entirely through hardware. For a user
in a cloud setting, hardware is typically limited to cores, main memory, permanent storage
and a network interface. Under NoHype, cores are pinned to virtual machines on initial
bootup, and regions in memory are allocated to virtual machines through partitioning using
hardware assisted paging (such as Extended Page Tables for Intel VT architectures). Devices
such as a network card may be used through virtualised device support, which exposes the
device through multiple, virtual interfaces, or generally via IOMMU support.
NoHype eliminates several classes of cache-level attacks by never allocating fractions of
a CPU to a virtual machine. This is justified by asserting that one core is an insignificant
unit of computational capacity in modern architectures, moreso fractions of a core. A distinct
advantage of this allocation policy is that active attacks on L1 cache are avoided entirely.
The architecture also fends against memory access violations through paging, and page
tables can only be compromised by subverting the cloud manager. Registers are also hidden
as there is no underlying hypervisor executing throughout the virtual machine’s lifetime,
avoiding cross-VM leakages. Side-channel bandwidth is also reduced through private L1
caches, I/O rate limiting and fair access to memory. [Kel+10]
Resource partitioning and limiting communication between virtual machines in a struc-
tured manner is non-trivial. sHype [Sai+05] extends the Xen hypervisor by allowing the
regulation of explicit data flow and limiting covert channel capacity by simplifying resource
management, allowing administrators to define security policies dictating sharing using a
variety of property languages.
Policies in sHype can be defined in terms of individual virtual machines, or named groups
(coalitions) of virtual machines executing at the same security and access levels. These al-
low the definition of Mandatory Access Control (MAC) policies that are translated into refer-
ence monitors, which mediate security-critical operations which may leak information across
virtual machines. For example, MAC can be used to regulate Xen’s inter-machine commu-
nication mechanisms, namely event channels and shared pages. Apart from mediating all
security-critical operations, reference monitors should also be tamper-proof as well as min-
imal, the latter rendering them more amenable to verification. Verification is paramount, as
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MAC domains form part of the Trusted Computing Base (TCB), and constitute a security risk.
Security-critical operations are defined by inserting security enforcement hooks that delin-
eate regions within the hypervisor that allow cross-VM sharing. The use of hooks is guarded
by MAC policies. Hooks are functionally transparent, executing if legal, and failing with an
error code otherwise. In sHype, security enforcement hooks are defined for overt commu-
nication channels [JSS07], namely domain management operations (such as suspending and
migrating virtual machines), inter-domain event channel communication and shared memory
pages.
MAC for sHype may still admit covert channels, as they remain hard to identify and pre-
vent. Thus, policies are extended to include notions of risk with risk flow policies [JSS07].
Assuming that covert communication may only be carried out between concurrently execut-
ing virtual machines, risk flow analysis ensures that virtual machines are never scheduled in
such a way that information may leak. First, one defines the possible overt flows between
entities, followed by potential covert flows. Risk flows are consequently defined as the union
of such flows. Information may cross between flows transitively, restricting schedules based
on which flows have already occurred. Flows may be restricted by labelling conflict sets which
partition virtual machines.
MAC and risk flow allow the definition of various policies. For example, the Chinese wall
security model was formulated as a policy [JSS07], stating that an object can only be read if a
prior object in its permission group has already been read, or if nothing has been read to this
point. This implemented freedom of choice, as the system locks into parts of the policy based
on the initial state chosen. The basic Chinese wall policy does not support unidirectional
flows, and may thus be reformulated as the Aggressive Chinese wall policy, defining conflict
sets for each machine.
In general, Chinese wall policies were found to be too restrictive [JSS07]. An alternative
approach to defining policies that was analysed was the use of the Bell-LaPadua model, which
can be used to define lattice structures allowing information from low-security zones to leak
into higher-security zones, but not vice versa. A shortcoming of this approach is that one
is only able to specify the most limited level of risk. A similar lattice-based policy that was
analysed was the Caernarvon policy, which allows subjects flows within a range of labels
defining lower and upperbounds on segments within a lattice.
The work concluded with three primary observations [JSS07]. Firstly, as risk flow may
span across systems, MAC has to be coordinated between the different participants. Next is
that strict partitioning may hinder a system’s execution by denying applications legitimate
access to resources, an issue which may further be aggravated by the choice and restrictions
of the policy language used. Finally, risk flow policies for a system cannot intersect, as this
would signify that information may leak transitively between partitions.
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Memory partitioning The abundance of attacks that attempt to subvert virtual machine
confinements by targeting memory have led to the development of a number of tailored coun-
termeasures. For example, StealthMem [KPMR12] provides virtual machines with private
memory pages that map uniquely to lines in last level caches (L2/3), thus eliminating the
ability for attackers to force cache collisions. This is achieved by locking a stealth page of
a virtual machine into shared cache, forbidding other virtual machines from paging it out.
Given the principle of cache inertia and predictable cache associativity, modifications to a
cache set can be regulated by restricting access to each index’s pre-image set. A virtual
machine, or a coalition of machines, may then be allocated sole access to colliding pages.
Reserving lines in cache contracts the cache’s size, which will affect performance, and limits
its applicability to L1 caches.
Internally, StealthMem binds physical page tables to cores rather than virtual machines.
Thus, StealthMem must also save and restore stealth pages during vCPU switches, copying
the contents of a stealth page and ensuring that the pinned stealth page’s contents are flushed
out from cache before the next virtual machine is scheduled. Another consequence of hav-
ing stealth pages pinned to cores is that processes will see different stealth page contents
depending on which vCPU they are running. While this may be inconsequential for lookup
tables (for example, AES tables would remain identical to all processes), migration will be
hindered in cases where processes write to the stealth page.
The approach of StealthMem is similar to page colouring [Raj+09], yet the overheads of
the former are significantly smaller than those of the latter, which grow with the number of
virtual machines [KPMR12].
2.5.4 Networks
Most machines form part of a local or a wide-area network, which can serve as a medium
over which illicit channels can be formed. Networks enable remote attacks, whereby a process
on one machine can form a channel with a second on a different machine.
2.5.4.1 Attacks
Illicit network-level channels broadly fall under the category of storage or timing chan-
nels [CBS04]. For example, covert storage channels may hide information in unused packet
header fields or as steganographically obscured data encoded in the payload [HS96]. Chan-
nels based on unused header fields are of questionable reliability, both because they are an
established avenue of attack, as well as the fact that the handling of such fields varies across
routers and network interfaces.
Network timing channels are far more insidious, as they are formed through measuring or
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modulating the order, frequency and timing of packets as they are transmitted [CBS04]. For
example, timing side-channels have been used to infer secret encryption keys [BB03; Ber05].
More recent attacks are also capable of inferring a connection’s internal state and sequence
numbers, and whether a given pair of hosts is communicating over a TCP channel [Cao+16].
Covert channels can also leverage timing information. For example, a packet sorting channel
encodes messages into the order in which packets arrive (the true packet order is defined
by the sequence number in packet headers). The arrival of out-of-order packets is not an
unexpected occurrence under normal operation, thus complicating the detection of such a
side-channel. Similarly, a general timing channel operates by alternating between sending
bursts of traffic (such as a succession of ping operations) and no traffic, and must be detected
through traffic analysis [CBS04].
2.5.4.2 Mitigations
Illicit channels at the network level, while considered dangerous, are susceptible to noise
via traffic congestion and poor quality of service guarantees [CBS04]. Intermediate packet
processing and congestion control procedures, such as batching and caching, alter the timing
properties of a transmission, and degrade a channel. The principle of batching can also be
pursued as an active countermeasure to normalise transmission times [AZM10b; Gor+12].
Note that this will not completely eliminate timing attacks, rather it can be used to lower any
potential channels’ bitrates and render them impractical. Conversely, a traffic normaliser that
sanitises traffic and standardises all unused or redundant fields in headers would completely
eliminate a class of storage channels [CBS04]. Packet sanitisers may also be employed to
remove sensitive data which crosses from high to low security levels.
Network jitter can cause bits to arrive outside of their expected sampling window, intro-
ducing errors and breaking synchronisation. Ultimately, a transmitter must also be able to
communicate the interval times being used, although these may be decided through different
channels. Countermeasures to synchronisation loss include start-of-frame synchronisation
packets sent by the transmitter prior to transmission, and silent intervals with no packet
transfer (particularly during periods of heavy network load). Receivers may apply interval
adjusting by modelling the network conditions under ideal conditions and comparing them
with actual reception times, deriving time offset values and applying them as necessary. Al-
ternatively, the transmitter may attempt to monitor incremental changes in the network and
adjust its speeds based on the feedback loop formed. [CBS04]
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2.6 Conclusion
The key observation of this chapter is that illicit channels are formed between entities through
a shared medium. The position of two entities relative to each other determines the type
of illicit channels that can be formed between them. For example, two processes sharing a
physical core may form a channel over the memory subsystem, whereas processes on separate
machines may form a network-based illicit channel. This leads to the notion of co-location,
where entities are said to be co-located within a medium if they can leverage it to form illicit
channels. A general countermeasure against illicit channels is thus to break co-location, or
isolate the given endpoints from each other. In this regard, isolation means that the endpoints
should no longer share their communication medium.
Isolation within a cloud infrastructure is a scarce commodity due to the cloud’s incentive
for consolidation. Thus, the heavy-handed approach of isolating every tenant to its own ded-
icated machine would be wasteful and uneconomical. Instead, a more nuanced approach to
isolation should be adopted, whereby every medium is addressed using its own interpretation
of isolation. This culminates into the concept of fine-grained isolation, which forms the focus
of the upcoming chapter.
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MODELLING LOCALITY AND MIGRATION
COMPUTATIONS ARE NOT PERFORMED IN THIN AIR, much as though the cloudtries to hide it, and the increased sharing of computational resources elev-
ates the risk of illicit channels. This creates a demand for efficient mechanisms
that can effectively isolate particular computations. Modelling serves to capture the
intricacies of sharing within complex infrastructures, and provides the basis over
which subsequent mitigation strategies can be built.
3.1 Introduction
To devise a comprehensive strategy against illicit channels, one must first derive order and
structure from within the zoo of seemingly disjoint attack and defence techniques.
While the channels’ mechanism of action is perhaps, at first glance, the most obvious
characteristic on which to base a taxonomy of exploits, it is not necessarily the most useful
in the context of attack mitigation. Specifically, grouping by mechanism of action limits the
capacity for abstraction and uniform reasoning. For example, by grouping all timing channels
into a single class of attacks, one is limited in the number of comprehensive mitigations
that can be applied effectively to each member of that class, as each timing channel has its
own intricacies and will generally require its own mitigation. In addition, such a grouping
eliminates all sense of scope, that is it hides the range of the illicit channels, and gives no
indication as to which processes can communicate with which. Conversely, fracturing the
class into an agglomeration of individual illicit channels removes any advantage of grouping,
as each channel will have to be counteracted using a tailored mitigation.
It becomes apparent that an approach based on partitioning and isolation would benefit
from a characterisation of illicit channels that captures scope. This is because hard isolation
will affect all illicit channels at the granularity or medium at which the isolation operation
is procured. To illustrate, while fuzzing a timing channel on a machine may leave a cache-
based attack intact, isolating the offending process to a different machine will break every
machine-wide illicit channel that can be formed with other processes at the origin. This is
not to say that a better understanding of an illicit channel’s behaviour would somehow be
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a detriment. On the contrary, a fuller understanding of the attack surfaces and vectors that
afflict a system enables the directed use of soft isolation, which can serve as an effective, if
less comprehensive, mitigation against specific illicit channels.
As evidenced by Chapter 2, illicit channels can be formed at various granularities and
scopes. More interestingly, the hierarchical nature of modern computer systems and infra-
structures is mirrored by illicit channels, where the scopes of channels appear to be delimited
by common system boundaries. Thus, for example, one finds attacks that can form channels
amongst entities sharing the same core, cache, physical machine or network, amongst other
confinements.
Classifying illicit channels into a hierarchy of scopes is not simply an exercise in taxonomy,
rather it allows the application of two principles during dynamic isolation and reconfigura-
tion, which in this document are termed cascading and reconfiguration minimisation.
Cascading is the notion that isolating a process to break a channel with a wide scope can
also have a knock-down effect and destroy channels with a narrower scope. For ex-
ample, consider the scenario where two virtual machines are sharing a physical ma-
chine. Migrating one of the VMs to a different machine would prevent the formation of
machine-wide illicit channels, and would also remove the risk of cross-VM cache-level
attacks.
Reconfiguration minimisation is a related concept, whereby a mitigation attempts to pro-
vision the smallest amount of isolation necessary in order to break a given channel.
With reference to the previous example, if a system only needs to be protected against
cache-level attacks, then one may opt to only isolate at the cache-level, rather than
attempt to isolate entities at the coarser-grained VM-level and relying on cascading.
Both principles are based on more general concepts of locality. For instance, when procur-
ing isolation at runtime using migration, one finds that the performance impact of migration
grows with the size of the structure being migrated, as well as the distance between the source
and destination. The full effects of this phenomenon will be quantified in Chapter 4, yet even
intuitively, one would for example expect a virtual machine migration from one machine to
another to take longer than repinning a process to a different core on the same machine, as
this would require a larger state transfer over a greater distance. In this regard, the principle
of reconfiguration minimisation would be to keep migrations as local as possible. Note that
minimisation must be taken within the context of the entire system. Specifically, it may tran-
spire that several locally-scoped reconfigurations can be subsumed by a single migration at a
higher level with cascaded effects, and that the latter will have a lower performance impact
on the system than executing each of the former reconfigurations individually. As will be
seen in this chapter, not all isolation operations have a cascading effect, as this depends on
38
CHAPTER 3. MODELLING LOCALITY AND MIGRATION
the relative positions of the endpoints of the channel in question. Thus, for example, isolat-
ing a virtual machine will still preserve the internal process structure, meaning that an illicit
channel formed between processes within the virtual machine cam be reconstructed at the
destination if the channel’s medium lies within the machine.
Reasoning about isolation and dynamic reconfiguration is non-trivial, particularly when
considering modern systems of networked machines. This chapter explores the development
of a holistic model of locality and isolation that describes the movement and isolation of
computations within hierarchical systems. This model serves to rigorously define co-location,
which is a pre-requisite for the construction of illicit channels defined by the channels’ scope,
as well as formalise the use of migration to reconfigure systems dynamically in order to
provide a requested level of isolation.
Several additional demands must be fulfilled by the model for it to be considered holistic
with respect to its ability to represent the attacks and mitigations explored in the previous
chapter. First, it must be able to express the fundamental notions of confinement and locality
sharing, which serve to define whether or not a given computation is isolated relative to
other entities within the system. This must allow both soft and hard isolations to be handled
uniformly. In addition, so as to correctly reflect the hierarchical nature of modern systems, it
must also be capable of expressing nested confinements.
As scheduling and placement play a central role in co-location, the model must be able to
describe both temporal as well as spatial aspects of a system. Another aspect addressed by
the model is the notion of partial specification, where entities within a system (such as tenants
on a cloud) only have a partial view of their environment, and must be able to delegate their
isolation requirements to external entities.
The ability to simultaneously model different parts of a system using different granular-
ities can lead to an improvement in hardware utilisation, as fewer resources are committed
to providing isolation guarantees. Being able to compare the cost of maintaining different
isolation levels also allows resource allocation to be optimised dynamically, further improv-
ing utilisation. Apart from being quantifiable, the cost of maintaining isolations must be
attributable, particularly in the case of cloud computing.
Chapter Outline
This chapter is structured as follows:
Section 3.2 defines the fundamental notions of confinement, containment and co-location,
with which illicit channels can be described.
Section 3.3 describes how agents can be used to dynamically manipulate a system model,
reconfiguring a system using local and global migration operations.
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Section 3.4 explores different ways in which a model of a system can be analysed and eval-
uated.
Section 3.5 defines the considerations that must be made when choosing the subjects and
targets of migration operations.
Section 3.6 demonstrates the model’s application to the modelling of several illicit channels
and channel mitigations.
Section 3.7 concludes this chapter.
3.2 A Hierarchy of Isolation
Modern computer architectures consist of a multitude of logical and physical environments.
For example, an operating system is an environment which controls the physical resources
that have been assigned to it. The resources comprising an environment may be further
sub-divided into constituent groups of finer-grained environments, forming a hierarchy. Ex-
panding on the previous example, an operating system generally contains several process
environments that it manages and schedules.
A fundamental task in security is to enforce boundaries on environments, regulating ac-
cess to their underlying resources. This is done through a variety of mechanisms, such as
memory protection and context switching. Thus, environments also serve as confinements,
with different environments placing restrictions on access to their internals. Alternatively,
they can be seen as isolations, with the effects occurring in one being invisible to the other.
3.2.1 Confinement and Containment
The fundamental unit of computation and boundary delineation in this work is the confine-
ment, defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Confinement). A confinement (equivalently, isolation or locality) denotes a
boundary within which a number of sub-confinements exist. A confinement of type Γ with a
name N and capability set C containing a set of sub-confinements SB is denoted as Γ:N(C) [SB].
A confinement’s name is typically dictated by its type, and serves to identify it from
amongst its siblings. It is assumed that confinements can be uniquely identified by their
name. In the case of conflicts and duplicate names, one can either associate a generated
unique identifier to the confinements through an additional preprocessing step, or differenti-
ate between confinements using the prefix of containments leading to them.
Capabilities are used to limit how confinements can interact and modify each other, as
will be seen in Section 3.3.1. The capability set can be omitted when it is empty.
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The notion of confinement automatically entails one of containment, where a confinement
X contains Y when Y is a sub-confinement of X. Since Y is itself a confinement, this enables
the representation of hierarchical containment. For example, processes execute within the
confines of a CPU, and multiple CPUs are confined to a single machine, which can itself form
part of a network.
Definition 2 (Containment). A confinement X is contained within a confinement Γ:D(C) [SB]
if X ∈ SB. This is denoted as X∈D.
Illicit channels exploit the fact that certain confinements are imperfect, and do not keep
their sub-confinements completely isolated from each other. An illicit channel is thus formed
when members of a confinement can communicate with each other over an unregulated me-
dium. Thus, imperfect confinements can be seen as introducing locality, where confinements
that should theoretically be disjoint are connected through a channel exploiting some char-
acteristic of their parent confinement. The principle of containment can thus be extended to
express co-location, which is defined as follows.
Definition 3 (Co-Location). X is said to be co-located with Y through D, written as X D←→ Y, if
X∈D ∧ Y∈D.
The state leaked within a confinement can potentially be observed both by its direct sub-
confinements as well as their members. For example, a thread confinement running within a
process confinement may communicate with another thread via the process’ parent operating
system. This is expressed through an extension of the basic co-location and containment
predicates, in the form of the nested containment and nested co-location predicates, which are
defined as follows.
Definition 4 (Nested Containment). A confinement X is recursively contained, or nested,
within a confinement D (denoted as X∈+ D) if it is contained within any of its sub-members,
that is, X∈+ D def= X∈D ∨ ∃D′ ∈D. X∈+ D′.
Definition 5 (Nested Co-Location). A confinement X is recursively co-located with Y via a
confinement D (denoted by X D⇐⇒ Y) if they share a common ancestor. This can be expressed
formally as X D⇐⇒ Y def= X∈+ D ∧ Y∈+ D.
Together, these predicates can be used to model various architectures and attack scen-
arios. The following is a simple example of how one can model a cache hierarchy, and how
co-location would manifest itself in such a model.
Example 2 (Parallel Execution). Consider a CPU package with two cores (C) sharing an
L3 cache, with each core having its own L1 and L2 cache. Moreover, each core employs
simultaneous multithreading (SMT) (or hyperthreading, in the case of Intel machines) and
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exposes two hardware threads, which share a given core’s L1 and L2 caches. This can be
modelled as:
CPU def= L3:0 [L2:0 [L1:0 [C:0 [] ,C:1 []]] ,L2:1 [L1:0 [C:2 [] ,C:3 []]]]
Figure 2.1 illustrates the nesting of confinements specified by CPU. Two processes X and
Y can be susceptible to an attack via an L1 cache [OST06] if
∃L1:L∈+ CPU. X L⇐⇒ Y
or via the L3 cache [Zha+14] if
∃L3:L∈+ CPU. X L⇐⇒ Y
For the given hierarchy, the latter will hold whenever processes execute simultaneously.
Note that while the physical proximity between an attacker and victim (or equivalently,
the depth at which the two entities appear within the model) can determine the feasibility
of a channel [Gur+14; Gur+15], it does not necessarily imply that an illicit channel’s useful
bandwidth will be higher. That is, while processes that are closer to each other can generally
communicate at a faster rate or perform more events per unit time than others that are further
away (for example, processes sharing a cache interact with their shared resource at a higher
frequency than if they were co-located through a network) [Gli93], not every interaction
carries information relevant to the channel.
3.2.1.1 Modelling Soft and Hard Isolation
Soft and hard isolation are represented within the model in an identical fashion, namely as
a confinement following the specification given in Definition 2. The nature of the isolation
provided by a confinement is indicated by the confinement’s type, with no explicit mention
as to whether the confinement implements soft or hard isolation. Instead, the distinction
appears when considering a confinement’s semantics and behaviour during a hierarchy’s life-
time.
Table 3.1 lists a number of confinement types that can be used to provide hard isolation at
various system granularities, along with their common unique identifiers. The confinement
model places no restrictions on the types of sub-confinements, which allows the description
of partial specifications and incomplete system hierarchies. In practice, it follows that certain
containment patterns do not occur, and that the presence of certain confinements imply the
existence of a parent of a specific type. For example, a virtual CPU (vC) confinement would
imply the existence of a VM to which it belongs. To that end, the table also lists the common
types of sub-confinements that each confinement type can typically accept in a fully-specified
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Type Description Identifier Can Contain
Net Network Network ID Net, M
M Machine IP/Hostname L3, OS
L3 L3 Cache Index L2
L2 L2 Cache Index L1
L1 L1 Cache Index C
C Physical core Index vC, PE, Con, VM
Table 3.1: Examples of hard isolations, and their containments.
Type Description Identifier Can Contain
VM Virtual machine VM name/UUID vC, OS
vC Virtual CPU VCPU ID vC, PE, Con, VM
Con Container Container name/UUID P
PE Control group Group name Con, P
P Process Process ID (PID) -
OS Operating System Hostname PE, Con, VM
Table 3.2: Examples of soft isolations, and their containments.
hierarchy. Note that M and C also admit the containment of several types of soft isolation
confinements, such as processes and virtual machines.
Table 3.2 tabulates the set of soft isolation confinements with which this work is primarily
concerned. These types, in combination with the hard isolation types defined in Table 3.1,
form the core components of the systems for which the overall mitigation approach is de-
signed, and serve as the fundamental building blocks for a cloud-based deployment scenario.
Note that hardware can be partitioned into finer granularities. For example, as will be seen
in Section 3.6.2, one can further decompose monolithic cache confinements into their finer
constituent cache sets. Nevertheless, the hierarchy as described is sufficient to model the
principal actors within a network of machines, and additional confinement layers and parti-
tionings such as software-defined networks or subnets can easily be incorporated by extend-
ing the type hierarchy. Conversely, the hierarchy can be simplified by restricting analysis to
the coarser-grained virtual machine level, reverting to the more traditional and less nuanced
approaches to isolation.
Predictably, the hard isolation confinements listed in Table 3.1 are predominantly rigid
architectural elements such as caches and networks, which, while offering some degree of
configuration, exist at fixed locations in relation to each other. Conversely, the soft isolations
described in Table 3.2 are dynamic, and can be created, destroyed, or in some cases, moved.
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3.3 Migration and Reconfiguration
The ultimate aim of the model is to be able to model the dynamic elimination of co-location
between confined entities. This requires the ability to model the modification of containment
hierarchies through operations enabling the creation, destruction and migration of confine-
ments. The latter is modelled as moving an isolation from one containment to another. The
implementation of these operations varies based on the isolations involved, and may require
a series of compound actions that incur multiple changes at different parts of the hierarchy.
3.3.1 Agents
Changes to the hierarchy are effected by agent processes. Agents represent scheduling com-
ponents that manage confinements. For example, an operating system’s process scheduler
can be modelled as an agent confinement that regulates movements between an idle queue
and core confinements. Agents are represented within the model as extended confinements,
and are defined as follows.
Definition 6 (Agent). An agent is a confinement A:N(CAG)→T [Q], where A denotes an agent
type, N is the agent’s name, T is a set of confinements visible to the agent, CAG is its cap-
ability set, → ⊆ T × T is a mapping defining legal containments, and Q is a queue of idle
confinements.
Agent confinements serve to make the scheduling aspects of a system explicit. While
agents are given the abstract agent type A, they can be implemented in a variety of ways.
For example, as will be seen in Section 4.4, an agent can be implemented as a user-level
process that issues scheduling commands to the underlying operating system environment.
Similarly, an agent can be an externalised representation of a scheduling procedure that is
embedded within a larger system. For example, an agent can serve to expose the behaviour
of an operating system’s scheduler, allowing its semantics to be incorporated into the model.
Agents may also be embedded at different levels of a hierarchy. For example, a network
domain controller or router can be modelled as an agent embedded within the network’s
hardware layer.
The set of confinements T contains a subset of the confinements that constitute the hier-
archy being modelled. While this could theoretically be fixed as the universal set of possible
confinements, it is assumed that T is the set of legal confinements with which an agent can
interact.
An agent’s control over its set of known confinements T is limited through a system of
capabilities. An agent can create, destroy or migrate a confinement if it shares a capability
with the confinements involved. This gives rise to the following notion of capability checking.
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Definition 7 (Capability set comparison). Two confinements with capability sets A and B can
interact if their capability sets intersect, that is, if A e B is true, where A e B def= A ∩ B 6= ∅.
Capabilities serve to describe the extent of an agent’s influence, being restricted to the
capabilities denoted by CAG. The task of checking capabilities is intentionally kept abstract,
as the actual authorisation operation varies depending on the confinements involved. For
example, within a single operating system, a root password can serve as a single capability
that allows all of its sub-confinements to be managed. Other mechanisms include certificates,
user groups, and policies defined via polkit (as is done in the case of virtual-machine man-
agement using libvirt [Lib]). The concept of a capability set is used, rather than simply
using the confinement name as a capability (as in the case of mobile ambients [CG98]), as it
separates the identification aspect of a confinement from its control and policy mechanisms.
In addition, the use of a set more closely reflects the principle that there are multiple and
different control mechanisms present in a complex system. Mutability is not modelled as an
intrinsic property of a confinement, rather it is determined by the availability of a confine-
ment’s capability to agents.
The relation → specifies the containments that are allowed by the agent’s scheduling
policy. This is used during analysis when determining potential co-locations between con-
finements. Pairs in the mapping are of the form 〈X,D〉, which represents that a confinement
X can be contained by a parent confinement D.
Finally, the idle queue Q is a set of confinements that are controlled by the agent, and
that have been temporarily removed from the active parts of a hierarchy during the system’s
execution. The idle queue effectively functions as a limbo, or holding area, for confinements
that are not executing. For example, an agent representing a process scheduler would transfer
processes between C confinements and its idle queue, placing the active processes within the
former and confining the idle processes in the latter.
3.3.1.1 Probes
A probe is an abstraction of an event source. This is modelled as a confinement, and is
effectively an agent that lacks migration capabilities.
3.3.2 Communication and Scoping
For any non-trivial hierarchy of confinements, it is generally the case that no one confinement
will have complete knowledge of the topology of which it forms part. Consequently, an agent
will only have a partial view of a system.
Consider the simplified cloud infrastructure illustrated in Figure 3.1, which consists of
a minimal model of a single node MACHINE with two cores, over which two tenant virtual
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VM:1
vC:V1
A:TA1
M:MACHINE
C:C1
vC:V0A:HYP
C:C0
vC:V1
VM:0
vC:V0
A:TA0
Figure 3.1: Partial model showing agent scopes and boundaries.
machines are executing. In this model, each VM has an agent TA0 and TA1 running within
it, while the infrastructure provider has an agent HYP running on the base system.
The virtualisation confinements within MACHINE prevent the tenants’ agents from enu-
merating their parent confinements through standard operating system interfaces. In addi-
tion, even if the details of the parent confinements can somehow be inferred (for instance,
through illicit channels), the tenants’ agents would not have the necessary capabilities to
alter them directly. For instance, mere knowledge of the existence of additional co-located
tenants would not automatically grant a tenant’s agents control over them.
Thus, in this scenario, the constituents of each virtual machine are hidden from the en-
tities, or agents, outside of their boundaries. For a given agent to have full knowledge and
control over the entire hierarchy, it would have to collude with the other agents. Unanimous
collaboration between rational agents would be unreasonable in the case of a public cloud,
since
i) tenants are adversaries (or at the very least, mutually-distrusting neighbours) that will
not willingly disclose their internal state,
ii) the cloud provider will not advertise details regarding its infrastructure due to the as-
sociated security risks, as well as a general lack of incentive, and
iii) tenants would not willingly expose their internal state to a cloud, and suspicions that
a cloud provider is performing introspection [DG+13] will quickly lead to the tenants’
confidence in the platform being undermined.
Collusion would thus be limited to cases where multiple virtual machines are owned by
the same tenant, or when a virtual machine is compromised and is intentionally attempting
to leak data to an outside entity.
While a tenant agent may be unaware of its parent environment’s confinements, the con-
verse does not hold. Containment relationships crossing a boundary still require that the
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sub-confinement be exposed to its parent. For example, while tenants in Figure 3.1 might
not know the number of physical cores that are available on the machine, the hypervisor
must have a handle to the tenants’ vC structures in order to manage their core pinnings.
Furthermore, the agent’s position within a hierarchy also determines its view of a confine-
ment, and can alter its observed type, particularly in the case of confinements on the fringes
of an agent’s scope. For example, vC confinements managed by HYP are seen as Cs by pro-
cesses within the tenants’ VMs. Thus, isolation requests across scopes must be accompanied
by a mechanism to rename confinements. Confinement renaming is not always straightfor-
ward, as evidenced by the migration of processes, which have a significant amount of state
dispersed within their parent OS confinement that has to be translated on migration. For in-
stance, a process’ PID may have to be changed on migrating to a new OS environment [Cri],
which would alter its internal system view. A prevalent workaround is to employ namespace
mechanisms, commonly in conjunction with containers [Lib], to encapsulate structures such
as PIDs and network interfaces and separate them from the common namespace of the base
OS. This ensures that a migrated process’ structures remain internally consistent.
When migrating a confinement, an agent must be able to access both the source and
destination confinement. Scoping complicates migration, as these confinements may lie out-
side of the original agent’s control. For example, consider the case where an agent on one
machine is attempting to migrate a virtual machine onto another physical machine. In this
scenario, the agent would require control over the target. One option would be to tempor-
arily transfer a capability over the destination to the agent performing the migration, yet
this would pose a security risk. Instead, to exert influence on locations outside its scope, an
agent must proxy its requests through an external agent that controls the target scope. Using
the previous example, rather than allowing the initiating agent to directly control the virtual
machine’s receiving endpoint at the destination, the agent forwards a migration request to
the destination’s controlling agent. The receiving agent then proceeds in creating the des-
tination’s virtual machine process whilst retaining control over the new virtual machine. By
approaching the problem of migration in terms of provisioning isolation and regulating mi-
grations crossing control boundaries at the agent level, one simplifies the secure and reliable
management of capabilities and allows for the modelling of restrictive sharing policies.
3.3.3 Scheduling
Agents are scheduling manifest, modelling the execution and placement of confinements. An
agent may perform two fundamental forms of scheduling, namely it can
i) transfer confinements directly between confinements that it controls and its idle queue,
giving rise to local scheduling, and
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L-SC
A:AG(CAG)→T [Q ∪ {X}]
Γ:N(C) [SB] AG ≡ X y N.AG’ CAG e C CAG e cap(X) (X,N) ∈→
A:AG’(CAG)→T [Q] Γ:N(C) [SB ∪ {X}]
L-DS
A:AG(CAG)→T [Q]
Γ:N(C) [SB ∪ {X}] AG ≡ X y AG.AG’ CAG e C CAG e cap(X)
A:AG’(CAG)→T [Q ∪ {X}] Γ:N(C) [SB]
Figure 3.2: Local migration rules.
ii) migrate a confinement to a different part of the containment hierarchy that is managed
by another agent, leading to global scheduling.
Local migration limits the pool of targets to which an agent can schedule a confinement
to its set of known confinements, assuming that it also owns the corresponding capabilities.
On migrating a confinement globally, one changes the set of potential parent confinements
to those that are owned by the destination’s agent and allowed by its containment mapping
→.
The following is a description of the two forms of scheduling, as well as a definition of a
hierarchy’s configuration, or state at a given point in time.
3.3.3.1 Local Scheduling
Local scheduling moves a confinement between an agent’s idle queue and a target confine-
ment via the local-schedule (L-SC) and local-deschedule (L-DS) rules, the general forms of
which are defined in Figure 3.2.
The local-schedule rule describes the movement of a confinement X from within an agent
AG’s idle queue to a confinement N, triggered on the issue of a migration instruction (X y N)
that moves X from its idle queue to the target locality N. For the local-schedule to execute,
the agent must share capabilities with the target confinement, as well as the confinement
being moved. This is represented using the capability comparison operator (Definition 7)
on CAG and the capability set C, as well as the capability set of X. The latter is represented
using the helper function cap() that returns a given confinement’s capability set, that is,
cap(Γ:N(C) [Sb]) → C. Finally, the rule checks that the allocation is permitted (as defined
by →). Given that all the conditions have been met, the confinement X becomes a sub-
confinement of N.
The local-deschedule operation is similar, with the key difference that the confinement in
question (X) is moved from a confinement within the locally-scoped containment hierarchy
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back into the agent’s idle queue.
Confinement creation and destruction can be modelled as the addition and removal of
confinements from an agent’s idle queue, respectively. The destruction of non-idle confine-
ments would thus have to be preceded by a local-deschedule operation. Modelling destruc-
tion in this manner avoids having to assign a different set of semantics for rendering a con-
finement inactive due to destruction or suspension.
Creation and destruction would generally be reserved for soft isolations, as hard isolations
are normally fixed confinements dictated by hardware. While hardware confinements such
as caches are not typically disabled at runtime, an agent may nevertheless want to delete
their representation from the model if it is certain that the threat of a channel through that
confinement has been neutralised.
In theory, one could model the deployment of soft isolation techniques for separating
a given set of confinements as the destruction of the parent confinement through which
they are co-located. In reality, soft isolation techniques are generally imperfect, and can
themselves introduce information leaks. For example, a work-conserving scheduling policy
may reveal details such as the number of processes co-located with an attacker. Instead, soft
isolations should be modelled as the creation of a new confinement, the existence of which
depends on a separate set of conditions holding, as will be seen shortly.
Example 3 (Round Robin Scheduler). Consider the CPU hierarchy defined in Example 2.
An agent implementing a simple round-robin scheduler with a shared run queue can be
defined as A:RR(CAG)→T [Q], where Q contains an ordered list of processes, and→ defines the
allowed mapping of processes to physical cores. The default behaviour is to map all processes
to all available cores, giving → def= {(X, Y) | X ∈ Q ∧ Y = C:N(C) [SB] ∧ Y∈+ CPU}. Given
that ↑()→ is a function that returns the allowed parent containments within which a given
confinement can be placed, that is, ↑(X)→ def= {Y | (X, Y) ∈→}, the scheduler can be defined
as a CSP-like process as follows:
RRQ([P | PS] , CA, CF) ≡
C:X∈↑(P)→∩CFu P y X.RRQ(PS, CA, CF \ {X}) u
P:P’∈C:Y∈ CAu P’ y rr.RRQ(PS | [P’] , CA, CF ∪ {Y})
where CA is the set of all cores being managed by the scheduler, [P | PS] is an ordered list of
processes with P as its head and PS as its tail, and CF is the set of idle cores. The process
would thus be initialised as RRQ(Q, CS, CS), where CS =
{
X | C:X∈+ CPU}.
Next, consider the scenario where a security-sensitive process S is added to Q. If the
process is susceptible to a cache-level synchronous attack [OST06], then one must avoid
co-locating S with other processes during its execution. As formulated, the scheduler will
execute processes in the order specified by the idle queue, but processes can be descheduled
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pre-emptively at will, meaning that every other process can potentially execute in parallel
with S. Forcing processes to execute for an equal and fixed time-slice will cause S to poten-
tially be co-scheduled with the |CS| − 1 processes that appear before and after it in the idle
queue. Finally, changing → to ensure that S always executes by itself will prevent spatial
co-location, at the cost of underutilised hardware. As a compromise, → can be varied dy-
namically, with the number of processes that can share cores growing proportionately to the
time elapsed since the last scheduling of S.
3.3.3.2 Configurations
Reasoning about temporal locality requires the ability to describe how a model evolves from
one configuration to the next, where a configuration is defined as a set of confinements de-
scribing a snapshot of the system as a given point in time. The evolution of a configuration is
determined by the agents it contains. The presence of multiple agent and varying scheduling
policies mean that, in general, there is more than one legal next configuration. This leads to
the notion of a next(C) function, which returns the set of possible configurations that can
be reached from a configuration C through a single application of a local schedule or des-
chedule operation (Figure 3.2). This is extended to the iterated next configuration function
nextn(C), which returns the set of configurations reachable from C in n steps, defined as
follows:
next0(C) def= {C}
nextn(C) def=
{
nextn−1(C′) | C′ ∈ next(C)
}
Finally, the configuration combination operator nextn∪(C) is defined as:
nextn∪(C) def=
{
Γ:N(C) [SB] | Γ:N(C) [SB′]∈+ CFS}
where SB def=
⋃{
SB′′ | Γ:N(C) [SB′′]∈+ CFS}
and CFS def=
⋃ ⋃
0≤i≤n
nexti(C)
This effectively performs a union of every possible configuration reachable within n local
scheduling operations, including intermediate configurations. The result is a graph that
shows every containment combination attainable in a set sequence of steps. This can be
used to represent a system’s temporal behaviour as a static spatial graph. A related graph
can be achieved by combining each agent’s containment mapping, giving a graph of potential
containments, yet this would over-approximate containments, as a scheduling policy may opt
to only use a subset of mappings available to it.
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L3:0
L2:1
L1:1
C:3C:2
P:SC
L2:0
L1:0
C:1
P:S
C:0
(a) No isolation at L1
L3:0
L2:1
L1:1
C:3C:2
L2:0
L1:0
C:1
P:SC
L1S:MITC
P:CLEAN
C:0
P:S
L1S:MIT
(b) Creation of L1S via soft isolation
Figure 3.3: Cache-level co-location and mitigation via soft isolation, with arrows denoting
containment.
3.3.3.3 Isolation using Local Scheduling
Soft isolation can be obtained in a number of ways, often by using some form of normaliser.
In this scenario, a normaliser is a process or procedure that, through its execution, produces
a new confinement that exposes less information than its non-normalised counterpart. For
example, normalisers can reduce the information content of a side-channel that observes
triggering times of several mechanisms, such as packet delivery times [Gor+12] and hard
disk usage.
Both soft and hard isolations are represented as confinements (Section 3.2.1.1). Schedul-
ing a confinement into a soft isolation confinement would imply that the conditions for that
confinement to exist must hold. For example, by never co-scheduling processes, one creates
a mutually-exclusive containment at the cache level. This allows a dynamic scheduling policy
to be treated as a static guarded resource, simplifying the representation.
Example 4 (Round Robin Scheduler, revisited). In Example 3, co-location with a security-
sensitive process S was only considered with respect to a single moment in time, yet an
access-based cache-level side channel’s effects persist beyond a process’ execution [OST06]
until the security-sensitive memory blocks have been flushed. Thus, simply disabling co-
scheduling during S’s execution would not be sufficient to break the channel reliably.
The duration of the residual effects of caches is independent of real time, and is de-
termined by cache evictions. For the pre-emptive round robin scheduler described earlier,
the position of S in the idle queue relative to an attacker process will generally affect the
illicit channel’s quality, as the probability that S’s sensitive cache blocks become clobbered
increases with the number of processes that execute in the interim. If cache eviction patterns
and process quanta are irregular, or if a fully pre-emptive scheduling policy is used, then each
core in next∞∪ ({CPU}) will contain Q.
Residual effects can be explicitly removed through a cache-cleaning process [ZR13] that
invalidates cache blocks, masking their timing variations. The process (henceforth referred
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to as CLEAN) must execute after each de-scheduling of S. Any process using the same cache
that executes concurrently with S can potentially infer the timing state up to the point of
CLEAN’s completion. Thus, one must place an additional restriction on concurrent execution.
If these two conditions can be guaranteed as invariants, then the cache has effectively been
partitioned into two sub-confinements of type L1S (a soft-isolated L1), transforming the
hierarchy described in Figure 3.3a to that illustrated by Figure 3.3b (for simplicity, S is pinned
to C:0). The partitioning serves to isolate the process S from the other processes SC (the
latter being the complement of S). Note that the processes remain co-located within L1:0, as
they are still ultimately sharing hardware locality. If the soft isolation is deemed perfect, then
the L1 confinement can be destroyed. Removing CLEAN would lead to the partitions being
destroyed, and the L1:0 confinement being recreated.
3.3.3.4 Global Scheduling
Local scheduling limits an agent in its ability to procure isolation, as it can only move entities
amongst confinements that are under its direct control. An agent can be supported by addi-
tional agents external to its scope in two ways. First, an external agent can provide isolation
guarantees on the parents of confinements that are being managed by an agent. For example,
if an agent running within a virtual machine requires a hard isolation guarantee that a pro-
cess executes alone on a core, then it must query an agent in the underlying hypervisor’s
scope to ensure that the vC confinement is placed in a dedicated C confinement.
Secondly, an external agent serves to extend the pool of available confinements, allow-
ing confinements to be migrated to a different scope. Building on the previous example, the
hypervisor agent can migrate vC confinements amongst cores until an isolated core is pro-
visioned. If the agent finds that all of its resources are committed, it can query additional
external agents for isolations on different machines.
Migrating from one agent’s scope to the next leads to the notion of global scheduling.
Broadly, global scheduling involves two steps, namely
i) identifying a target agent which can procure the required level of isolation, and
ii) migrating the confinements required to achieve isolation.
Global migration changes a confinement’s place within a hierarchy by placing it under
another agent’s control and modifying its mapping rules. Consequently, migration changes a
system’s infinite configuration next∞∪ ().
Figure 3.4 defines the general rule for migrating a confinement X globally. The source
agent SRC initiates a migration request to a destination agent DST with an isolation criterion
isol(), which DST attempts to match against its known and controllable confinements. Fol-
lowing the migration, each agent updates its containment mapping rules, with SRC removing
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G-SC
A:SRC(CSRC)→SRCTS [QSrc ∪ {X}] A:DST(CDST)→DSTTD [QDst]
DST∈ TS SRC ≡ X isol()y DST.SRC ’ D∈+ {D’ | D’ ∈ TD}
CSRC e CDST CSRC e cap(X) CDST e cap(D) isol(X,D)
A:SRC ’(CSRC)→SRC′TS\{X} [QSrc] →SRC′≡→SRC \ {(X, Y) | (X, Y) ∈→SRC}
A:DST(CDST)→DST′TD∪{X} [QDst ∪ {X}] →DST′≡→DST ∪{(X,D)}
Figure 3.4: Global migration rule.
the associated mappings, and DST adding a rule for X’s allowed containments. The source
and destination agents can be the same, allowing confinements to be created, destroyed, or
simply remapped. The rule can be modified so that X is assigned multiple potential parent
confinements at its destination. This allows a confinement to maintain the same number
of allocated resources across migrations, for instance, it would allow a virtual machine to
preserve its ratio and mapping of virtual CPUs to physical CPUs at the destination.
As will be seen in Chapter 4, global migration is implemented through a variety differ-
ent mechanisms, the choice of which depends on the containment level being considered,
as well as the position of the agent relative to the confinements being migrated. The choice
of migration approach affects the performance impact of reconfiguration, due to varying
amount of state that will have to be moved about. As a general rule, reconfiguration costs
can be minimised by favouring migrations between nearby confinements over migrations to
distant destinations. This is also affected by the confinements’ depth within the hierarchy.
Conversely, it may occasionally prove to be advantages to perform multiple local reconfig-
urations over a single large migration, particularly in the case of cascaded confinements. In
addition, other factors such as data locality within a data centre can serve to restrict the set
of viable destinations that a confinement may have.
Agent discovery varies depending on the confinement level being considered, but it gen-
erally involves mapping an agent’s identifier to its actual address. Discovery mechanisms
include broadcasts, distributed keystores and centralised repositories. Each method has its
own drawbacks in query time and consistency. Depending on the frequency of agent dis-
covery operations and actual migrations, one may also consider propagating notifications
of topology changes down a hierarchy following a migration, with lower-level agents sub-
scribing to their parent agents and receiving notifications whenever their scopes have been
altered. The difficulty then lies in the choice of communication interfaces that are made
available to sub-confinements. For example, while logics such as the cloud calculus [Jar+12]
make use of a parent() operator, which returns a handle to a confinement’s parent, such a
predicate is not generally available out of the box. On the contrary, there are several cases
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OS:BASE
C:1 C:2C:0 C:3
PE:ALL
P:S A:AT P:SC
(a) Bare metal
OS:BASE
C:1 C:2C:0 C:3
PE:ALL VM:VM
vC:0 vC:1
P:PS A:HYP
OS:GUEST
PE:ALLPE:SEC
P:S A:AT P:SC
(b) Single-Layer Virtualisation
Figure 3.5: Introducing indirection through virtualisation.
where the parent confinement maintains an active effort to fully encapsulate its child confine-
ments and remain transparent. This is particularly evident in the case of virtualisation, where
the virtualisation platform generally limits direct interaction from its guest virtual machines
to a set of defined drivers, and makes a conscious effort to provide guests with the illusion
that they are running directly on the underlying hardware. As will be seen in Section 5.2.3,
this problem can be overcome through the creation of additional explicit interfaces through
which an agent within the guest virtual machine can pass up requests to a hypervisor-level
agent.
As a confinement may potentially be migrated across hostile boundaries, additional meas-
ures must be adopted to secure communications between the endpoints of an implementation
of the system.
3.3.3.5 Isolation Constraints
A consequence of agent scoping is that changes to external confinements need to be delegated
to an agent. In addition, operations that modify the hierarchy cannot directly refer to specific
external confinements, both due to scoping and security reasons.
Consider a simple isolation condition isolP(), which checks whether a process exists by
itself in a C environment, defined as follows:
isolP(P:X,C:D) def= ¬∃P:Y∈+ D. X 6= Y
The evaluation of isolP() varies based on the underlying system assumptions. Fig-
ure 3.5a illustrates a partial next∞∪ () graph of the CPU hierarchy from the perspective of
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OS:BASE
C:1 C:2C:0 C:3
PE:ALL VM:VM
vC:0 vC:1
vC:0 vC:1
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OS:GUEST
PE:SEC PE:ALL
P:S A:AT P:SC
Figure 3.6: Nested virtualisation (two layers).
an agent running within a virtualised environment (or equivalently, a non-virtualised, bare-
metal environment). In this case, for D quantified over all visible confinements, isolP(S,D)
will fail (return false) due to processes sharing a process control group ALL. To comply with
the isolation requirement, processes must be partitioned into two process groups contained
in disjoint sets of cores.
Subsequently adding a virtualisation layer produces the containment tree shown in Fig-
ure 3.5b. If multiple VMs execute in parallel, then the isolP() predicate may fail. Thus, the
hypervisor agent HYP must be queried to ensure that cores are allocated exclusively to the vC
containing S. Given that X 7→ X’ renames a confinement X into a locally-scoped confinement
X’, a second isolation condition isolvC() is defined and sent to HYP, where:
isolvC(C:X,C:D) def= X 7→ vC:X’ ∧ ¬∃vC:Y∈D. X’ 6= Y ∧ X’ D⇐⇒ Y
In this case, D is a free variable which must be bound by HYP. As described in the previ-
ous section, the C confinement must be renamed to a structure visible to HYP, namely X’. As
virtualisation and containments can potentially be nested to an arbitrary depth (Figure 3.6),
the isolvC() isolation request must be pushed upwards in the hierarchy, until the base con-
finement is reached. This ensures that the intermediate levels of indirection do not lead to
co-locations. While the use of nested virtual machines might not currently be widespread,
the growing adoption of containers may increase the occurrence of such topologies.
Finally, an isolation request may place additional constraints on co-location. For example,
tenants may request that VMs can only be co-located on a machine if they are all owned
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by the same tenant. Given that X is the tenant’s machine from its scope, and D is the base
machine, this can be expressed as:
isolVM(M:X,M:D) def= X 7→ VM:X’∧¬∃VM:Y∈D. X’ D⇐⇒ Y∧
tenant(X’) 6= tenant(Y)
3.4 Cost Functions and Metrics
Different configurations vary in the degree of isolation that they offer and the cost required to
maintain them. The ability to quantify these factors is essential to the process of provisioning
isolation, as it allows configurations to be compared, and enables allocations to be optimised.
Cost can be expressed with respect to different resource types, including power consumption
and computational costs, yet these can often be derived from the more general measurement
of utilisation.
When comparing system hierarchies containing long-lived processes, one must consider
the cost of maintaining a configuration over time, rather than simply comparing a system’s
instantaneous configuration. Thus, accurate measurements of costs should be evaluated over
the next∞∪ () of a given hierarchy.
What constitutes cost depends on the isolation approach being used. For example, while
the upkeep cost of a soft isolation technique may be represented by its overhead, or the com-
puting capacity committed to the active process that is preserving the isolation, the cost of
hard isolation is that it can lead to unused computational capacity. The impact of unused
capacity, especially in the context of cloud computing, materialises in the form of lost poten-
tial profits and unnecessary maintenance costs. Thus, the former is quantified through the
presence of higher workloads, whereas the latter leads to the reduction or absence of com-
putation. Depending on the degree of isolation involved, one can expect a crossover point,
where the cost associated with committing resources to a soft isolation outweigh the cost of
maintaining the capacity that would be left unused using hard isolation. This crossover point
varies when one considers that freeing resources committed to maintaining soft isolation will
also make them available for the actual workloads that require isolation. The composition
of isolation strategies will also affect scalability and the total cost of isolation. For example,
a compound action such as creating a virtual machine and migrating a process that requires
isolation to it may prove cheaper than migrating the process’ original virtual machine, due to
the larger granularity of the latter confinement.
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3.4.1 Core Metrics
The following defines a number of fundamental metrics and expressions for analysing con-
figurations and evaluating costs.
3.4.1.1 Capacity
A basic metric of a model is its total capacity, or the number of confinements that a given
configuration contains. This is defined as
capacity(C) def= |
{
X | X∈+ C
}
|
Rather than the total capacity, one is generally interested in the capacity of a hierarchy
with respect to a given confinement type Γ, which allows the enumeration of elements such
as VM and M. This is defined as
capacityΓ(C) def= |
{
X | X∈+ C ∧ X = Γ′:N ∧ Γ′ = Γ
}
|
3.4.1.2 Utilisation
Certain confinements can only contain a number of sub-confinements before the system’s
overall performance peaks or begins to drop. For example, consider the scenario of a process
scheduler allocating processes to cores evenly. Given that load(Y) returns the average CPU
utilisation of a process Y expressed as a fraction, one can measure CPU utilisation for a
hierarchy C as a dimensionless unit as follows:
util(C) =
∑
C:X∈+ C
min
( ∑
P:Y∈ X
load(Y)
| {D | C:D∈+ C ∧ Y∈D} | , 1.0
)
≈
∑
C:X∈+ C
min
(
k
∑
P:Y∈ X
|↑(Y)→|−1 , 1.0
)
The second formula is an approximation that can be computed statically given an average
processor usage k and the P-to-C mapping defined by an agent’s → structure (the relation
↑()→ being defined in Example 3). The min function caps each C’s usage value to 100% (1.0),
as each C can only work at its maximum. In the case of a hierarchy containing a mixture of
core architectures and performance ratings, a more precise utilisation metric can be derived
by parametrising the capped value and changing it based on the core’s type. These values
can be expressed as a ratio with a basic core type, or using an absolute performance metric
such as instructions per second. While the expression is designed for the context of core
utilisation, this metric can also be extended to other forms of bounded containment.
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3.4.1.3 Consolidation factor
Beyond measuring the aggregate utilisation of a system’s capacity, cloud providers are inter-
ested in their infrastructure’s consolidation factor. This is represented as utilisation/capacity,
or the ratio between the system’s utilisation and the number of confinements of a given type
within a hierarchy. This figure encompasses both underutilisation as well ask skewed load
distributions.
3.4.1.4 Pairwise co-locations
Assuming that every co-location is an equally-large threat to a tenant, one would reduce the
attack surface by minimising the total number of co-located pairs in a given hierarchy, which
can be computed as follows:
pairs(C) = 12 |
{
〈X,D, Y〉 | XY,D∈+ C ∧ X 6= Y ∧ X D←→ Y
}
|
When forming a coherent defence against illicit channels, a tenant may opt to prioritise
certain isolations over others. For example, a tenant may prefer to minimise co-locating pro-
cesses with other tenants prior to isolating its own local structures, based on the assumption
that the risk of an external attack is greater than an internal one. In this case, pairs() can
be extended to only consider subsets of parent confinement types.
3.4.2 Applying Metrics
As containment hierarchies are acyclic, they can be topologically sorted, and metrics can be
computed by performing a breadth-first search and evaluating each sub-graph, provided that
costs are compositional. The evaluation of metrics is complicated by agents’ partial system
specifications. For example, a tenant can compute pairs() within its own VM, yet this will
only serve as a lower-bound, and would have to be combined with additional information
from the parent confinement.
In a cloud scenario, tenants and the cloud provider are fundamentally at odds and will
attempt to optimise their configurations with respect to different metrics. For example, a
tenant will want to compromise between pairwise co-locations and total capacity, the latter
having a material financial impact on its operations. Conversely, while a cloud provider will
attempt to optimise consolidation so as to maintain a smaller deployment, it has a lower
incentive to minimise a tenant’s total capacity if it bills its clients on the basis of committed
resources.
Example 5 (Comparing architectures). A system’s containments can vary across vendors.
To illustrate, consider two different CPUs, namely an Intel i7-4790 (INTELT) with 8 hard-
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ware threads using SMT1, and a hex-core AMD Phenom II X6 (AMDT). Apart from cache
exclusivity, the architectures vary in that the former has two hardware threads to each L1
containment, whereas the latter has per-core L1 and L2 caches. This results in the following
models:
INTELT
def= L3:0 [{L2:I [L1:I [C:I [] ,C:I+4 []]] | 0 ≤ i ≤ 3}]
AMDT
def= L3:0 [{L2:I [L1:I [C:I []]] | 0 ≤ i ≤ 5}]
Consider the case where processes must never be co-located through L1 or L2. For the
INTELT hierarchy, this effectively halves the C capacity. Assuming that each system divides P
processes amongst its Cs equally, util(AMDT) = min (kAMDTP/6, 6.0) , and util(IntelT) =
min (kINTELTP/4, 4.0). Thus, INTELT’s process execution time kINTELT must be two thirds of
kAMDT in order to have equal utilisation rates.
3.4.3 Ongoing and Migration Costs
Configurations offer different security guarantees at different costs. Evaluating costs and
metrics on a configuration’s next∞∪ () is a tradeoff between performance and precision, as it
avoids recomputing costs after each local migration operation.
Given a static model, a configuration can be progressively modified until it reaches an op-
timal state with respect to a property of the system. For example, tenants within a cloud have
an incentive to use resources efficiently, and cloud providers generally attempt to provide
resources to tenants with a minimum of overhead. Thus, if no confinements are created
or destroyed by the tenants’ agents, a cloud provider can alter the system’s configuration
incrementally until it reaches its lowest cost state.
The fluidity of cloud architectures necessitate a dynamic model, which limits the time
allowed for a system to converge to an optimum. More generally, assuming that a system will
remain in configuration C for a duration τ , one should temporarily move to C′ if the cost of
τC is greater than that of migrating to and from C′ combined with the cost of maintaining τC′.
An accurate characterisation of τ enables configurations to be optimised with a minimum of
migrations, yet a system in constant flux or with very small values of τ can potentially negate
gains in migrating. Cheap migration operations can help offset the effects of τ .
Example 6. Figure 3.7 models migrations between various next∞∪ () states of a system’s L1
caches with three processes, where one of the caches has deployed the soft isolation strategy
described in Example 4. Utilisation rates are given in brackets, assuming that
i) each L1 confinement is shared between two cores and has a total capacity of 2,
1For this architecture, the indices for hardware threads sharing the same core are not consecutive.
59
CHAPTER 3. MODELLING LOCALITY AND MIGRATION
(2)L1:L0 [L1S:S0 [] ,L1S:S1 []] | L1:L1 [P0, P1, P2]
(2 + α)L1:L0 [L1S:S0 [] ,L1S:S1 [P1]] | L1:L1 [P0, P2] (2 + α)L1:L0 [L1S:S0 [P0] ,L1S:S1 []] | L1:L1 [P1, P2]
(1 + 2α)L1:L0 [L1S:S0 [P0] ,L1S:S1 [P1]] | L1:L1 [P2]
(1 + 2α)L1:L0 [L1S:S0 [] ,L1S:S1 [P0, P1]] | L1:L1 [P2] (1 + 2α)L1:L0 [L1S:S0 [P0, P1] ,L1S:S1 []] | L1:L1 [P2]
(2α)L1:L0 [L1S:S0 [P0] ,L1S:S1 [P1, P2]] | L1:L1 [] (2α)L1:L0 [L1S:S0 [P0, P2] ,L1S:S1 [P1]] | L1:L1 []
(2α)L1:L0 [L1S:S0 [] ,L1S:S1 [P0, P1, P2]] | L1:L1 [] (2α)L1:L0 [L1S:S0 [P0, P1, P2] ,L1S:S1 []] | L1:L1 []
Figure 3.7: A subset of possible global migrations between configurations.
ii) each process has a utilisation factor of 1,
iii) L1 confinements have zero cost, as they are built into the architecture, and
iv) non-empty L1S confinements reduce their core’s capacity to α (overhead values can
reach up to 7% [ZR13]).
Disabling co-scheduling on the partitioned core will cause its capacity to be halved. Utilisa-
tion is highest (2+α) when the unmitigated cache is at full capacity, with additional processes
running within soft isolations. The configurations with the lowest pairs() are obtained for
1 + 2α.
Metrics can also be extended to encompass special purpose confinements [BPH14] and
heterogeneous deployments, with certain configurations being cheaper or more secure to
maintain on machines with dedicated hardware.
3.5 Automatically Generating Migration Sequences
The allocation of isolations to locations within a computational hierarchy is ultimately an
exercise in scheduling. In its most general form, determining where confinements should be
placed within a system is equivalent to bin-packing and eludes an efficient solution [Aza+14].
The problem of placement is further complicated by the addition of quality of service predic-
ates, which would typically include limits on capacity and utilisation. Finally, the hierarchical
nature of the systems being investigated introduces its own nuances. For example, migrat-
ing an intermediate node within a containment graph will have a cascading effect on the
constraints of its constituents.
The task is thus to determine a sequence of migration operations that will move a system
from a configuration C to a new configuration C′ that satisfies the isolation and quality of
service criteria that are being requested. If C′ is known, then one can compute a sequence of
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To break condition X CA⇐⇒ Y:
i) find D∈+ CA.
X∈+ D ∨ X = D ∨ Y∈+ D ∨ Y = D
ii) find/create CA’. ¬CA’∈+ CA
iii) replicate path from CA to D in CA’
iv) check isolation constraints and migrate
D to new parent in CA’
(a) Migration procedure outline
. . .
ROOT
CA’
CA’1
CA’0
CA
CA1
CA0
. . .
Y
. . .
Xfully-isolating
relative locality
preserving
non-isolating
Global
Scheduling
(b) Migration effects by graph height
Figure 3.8: Computing migration paths for breaking X CA⇐⇒ Y.
migration operations leading to it using a minimum edit distance algorithm for graphs, with
migrations corresponding to edit operations that are weighted according to the migration
mechanisms’ costs. One drawback of such an approach is that the minimum graph edit
distance cannot always be calculated efficiently [Gao+10]. More crucially, this approach
requires that C′ be identified beforehand, whereas one typically has to compute both the
migration sequence as well as the final configuration.
Figure 3.8a provides a general outline of the steps required to break the co-location of
X and Y via a common ancestor CA within a partially-specified hierarchy described in Fig-
ure 3.8b. In the absence of efficient and exact oracles, several steps must be approximated
by heuristics, as will be discussed in the remainder of this section. Note that the process of
releasing or removing isolation constraints is similar to this procedure, with a greater focus
on consolidating previously-isolated confinements back into existing confinements so as to
lead to a cheaper configuration.
3.5.1 Finding a Source
The impact that the migration of a confinement D will have on a graph’s isolation constraints
will vary based on the position of D within that graph. For instance, migrating a process from
one CPU core to the next will break locality at the core level, but not at the machine level.
The choice of confinement source (and similarly, destination) is limited by the set of agents
available to the orchestrator of the migration, as this directly affects the visible confinement
scopes.
When attempting to reconfigure the configuration illustrated by Figure 3.8b to comply
with the constraint ¬(X CA⇐⇒ Y), one finds that individual migration operations moving con-
finements outside of CA can take one of three forms, namely:
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i) fully isolating, where X and Y share no common ancestor up to the depth of CA,
ii) relative locality preserving, whereby co-location through CA is broken, yet the confine-
ments are still co-located within an intermediate common confinement, and
iii) non-isolating, where the structures producing co-location through CA are preserved by
the migration.
Hence, the depth within the graph at which the confinement being migrated exists determines
how many co-locations will survive migration through the effects of cascading (Section 3.1).
Consequently, for isolation to be achieved, one must migrate a confinement on the contain-
ment path leading from CA to X or Y. Note that in the case of multiple separate routes for
co-location through CA, one may have to migrate more than one confinement to fulfil a single
isolation constraint.
Migrations that preserve relative locality may be insecure and must be performed with
caution, as attacks on the locality type of CA may still be viable were one to migrate to
a location of the same type (such as the sibling CA’). Conversely, one cannot rely entirely
on fully-isolating migrations due to the finiteness of physical infrastructures. In the case
of migrations at the same depth, such as when migrating either X or Y, one should ideally
choose a migration that results in the lowest cost.
3.5.2 Finding a Target
Given that an appropriate confinement D∈+ CA has been marked for migration, the next
step is to determine a suitable destination. Trivially, this must exist outside of CA. Referring
to Figure 3.8b, the earliest depth within the graph to which the localities can be migrated is
CA’, a confinement directly co-located with CA.
Provided that it is of the correct type, any confinement CA’. ¬(CA’∈+ CA) can serve as a
destination confinement, yet a heuristic may find it reasonable to attempt to keep migrations
as local as possible. In broad terms, migration amongst smaller localities (vC to C, or P to
C) can be performed in milliseconds, as opposed to the migration of larger structures (P to
OS, or VM to M), which can be a thousand times slower, principally due to the involvement
of the network layers and shared storage, as will be seen in Chapter 4.
3.5.3 Creating an Equivalent Environment
When migrating a confinement to a new parent, one would generally have to create a con-
tainment graph at the destination that matches the source’s nesting structure. In certain
cases, it may not be necessary to duplicate the full environment at the destination. For ex-
ample, when migrating a VM that is running within a second VM, one may opt to migrate
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the former directly to bare metal. Conversely, a process will not operate correctly unless its
environment’s assumptions are correctly mirrored at the destination.
3.5.4 Satisfying Constraints
When executing a sequence of migration operations, one must ensure that both the end state
as well as the intermediate configurations do not violate any constraints that have previ-
ously been placed on the system. Ideally, constraints are checked before any migrations are
performed, and migrations are only carried out once it has been established that they re-
spect all isolation constraints. Failing this, transaction semantics must be added to migration
sequences, giving the ability to dynamically roll back migration operations and attempt to
identify an alternative path.
Backtracking will introduce delays in the servicing of isolation requests, which may not
always be tolerable. If the workloads are well characterised, one may determine that certain
constraints can be temporarily relaxed. For example, a tenant may tolerate a short-lived dip
in performance, which would in turn allow a machine to be temporarily over-provisioned
whilst performing a sequence of reconfiguration operations.
3.6 Applications
The following section investigates various contexts in which the model can be applied, in-
cluding runtime enforcement, as well as in the modelling and analysis of an access-based
side-channel and a replication-based timing channel mitigation.
3.6.1 Runtime Isolation
While co-location properties can be verified for specific scopes, the guarantees may no longer
hold after a system has been reconfigured. Runtime monitoring serves to dynamically resolve
isolation predicates that depend on confinements at the edges of a configuration’s scope. The
model can be used to define policies within a runtime monitoring framework, where declar-
ative restrictions on co-locations are used to define invalid configurations. Once a bad state
is detected (such as on detecting suspicious memory access patterns [Zha+11]), the system
can be reconfigured to a correct state using migration, leading to a reactive architecture. An
implementation of this principle will be expounded upon at greater lengths in Section 4.4.2.
Alternatively, the framework can be driven by a system of leases, with isolation being pro-
cured before a security-sensitive process executes.
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3.6.2 Pre-emption Rate Limiting
The presented model can be used to reason about attacks at different granularities, which
we demonstrate by modelling an access-driven cross-VM side-channel attack developed by
Zhang et al. [Zha+12a], and its scheduler-based mitigation [VRS14]. The attack relies on a
PRIME-PROBE cache access pattern, similar to the attack described in Example 3.
Consider a hypervisor managing two virtual machines, namely a victim VMv and attacker
VMa. Both machines (collectively referred to as
→
V) share a core C0. The hypervisor agent HYP
is defined as:
A:HYP({CVMv , CVMa , CC0}){(VMv,C0),(VMa,C0)}{VMv,VMa,C0} [
→
V ]
and implemented as a process HYPI defined as:
HYPI ≡VM:X∈
→
Vu X y C0.X y HYP.HYPI
The next∞∪ () graph of the system at this coarse level of granularity would reveal that the
virtual machines are co-located through C0, yet the mechanism by which they interfere with
each other is not immediately apparent. The hierarchy can be defined at a finer granularity
by modelling L1 as a confinement of N cache-line sets (CLS), giving:
L1:CLS0 [{CLS:CSi [] | 0 ≤ i < N}]
Cache-lines are invalidated as processes execute within a vC. In a fine-grained model,
the agent process is modified to map vCs to CLS confinements, signifying that an operation
running within that vC has disturbed the cache set in question (more precise models of
cache eviction policies may also be defined, yet this is unnecessary for the purposes of this
exposition). A process carried out by an agent AG which schedules a vC to a C, models the
VM’s interactions with CLS for R times, and then yields control of the scheduler is defined
as:
run(A:AG,L1:L,C:C,vC:VC, R) ≡ VC y C.(CLS:CS∈Lu VC y CS)R.VC y AG
The attack is access-based, where the attacker attempts to determine the pattern of a
victim’s memory accesses. The attacker achieves this by priming the cache and checking
its access times after the victim executes, placing its vC VCa within a cache set previously
occupied by VCv, leading to the sequence:
run(AG, CLS0, C0, VCa, N).run(AG, CLS0, C0, VCv, R)
The attacker’s resolution of the victim’s intermediate cache states is greatly influenced by
R. If a victim can be pre-empted frequently, then the attacker can build a more precise
memory access model. Conversely, large values of R will increase the probability that other
cache regions unrelated to the security-sensitive computation under attack will have been
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accessed, leading to noise. Thus, the victim VMv attempts to choose a value of R such that it
maximises the value of pairs() formed over an execution.
A mitigation against this attack is to place a minimum running time on virtual ma-
chines [VRS14], which stops an attacker from forcing deschedules and limits its ability to
profile a victim. By knowing the number of cache invalidations required to achieve the de-
sired level of isolation and the cost of performing cache operations, one can determine a
minimum VM scheduling quantum length.
A similar fine-grained cache analysis can be performed for cache colouring [KPMR12],
where scheduling must guarantee disjoint cache sets. An additional related mitigation is
that of the cache cleaning process (Example 4), which is effectively a solution for the same
problem using a different scheduling level.
3.6.3 Timing Channel Elimination
STOPWATCH [LGR13] is a collection of mitigations designed to reduce the information con-
tent of timing channels in the cloud. The approach centres on the use of replication to create
R copies of each virtual machine (R ≥ 3), each of which is placed on a different machine
containing other tenants’ replicated VMs. Clock sources on a VM are then modified to
report time as a median of its local time and that of the replicas. This ensures that a co-
located attacker will observe the same timing behaviour. Several aspects of the mitigation
can be modelled, including event synchronisation and OS-level soft isolations. This section
will focus on the VM replication and placement aspects of STOPWATCH.
Given a network NET of machines, the VM placement requirements of STOPWATCH can
be modelled as three invariant conditions, namely:
∀VM:V∈+ NET. |
{
V ’ | VM:V ’∈+ NET, is_replica(V ’, V)
}
| = R (3.1)
∀VM:V,M:M∈+ NET. | {V ’ | VM:V ’∈M, tenant(V ’) = tenant(V)} | ≤ 1 (3.2)
∀VM:V1,VM:V2,M:M∈+ NET. V1 6= V2 ∧ V1 M←→ V2 →
¬∃VM:V3,VM:V4,M:M’∈+ NET. V3 6= V4 ∧ V3 M’←→ V4 ∧M 6= M’∧
tenant(V1) = tenant(V3) ∧ tenant(V2) = tenant(V4) (3.3)
The first invariant ensures that there are R replica machines within the network. The second
invariant checks that each machine has at most one virtual machine belonging to the same
tenant. The final invariant checks that any given pair of tenants can be co-located in at most
one machine.
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3.6.4 Other Properties
The following section outlines several additional scenarios that can be characterised using
the model and concepts explored in this chapter.
Basic Chinese Wall Policy The elimination of cache-level contention can be modelled at
a number of granularities. For example, the individual cache-lines can be modelled as fine-
grained confinements, contained within a larger cache-set parent confinement. Isolation can
also be enforced at the CPU package and process level.
Trusted/Allowed Co-Schedulings The model may be used to define groups of trusted con-
finements that can be co-scheduled within time or space, either by extending confinements
to allow for attributes, or by simply replicating the trust groupings using containments. In
the latter case, groups can be broken down into finer-grained federations of confinements,
which may also span across different confinement types.
Grouping Address Ranges Due to the circuitry and algorithms involved with memory ad-
dress alias resolution, accesses to certain memory elements may influence the time taken to
perform memory operations on other, essentially unrelated, memory elements [Cop+09]. In
the case of systems using pessimistic load bypass [Cop+09], this occurs amongst elements in-
terspersed by a fixed width. These groupings can be modelled by partitioning memory into a
series of buckets, the size of which varies based on the architecture in question.
Delayed Scheduling Due to the effects of a channel potentially persisting across time, one
can postpone the scheduling of a sensitive task, or prefix it with a normalising process (Ex-
ample 4). In the case of cache-based channels, one can postpone scheduling until a given
degree of cache entropy has been reached, thus avoiding the use of an explicit cache clean-
ing process. Tracking of cache pollution can be done using hardware event counters (these
will be covered in greater detail in Section 4.4.2.2). In the case of time-critical processes,
the system can set an upperbound on time, after which a high-entropy process is forced into
existence. This can also be extended to the virtual machine level, or a mixed-level mitigation
between processes and virtual machines belonging to a different entity. A related mitiga-
tion is to schedule and migrate processes or virtual machines in such a way as to maximise
the periodicity, or the time before any given confinement is co-scheduled with a previously
co-scheduled confinement.
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3.7 Conclusion
This chapter has investigated the modelling of temporal and spatial co-location within the
context of illicit channels, examining the issues of cost, scoping and migration. Migration
was subsequently split into local and global migration classes, with the former representing
scheduling operations, and the latter enabling the transfer of confinements between agent
scopes.
While it is assumed that the model will be used in the context of cloud infrastructures,
there is nothing within the model that inherently restricts its application to such scenarios.
Cloud architectures have primarily been singled out due to their diversity of confinement
types, and because the scale of cloud infrastructures translates into an abundance of potential
targets to which a confinement can be isolated.
Based on the established attacks and mitigations studied in the previous chapter, it ap-
pears that some degree of co-location is always necessary for an illicit channel to be feasible.
That is, one cannot claim that a system is completely air-gapped whilst simultaneously ad-
mitting an illicit channel. For example, physical phenomena such as electromagnetic eman-
ations may allow a channel to be formed over physical spans [Gur+14], subject to physical
co-location. In the case of remote attacks, although the attacker and victim may not share a
single global and authoritative real-time clock, the former may indirectly correlate progress
at the victim’s end with its own local clock [BB03]. Similarly, other remote attacks may still
rely on the execution of code at the victim to directly exploit co-location [Ore+15]. This co-
location prerequisite is useful as it simplifies the model by ensuring that the same metaphors
of co-location and containment can be uniformly applied to different attack and mitigation
scenarios.
The next chapter concerns the transition from model-based mitigations to concrete imple-
mentations using SAFEHAVEN, with particular attention to the performance of reconfiguration
and migration operations.
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CHAPTER 4
THE SAFEHAVEN FRAMEWORK
WITH THE TERMINOLOGY AND NOTATION required to model confinement andco-location defined, attention is now turned towards SAFEHAVEN, a frame-
work designed to facilitate the creation, deployment and evaluation of isolation
policies.
4.1 Introduction
Physical isolation provides tenants in a cloud with strong security guarantees against hard-
ware illicit channels. The viability of hard isolation as a general mitigation technique de-
pends on three factors, namely the availability of distinct hardware locations, the degree of
underutilisation tolerated by the owner of the infrastructure, and the cost of dynamic recon-
figuration.
The number of available isolated confinements depends on the size of the physical infra-
structure under consideration. If a cloud provider were to provision isolation at the machine
level, then it would very quickly run out of computational capacity, as well as obliterate the
system’s consolidation factor (and, by association, its profitability). This is closely tied to
the second factor, in that the granularity at which isolation is procured also determines the
granularity at which underutilisation occurs. Thus, for example, provisioning isolation at
the hardware thread level will block the utilisation of a co-located hardware thread, while a
machine-wide isolation guarantee will deny other tenants use of that machine.
The previous chapter demonstrated, by means of a hierarchical model, how a finer-
grained approach to isolation enables higher rates of utilisation by minimizing unused ca-
pacity and effectively multiplying the number of candidate confinements for isolation. This
chapter details the implementation of the model into a framework that allows the dynamic
provisioning of isolation at various levels of a system’s architecture, primarily at the core,
cache, and machine level, as well as their virtualised equivalents. Each confinement type is
studied separately, and is followed by a description of their integration into a unified frame-
work, dubbed SAFEHAVEN.
SAFEHAVEN is a framework that assists in the creation and deployment of networks of
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communicating probe and agent processes. Sophisticated system-wide detectors can be built
by cascading events from various probes at different system levels. A crucial aspect of this
approach is that detectors can be both anticipatory as well as reactive, meaning that they can
either trigger isolations as a precaution or as a countermeasure to a detected attack.
SAFEHAVEN is implemented in Erlang [Erl] due to its language-level support for many
of the framework’s requirements, with probes and agents as long-lived distributed actor pro-
cesses communicating their stimuli through message passing. Other innate language features
include robust process discovery and communication mechanisms and extensive support for
node monitoring and error reporting. SAFEHAVEN was developed in lieu of adapting existing
cloud-management suites such as OpenStack [Ope] so as to focus on the event signalling and
migration aspects of the approach. Erlang’s functional nature, defined communication se-
mantics and use of generic process behaviours [Erl] help to simplify the automatic generation
and verification of policy enforcement code, paving the way for future formal analysis.
The framework is demonstrated using two case studies, showing its efficacy both in a
reactive, as well as an anticipatory, role. Specifically, SAFEHAVEN is used to detect and foil
a system-wide covert channel in a matter of seconds, and to implement a multi-level moving
target defence policy. The results from these case studies are used to quantify the last of the
three factors determining the approach’s viability, namely the overheads of migration and
reconfiguration.
Chapter Outline
This chapter is structured as follows:
Section 4.2 investigates concrete and real-world analogues to the confinements considered
in the previous chapter, and details their migration and management.
Section 4.3 illustrates the core elements of SAFEHAVEN agents by means of an example.
Section 4.4 evaluates the application and performance of different migration mechanisms
when used to counteract a machine-wide covert-channel attack and when implement-
ing a moving target defence.
Section 4.5 concludes this chapter.
4.2 An Instantiated Hierarchy
The following section details the implementation of a framework for managing an instanti-
ation of the model described in the previous chapter. The framework, dubbed SAFEHAVEN, is
designed to control a number of confinement types, a list of which can be found in Table 4.1.
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The technologies and confinement types that were incorporated within SAFEHAVEN were
chosen as analogues to the confinement types described previously (Section 3.2.1.1), and
form the fundamental components of cloud environments and workstations.
Model Technology Reconnaissance Identifier
OS Linux uname Host name
VM QEMU virsh VM name
vC KVM or emulated virsh, /proc/ vCPU ID
Con LXC lxc-info Container name
PE cgroups cset cgroup name
P System process ps Process ID
Table 4.1: Summary of technologies used to implement confinement stack and the methods
by which confinements are enumerated at each level.
As part of its duties in managing containments and allocations, SAFEHAVEN also allows
the enumeration of confinements through a series of reconnaissance (or recon) functions,
the implementation of which varies based on the hierarchy level in question. Using recon
functions, an agent can query the underlying system at runtime and build a partial model
of the infrastructure, translating it into a graph of first-class Erlang objects representing con-
finements. This facilitates the creation of dynamic policies. Table 4.1 summarises the core
enumeration mechanisms that are used at each confinement level being considered.
Figure 4.1 illustrates a containment hierarchy built primarily using the aforementioned
confinement types, as well as the core migration pathways that are considered in this work
(depicted through arrows 1 to 7). The remainder of this section provides a detailed descrip-
tion of the modelling and implementation of each migration path.
4.2.1 Cores (C) and Virtual CPUs (vC)
Virtual CPUs (vC) are an abstraction of physical cores (C). In the case of QEMU virtualisation,
each virtual machine is assigned a subset of the C confinements that are physically available
on the underlying machine. In turn, each of the VM’s virtual CPU confinements can be
assigned (or pinned) to a subset of these allocated cores, either directly via QMP [Qema],
or through libvirt [Lib]. This means that a given vC can only execute within one of the
cores to which it is assigned, that is it can only be locally scheduled to cores within its group.
Similarly, a vC cannot be directly migrated to a core external to its parent VM’s assigned set
of Cs.
Figure 4.2 shows the series of migration operations required to migrate a vC from one C
allocation to another. The vC is first moved to an agent AG that executes in parallel to the
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Net:192.168.0.0/24
M:INTEL2
L3:0
L2:1
L1:1
C:HT3
vC:V1
PE:PE1
C:HT2
vC:V0
PE:PE0
L2:0
L1:0
C:HT1
vC:V1
PE:PE1
P:P3
C:HT0
vC:V0
PE:PE0
M:INTEL1
L3:0
L2:1
L1:1
C:HT3
vC:V3
PE:PE3
P:P2
C:HT2
vC:V2
PE:PE2
L2:0
L1:0
C:HT1
vC:V1
PE:PE1
P:P1
C:HT0
vC:V0
PE:PE0
P:P0
VM0 VM1 VM2
3 4
1 2 6 5
7
Process Migration
1: same core 5: different OS, same machine
2: different core 6: different OS, different machine
VM Migration
7: different machine
vCPU Migration
3: same core
4: different core
Figure 4.1: Configuration of two physical machines running three virtual machines, with
edges denoting containment. The paths labelled 1 through 7 denote routes for migration,
with the source confinement changing its parent to the destination.
VM to which the vC belongs, after which the mapping rules are modified, and the vC is
migrated to its destination core C1. vC migration within a nested virtualisation environment
follows a similar sequence of operations, except that the confinement type of M becomes
VM, and C0 and C1 become vC confinements.
The agent process shares the same operating system as the virtual machine, and exists at
the same level within the containment hierarchy. While the procedure may initially appear
to be a local scheduling operation, it entails a modification to the mapping rules, and con-
sequently modifies the system’s next∞∪ (). Thus, the operation is still a global migration, yet
its source and destination agents are the same.
With regards to capabilities, an agent requires authorisation over the hypervisor and vCs
to reconfigure the vC-to-C mapping. Note that the existence of a vC automatically implies
the existence of a VM further up the hierarchy, that is,
vC:VCPU∈C:CPU ⇒ ∃VM:VM. VCPU∈ VM ∧ VM∈ CPU
QEMU vCs can either operate as emulators, providing a fully-virtualised confinement, or
with hardware acceleration, typically using KVM [Kvma]. As will be seen in Section 5.3.6,
the latter may admit unsafe migrations, with virtual machines being migrated to physical
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[OS∈+ M:M,
C0∈+ M:M,
C1∈+ M:M,
VM∈ C0,
VM∈ C1]
OS:OS
[
VM:VM(CD)
[
vC:VCPU(CD)
]
,PE:PGA
[
A:AG(CAG){〈VCPU,C0〉}∪→AG{VCPU, C0, C1, VM} []
]]
C:C0(CX) [VCPU] C:C1(CY) [] AG ≡ VCPU y AG.AG’
CAG e CD CAG e CX
OS:OS
[
VM:VM(CD) [] ,PE:PGA
[
A:AG’(CAG)→AG{VCPU, C0, C1, VM} [vC:VCPU]
]]
C:C0(CX) [] C:C1(CY) []
CAG e CD CAG e CY AG’ ≡ VCPU y C1.AG”
OS:OS
[
VM:VM(CD)
[
vC:VCPU(CD)
]
,PE:PGA
[
A:AG”(CAG){〈VCPU,C1〉}∪→AG{VCPU, C0, C1, VM} []
]]
C:C0(CX) [] C:C1(CY) [VCPU]
Figure 4.2: vC migration.
machines that have a different set of active CPU traits.
4.2.1.1 Discovery
The set of vCs assigned to a machine can be enumerated from within the virtual machine’s
operating system by querying /sys/devices/system/cpu/. The pool of Cs available to a
virtual machine is set using control groups (Section 4.2.2), which, when using libvirt, are
mounted at /machine/vm-libvirt-qemu/emulator/, and can be modified by an agent with
capabilities over the mount point.
4.2.2 Process/Control Groups (PE)
An agent process running within an operating system can limit the execution of its co-located
processes to a set of Cs in a number of ways. Notably, the sched_setaffinity() system
call [Sch] allows a process to set a scheduling mask, which defines the set of cores to which
a process can be scheduled. The drawback of restricting execution through affinities is that
unprivileged processes can change their own mappings at will, subverting their confinement.
Consequently, SAFEHAVEN uses control groups (managed via cpusets [Cpu]) to define a
hierarchy of C partitions (PE). Each PE defines a group of cores, and assigning a process
to a PE confinement limits its execution to the partition’s associated cores. Collections of
cores can be further partitioned into subgroups, and all processes are initially placed within a
default root control group. Crucially, processes cannot exit their PE confinement by changing
affinities, and can only be reassigned to another PE by a privileged process. Control groups
are manipulated using cpusets [Cpu], which allows the creation and destruction of PE
confinements, as well as the transferring of processes between confinements.
Figure 4.3 defines the sequence of transformations that must be undertaken when mi-
grating a process group PG from one C allocation to another. The agent executes within the
operating system of which PG makes part. As in the case of vC migration, since the effects
are local to the operating system, both the source and destination agents are the same agent,
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[OS∈M:M,
C0∈M:M,
C1∈M:M]
OS:OS
[
PE:PG(CD),PE:PGA
[
A:AG(CAG){〈PG,C0〉}∪→AG{C0, C1, PG} []
]]
C:C0(CX) [PG] C:C1(CY) [] AG ≡ PG y AG.AG’
CAG e CD CAG e CX
OS:OS
[
PE:PGA
[
A:AG’(CAG)→AG{C0, C1, PG}
[
PE:PG(CD)
]]]
C:C0(CX) [] C:C1(CY) []
CAG e CD CAG e CY AG’ ≡ PG y C1.AG”
OS:OS
[
PE:PG(CD),PE:PGA
[
A:AG”(CAG){〈PG,C1〉}∪→AG{C0, C1, PG} []
]]
C:C0(CX) [] C:C1(CY) [PG]
Figure 4.3: PE migration.
yet the intermediate migration is nevertheless global. Process group migrations are always
internal to a machine, although cross-machine migrations can be approximated by first cre-
ating a process group at the target, and then subsequently migrating the processes from the
source machine.
4.2.2.1 Discovery
Control groups, their C allocations and their assigned processes can be enumerated through
the cpusets interface.
4.2.3 Processes and Containers (P, Con)
Using SAFEHAVEN, processes (P) and LXC [Lxc] containers (Con) are always placed within
a control group, and are migrated from one control group to another. Nevertheless, two
separate mechanisms are used, the choice of which depends on whether the target Con
shares the same OS as the origin, or if the target exists within a different OS.
OS:OS
[
PE:PGS(CX) [P:P] ,PE:PGD(CY) [] ,PE:PGA
[
A:AG(CAG){〈P,PGS〉}∪→AG{PGS, PGD, P} []
]]
CAG e CX AG ≡ P y AG.AG’
OS:OS
[
PE:PGS(CX) [] ,PE:PGD(CY) [] ,PE:PGA
[
A:AG’(CAG)→AG{PGS, PGD, P} []
]]
CAG e CY AG’ ≡ P y C1.AG”
OS:OS
[
PE:PGS(CX) [] ,PE:PGD(CY) [P:P] ,PE:PGA
[
A:AG”(CAG){〈P,PGD〉}∪→AG{PGS, PGD, P} []
]]
Figure 4.4: P migration, intra-OS.
Figure 4.4 represents the migration sequence invoked when migrating a process from a
group PGS to PGD, where PGS OS←→ PGD, leading to a migration that is internal to the parent
operating system. Arbitrary processes can be moved directly amongst PE groups within
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OS:OSS(CX)
[
PE:PGS(CX) [P:P] ,PE:PGSA
[
A:SRC(CSRC){〈P,PGS〉}∪→SRC{PGS, DST, P} []
]]
OS:OSD(CY)
[
PE:PGD(CY) [] ,PE:PGDA
[
A:DST(CDST)→DST{PGD, SRC} []
]]
CSRC e CX SRC ≡ P y SRC.SRC ’
OS:OSS(CX)
[
PE:PGS(CX) [] ,PE:PGSA
[
A:SRC ’(CSRC)→SRC{PGS, DST, P} [P:P]
]]
OS:OSD(CY)
[
PE:PGD(CY) [] ,PE:PGDA
[
A:DST(CDST)→DST{PGD, SRC ’} []
]]
CSRC e CDST SRC ’ ≡ P y DST.SRC”
OS:OSS(CX)
[
PE:PGS(CX) [] ,PE:PGSA
[
A:SRC”(CSRC)→SRC{PGS, DST} []
]]
OS:OSD(CY)
[
PE:PGD(CY) [] ,PE:PGDA
[
A:DST(CDST)→DST{PGD, SRC”, P} [P:P]
]]
CDST e CY DST ≡ P y PGD.DST ’
OS:OSS(CX)
[
PE:PGS(CX) [] ,PE:PGSA
[
A:SRC”(CSRC)→SRC{PGS, DST, P} []
]]
OS:OSD(CY)
[
PE:PGD(CY) [P:P] ,PE:PGDA
[
A:DST ’(CDST){〈P,PGD〉}∪→DST{PGD, SRC”, P} []
]]
Figure 4.5: P migration, inter-OS.
the same OS using cpusets, which is fast and can be performed in bulk. As with previous
instances, the fact that the source and destination process groups share the same environment
typically entails that both the source and destination confinements are managed by the same
agent process.
Figure 4.5 describes the second type of process migration operation, where the participat-
ing process groups exist within separate operating systems. There is no requirement that the
operating systems exist within different physical machines, and processes may be migrated
between virtual machine environments co-located over the same machine.
Transferring processes across operating systems is significantly more complex than in-
ternal migrations, as additional mechanisms must be used to package, translate and re-
build the process’ data structures at the destination. In SAFEHAVEN, this is handled using
criu [Cri], which enables process checkpoint/restore from within user-space. Recent ver-
sions of the Linux kernel (3.11 onwards) have built-in support for the constructs required by
criu.
To perform a migration, the source agent SRC deschedules the process being migrated (P),
and transfers it to the idle queue of DST, which resides within a different OS environment.
This was implemented by having SAFEHAVEN’s agents negotiate a migration, which then
delegate the process transfer to the criu daemon.
Cross-OS process migration comes with some limitations. Trivially, processes that are
critical to their parent OS cannot be migrated away. Other restrictions stem from a process’
use of shared resources. For instance, the use of interprocess communication may result
in unsafe migrations, as the process will be disconnected from its endpoints. Similarly, a
process cannot be migrated if it would cause a conflict at the destination, such as in the case
of overlapping process IDs or changing directory structures. This problem is addressed by
launching a process with its own namespaces, or more generally, by using a container [Cri].
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Migration preserves a process’ PE containment structure.
At the time that this research was conducted, LXC live migration was still under active
development. Consequently, a stop-gap measure was used to implement migration, whereby
a full checkpoint and restore were performed, transferring the frozen image in a separate
step using rsync [Tyc14]. As will be seen in Section 4.4.3.7, this has a severe impact on per-
formance, yet it allows the SAFEHAVEN approach to be realised, and future improvements to
the migration method can be easily dropped in without necessitating any significant changes
to the architecture.
4.2.3.1 Discovery
Process enumeration is performed through the ps command, which lists the processes within
the invoker’s environment. As will be seen in Section 4.4.2.4, a process may also scan the
/proc directory, which, being a synthetic file system, allows for a scanning process to quickly
and efficiently sweep through a process list.
4.2.4 Virtual Machines (VM)
Similar to process migration, VMs can be migrated locally (changing C pinnings) using PE
groups and cpusets, or at the global level (moving to another OS). The latter is performed
in SAFEHAVEN using QEMU’s live migration operators, backed by a Network File System (NFS)
server storing VM images.
M:MS
[
OS:OSS(CX)
[
VM:VM(CD)
[
vC:V(CD)
]]
,C:CS(CX)
[
vC:V(CD)
]
,PE:PGSA
[
A:SRC(CSRC){〈V,CS〉,〈VM,OSS〉}∪→SRC{DST, VM, CS, V, OSS} []
]]
M:MD
[
OS:OSD(CY) [] ,C:CD(CY) [] ,PE:PGSB
[
A:DST(CDST)→DST{SRC, CD, OSD} []
]]
CSRC e CX CSRC e CD SRC ≡ VM y SRC.SRC ’
M:MS
[
OS:OSS(CX) [] ,C:CS(CX) [] ,PE:PGSA
[
A:SRC ’(CSRC)→SRC{DST, VM, CS, V, OSS}
[
VM:VM(CD)
[
vC:V(CD)
]]]]
M:MD
[
OS:OSD(CY) [] ,C:CD(CY) [] ,PE:PGSB
[
A:DST(CDST)→DST{SRC ’, CD, OSD} []
]]
CSRC e CDST SRC ’ ≡ VM y DST.SRC”
M:MS
[
OS:OSS(CX) [] ,C:CS(CX) [] ,PE:PGSA
[
A:SRC”(CSRC)→SRC{DST, CS, OSS} []
]]
M:MD
[
OS:OSD(CY) [] ,C:CD(CY) [] ,PE:PGSB
[
A:DST(CDST)→DST{SRC”, VM, CD, V, OSD}
[
VM:VM(CD)
[
vC:V(CD)
]]]]
CDST e CY CDST e CD DST ≡ VM y OSD.DST ’
M:MS
[
OS:OSS(CX) [] ,C:CS(CX) [] ,PE:PGSA
[
A:SRC”(CSRC)→SRC{DST ’, CS, OSS} []
]]
M:MD
[
OS:OSD(CY)
[
VM:VM(CD)
[
vC:V(CD)
]]
,C:CD(CY)
[
vC:V(CD)
]
,PE:PGSB
[
A:DST ’(CDST){〈V,CD〉,〈VM,OSD〉}∪→DST{SRC”, VM, CD, V, OSD} []
]]
Figure 4.6: VM migration.
Figure 4.6 describes the sequence of steps required to migrate a virtual machine from
one physical machine to another. This operation is a compound action, as it migrates the
VM’s vCs in addition to the VM’s constituents. The vCs are represented explicitly within
the transformation rules as they lie on the boundary between the virtualisation layer and the
underlying hardware, and interface directly with the C layer.
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SAFEHAVEN uses KVM for virtualisation, managed via libvirt and QMP. In the case of a
cloud infrastructure, the provider’s agents exist within the base OS, running alongside a
tenant’s VM. The framework can easily be retargeted to Xen or Xen-like virtualisation plat-
forms, with hypervisor-level agents residing within dom0. The choice of hypervisor largely
determines what type of instrumentation can be made available to probes.
4.2.4.1 Live Migration Modes
Virtual machines are typically large structures, and transmitting their state data from one
machine to another over a network takes an appreciable amount of time, despite several
attempts to minimise the amount of state that must be transferred [HSS15; Jo+13].
Modern virtualisation platforms such as QEMU [Qemb] implement live migration, where a
VM is moved to a different physical machine with minimal downtime by letting the virtual
machine execute throughout the greater part of the transfer process. Migration is carried out
in two phases, namely
i) a state transfer phase, where a VM’s memory contents are sent to the destination, and
ii) a control transfer phase, where a VM stops executing at the source and resumes at the
destination.
Control transfer also includes setup and tear-down procedures such as device initialisation
and network announcements.
The order in which these phases are carried out leads to two approaches to live migration,
namely pre-copy and post-copy migration [Ahm+15]. Pre-copy works by iteratively transfer-
ring a VM’s pages, with each iteration transmitting pages that were dirtied while sending
the previous iteration. This process is repeated until the number of dirty pages falls below
a set threshold, at which point the VM is paused and resumed at the target following a final
transfer.
Post-copy swaps the transfer phases, transferring a minimum amount of control state and
resuming execution immediately at the target machine, with memory pages being pulled on
request from the source using demand paging [Mil+00].
Pre-copy migration has two main drawbacks, namely that the machine’s entire state must
be transferred before control can resume at the target, and that data-intensive processes
may invalidate pages at a faster rate than that at which they are being transferred, resulting
in non-convergence. In contrast, post-copy migration will transfer each page at most once,
guaranteeing convergence [HDG09].
The key drawback of post-copy migration is that the VM’s state is split between two ma-
chines, and a link or node failure during a migration can corrupt the VM. This makes the
method less robust than pre-copy migration, which can tolerate failures at the destination
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during a migration (the operation is simply aborted, and execution continues at the source
machine). This limitation can be mitigated in part using hybrid migration, whereby a migra-
tion is initiated in pre-copy and switches to post-copy on detecting non-convergence, which
would happen when memory pages are being modified faster than they can be transferred.
Additional countermeasures will be elaborated upon in Section 5.4.2.
Pre-copy migration support comes as standard with current versions of QEMU [Qemb].
Post-copy support requires that the base operating system hosting the virtual machines in
question are equipped with the userfaultfd kernel extensions, which are implemented
within a fork [Arc16]. These extensions expose a file descriptor from kernel-space to user-
level processes over which the kernel announces the addresses of faulting pages, and must
be present both at the source and destination environments. Post-copy functionality in QEMU
making use of these extensions was also implemented as a fork [Orb16]. Similarly, libvirt was
extended [Kle16] to expose the post-copy migration functionality to system processes via the
virtualisation driver. All testing and implementation was performed on QEMU v2.2.92.
Beyond its guarantee for convergence, post-copy virtual machine migration is especially
valuable in the context of illicit channel mitigation, as it rapidly breaks a virtual machine’s
co-locations with other entities executing at the source environment. Conversely, a virtual
machine being evicted using pre-copy migration will keep executing at the source for the
duration of the migration operation, leaving the VM vulnerable to attacks at the source. This
is particularly detrimental in the case of time-critical or high-bandwidth channels. This notion
of responsiveness, and the boon of convergence, will be explored in further detail later on in
this chapter.
4.2.4.2 Discovery
The list of running and idle virtual machines can be produced via virsh, which integrates
with the libvirt virtualisation driver.
4.2.5 Additional Operations
In addition to admitting migration, VM, P and Con confinements can be paused in memory,
which can serve as a temporary compromise in cases where an imminent threat cannot be
mitigated quickly enough through migration.
4.3 Agents
The core operations of an agent process are confinement reconnaissance and migration.
Agents perform both objective and subjective moves [CG98], as they can migrate confinements
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Algorithm 4.1 SAFEHAVEN confinement data structures.
1: % Confinement t y p e s ( atoms )
2: −type l o c _ t () : : l_network | l_machine | l _ l 3 | l _ l 2 | l _ l 1
3: | l_cache | l_cpu | l_kvm_vcpu | l _o s | l_kvm_vm
4: | l _ c o n t a i n e r | l_cgroup | l_proc | l _ n f s .
5:
6: −type name_t () : : s t r i n g () . % Confinement name data type
7: −type i d _ t () : : term () . % Confinement handle data type
8:
9: −record ( l o c a l i t y , % Confinement data s t r u c t u r e
10: { type : : l o c _ t () , % Confinement t ype
11: name : : name_t () , % Symbol i c name
12: id : : i d _ t () , % Handle ( IP , PID , e t c . )
13: caps : : term () , % C a p a b i l i t i e s
14: sub locs = [ ] : : [ l o c a l i t y _ t () ] } ) . % Sub−con f in ement s
15:
16: −type l o c a l i t y _ t () : : #l o c a l i t y {} .
to which they belong as well as external confinements. The remainder of this section will
demonstrate these fundamental agent duties by means of an example.
4.3.1 Data Structures
Algorithm 4.1 defines the fundamental Erlang data structure used within SAFEHAVEN, namely
the locality record type. These records are used as references to confinements that exist
within the system, and allow properties and agents to handle confinements uniformly. The
loc_t() data type lists the types of localities that are understood by the framework. Defining
the type of a locality structure allows SAFEHAVEN to determine which migration method
to apply when moving a confinement.
4.3.2 A Process-Level Agent
Algorithm 4.2 defines a prototypical SAFEHAVEN agent that partitions a set of processes
amongst a set of cores depending on their owner. This requires both enumeration and migra-
tion, which are employed as follows.
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Algorithm 4.2 Agent partitioning processes between CPUs by owner via SAFEHAVEN.
1: Procs = process : recon () , % Get sys tem p r o c e s s e s
2: [CR, CA|Cs ] = cpu : recon () , % Get a v a i l a b l e CPUs
3: l i s t s : foreach (
4: fun (P = #l o c a l i t y { type = l_proc , id = ID} ) −>
5: User = owner( ID ) ,
6: Dest = case User of % Choose d e s t i n a t i o n CPU
7: “ root” −> CR;
8: “apache” −> CA;
9: _ −> Cs
10: end ,
11: mig_process : migrate (P , Dest ) % Pin p r o c e s s
12: end , Procs ) .
4.3.2.1 Confinement Discovery and Enumeration
The view of an arbitrary agent within a cloud is generally limited to its immediate environ-
ment and that of other agents with which it is co-operating. For example, a tenant’s agents
will be restricted to the processes and structures of their OS environment. Similarly, the
cloud provider views VMs as black boxes. Knowledge of their internal structures is lim-
ited to what is exposed by the tenants’ agents, bar the use of introspection or disassembly
mechanisms.
The agent described in Algorithm 4.2 can directly query its OS environment to retrieve
the list of running processes (Line 1) and available cores (Line 2). Both recon() operations
return lists of confinements. In the latter case, the resultant list is split into three sub-lists,
namely
1. a single element list CR to which processes owned by root are to be migrated,
2. a single element list CA, designated for processes owned by the apache user, and
3. CS, a group of cores over which the rest of the processes are to execute.
Note that the above partitioning assumes that the system has a minimum of three cores. Both
reconnaissance operations can be run using ordinary user privileges.
As discussed earlier, a subtle consequence of virtualisation is that correctly virtualised
cores are seen by the confined processes as being actual, physical cores. Thus, for the agent
being considered, the cpu:recon() function would always return a set of seemingly physical
cores, yet an external agent would correctly discern them as being virtual.
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While side-channels and advanced fingerprinting techniques may allow an agent to de-
termine additional confinement attributes (Section 2.2), SAFEHAVEN restricts itself to overt
channels and named interfaces.
4.3.2.2 Migration
The second component of the agent iterates through the list of environment processes CR
and determines the destination of each process based on its owner, which is determined via
a helper function (Line 5). The agent then invokes process migration (Line 11), moving the
process under consideration to its target core. Internally, the migrate process translates the
set of cores to a process group, and migration to a PE group is carried out as detailed in
Section 4.2.3.
Note that in this example, the agent directly invokes the process migration routine, as
the object type of P is known beforehand. Alternatively, a meta-level and generic migrate()
operation can be invoked, which executes the relevant migration operation based on the
types of the confinements constituting its arguments. While this allows properties to be
expressed using more general types, one cannot always design agents that are completely
oblivious to the migration method being used. For example, while an agent may afford to
block processes’ execution pending short migrations, long lived migrations (such as when
moving virtual machines) may be executed in blocking or non-blocking modes, necessitating
an additional argument.
4.3.3 Communication
Communication within SAFEHAVEN is carried out using Erlang’s message passing facilities.
Processes can only message others that share a token (a magic cookie [Erl]) that serves as a
communication capability.
Erlang’s message passing enables agents to communicate uniformly with each other, and
hides many of the intricacies of the underlying network topology. The primary concern of
agents is thus how best to advertise each other’s addresses (or Erlang PIDs). One simple and
effective method is to have every agent participating in implementing a policy connect to a
known Erlang node. By enabling automatic announcements, each additional agent dialling
into the known node will be added to a network of processes, each of which can communicate
with each other, provided that their cookies also match. Finer grained agent networks can be
created by assigning per-connection cookies, and disabling automatic node propagation.
The choice of using avahi [Ava] within SAFEHAVEN was based on the principle of de-
centralisation and the aim of supporting highly fluid infrastructures. While broadcasts may
simplify the setup process of a confinement following a migration, it may lead to scalability
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issues, and one may have to resort to alternative nameserver schemes.
4.3.4 Allocation
To determine a destination for a confinement that must be migrated, an agent broadcasts
an isolation request to its known agents. If one of these agents finds that it can serve the
request whilst maintaining its existent isolation commitments, it authorises the migration.
The problem of placement is equivalent to the bin-packing problem [Aza+14], and a greedy
allocation policy will not produce an optimal allocation. Nevertheless, the SAFEHAVEN ar-
chitecture is sufficiently general so as to allow different allocation strategies. For example,
targets can be prioritised based on their physical distance. Prioritisation can also be used in
hybrid infrastructures, where certain targets may be more effective at breaking specific types
of co-locations than others. For example, a cloud provider can opt to mix in a number of
machines with various hardware confinements and lease them on demand. This principle
will be explored in greater detail in Section 5.3.6.
4.4 Implementing Detection and Mitigations
The fine-grained approach to isolation advocated by SAFEHAVEN serves two purposes. First, it
increases utilisation by promoting the use of the minimum unit of isolation required to secure
a confined entity. This has the knock-on effect of reducing the amount of hardware that is
left underutilised due to restrictions on co-locations. The second is that smaller confinements
are faster to migrate, and incur fewer overheads than larger confinements. The following
section attempts to substantiate the latter claim by examining the performance impact of
different migration mechanisms. It also describes how SAFEHAVEN can be used to mitigate
a machine-wide covert channel attack, as well as to implement a multi-level moving target
defence.
4.4.1 Experimental Setup
Table 4.2 provides a summary of the core attributes of the different physical and virtual
machine configurations used throughout the following experiments.
All experiments were carried out on two Intel i7-4790 machines (4 cores × 2 hardware
threads) with 8GB RAM (INTELT). A third computer (AMDT), an AMD Phenom II X6 1090T
with 8GB RAM, served as an NFS server hosting the VMs’ images (average sequential speeds:
81MB/s read, 76 MB/s write), and was also used in the experiment described in Section 5.3.6.
Machines communicated via a consumer-grade gigabit switch. All machines ran Ubuntu 14.04
LTS with the 3.19.0-rc2+ kernel patched for post-copy support (Section 4.2.4.1), and libvirt
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Machine ID CPU Cores Threads per Core RAM (Gb)
INTEL-MT Intel i7-2640M 2 2 4
INTELT Intel i7-4790 4 2 8
AMDT AMD Phenom II X6 1090T 6 1 8
VMT - 2 1 2
Table 4.2: Hardware configurations used during evaluation.
version 1.2.11. Each VM (VMT) was allocated two vCPUs and 2GB of RAM, and had a
20GB image. VMs used bridged network interfaces, and host discovery was performed using
avahi [Ava].
4.4.1.1 Benchmarks
The evaluation of the performance aspects of migration call for repeatable workloads that
are representative of the deployment scenarios under consideration, namely, clouds. The
PARSEC [Bie+08] benchmark suite was used to generate a variety of intense and mixed
workloads, with varying pressures on memory and computational capacity. The evaluation
focuses on a subset of the workloads present in the suite, namely
• blackscholes, a financial analysis application with small working sets,
• canneal, a simulated annealing benchmark with large working sets,
• streamcluster, a data mining and clustering application with moderate working sets,
• dedup, a storage deduplicator with large working sets,
• raytrace, a rendering engine with large working sets, and
• bodytrack, a computer vision application with moderate working sets.
In addition, the all benchmark was defined. This consists of the consecutive execution
of a single run of each of the aforementioned benchmarks, and was used for benchmarks
requiring a long-running and mixed workload.
4.4.2 System-Wide (Cross-VM) Covert Channel
The following section describes the use of SAFEHAVEN as an active countermeasure to thwart
a system-wide covert-channel.
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4.4.2.1 Overview
Wu et al. [WXW12] demonstrated that performing an atomic operation spanning across a
misaligned memory boundary will lock the memory bus of certain architectures, inducing a
system-wide slowdown in memory access times. This effect could then be used to implement
a cross-VM covert channel by modulating the observed memory access speeds.
4.4.2.2 Detection
Detecting the channel’s reader process is difficult, as it mostly performs low-key memory
and timing operations, and would execute in a co-located VM, placing it outside the victim
tenant’s scope. Conversely, writer processes are relatively conspicuous, in that they perform
memory operations that are atomic and misaligned. Atomic instructions are used in very
restricted contexts, and compilers generally align a program’s memory locations to the archi-
tecture’s native width. Having both simultaneously can thus be taken as a strong indication
that a program is misbehaving.
Although an attack can be detected by replicating a reader process, a much more dir-
ect, precise and efficient method is to use hardware event counters [Int11] to measure the
occurrence of misaligned atomic accesses. Recent versions of KVM virtualise a system’s per-
formance monitoring unit, allowing VMs to count events within their domain [DSZ10]. One
limitation of hardware counters is that their implementation is not uniform across vendors,
complicating their use in heterogeneous systems. In addition, while event counters are con-
fined to their VM and can only be used by privileged users, one must ensure that they do
not themselves enable attacks (for instance, by exposing a high resolution timer).
4.4.2.3 Policy
Algorithm 4.3 and Algorithm 4.4 outline the behaviour of the agents operated by the tenant
and cloud provider, respectively, while Figure 4.7 illustrates how the components taking part
in the mitigation interoperate. Each agent takes two arguments, namely the isolation that
they are monitoring and a list of additional cooperating agents. When a probe detects that a
process P is emitting events at a rate exceeding a threshold , it notifies its local agent. If the
environment is not already isolated, then the agent attempts to locate an isolated resource
amongst its own existing tenants. Failing this, the cloud provider is co-opted into finding an
isolated machine and resolving the request at the virtual machine level. If a process is mobile,
then the cloud provider can opt to create a new isolated VM to which the process can be
migrated, rather than migrating the source machine.
The degree of isolation required is regulated by the isolD(X) predicate, which checks
whether X is isolated within D. Evaluating this accurately from within the tenant’s scope
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Algorithm 4.3 Tenant agent for covert channel mitigation.
Require: An event rate threshold 
Require: AT set of tenant-owned agents
1: agent TENANT(OS:X,AT)
2: for all P:P∈+ X do
3: if evs(P) ≥  ∧ ¬isolX(P) then
4: D ← ⊥
5: if mobile(P) then
6: D ∈ {D’ | TENANT(D’, ∗) ∈ AT ∧ isolD’(P)}
7: if D 6= ⊥ then
8: P y D
9: else if X∈VM:V then
10: forward isolation request to CLOUD(Y, ∗). V∈+ Y
11: TENANT(X, AT)
12: end agent
Algorithm 4.4 Cloud agent for covert channel mitigation.
Require: AC set of cloud-owned agents
1: agent CLOUD(M:Y,AC)
2: receive isolation request for VM:X∈+ Y
3: if ¬isolY(X) then
4: D ∈ {D’ | CLOUD(D’, ∗) ∈ AC ∧ isolD’(X)}
5: if D 6= ⊥ then
6: X y D
7: else
8: fallback strategies
9: CLOUD(Y,AC)
10: end agent
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Figure 4.7: Policy showing mitigation for processes (VMSRC [P] → VMP [P]) and virtual ma-
chines (MACHINESRC [VMSRC]→ MACHINEv [VMSRC]). Arrows denote communication chan-
nels, with dotted paths denoting migration paths. Rectangles denote locality boundaries,
circles are predicate evaluation processes, while pentagons signify agents.
requires additional information from the cloud agent regarding its neighbours. The strictest
interpretation of isolation would be to allocate a physical machine to each VM requesting
isolation. Another approach is to stratify isolation into different classes determined by user
access lists [CDRC14], or to only allow a tenant’s isolated VMs to be co-located with each
other.
If an isolated destination cannot be found immediately, then soft isolation must be used
as a fallback strategy. Note that soft isolation only has to disrupt the channel until hard
isolation is achieved. For example, rather than migrating the locality requesting isolation,
one can evict its co-residents, applying soft isolation during their eviction. A simple, general
but intrusive method would be to pause the process until isolation is obtained. This should be
reserved for creating temporary isolations during fast migration operations. A more targeted
mitigation may attempt to degrade the attacker’s signal-to-noise ratio by flooding the memory
bus with its own misaligned atomic memory accesses. Finally, one may deploy a system such
as BusMonitor [SXZ13] on a number of machines and migrate VMs requesting isolation
to them. The problem with the latter solutions is that they must be changed with each
discovered attack, whereas a migration-based approach would only require a change in the
detector.
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4.4.2.4 Implementation and Evaluation
The policy was implemented in SAFEHAVEN as a network of Erlang server processes, with the
detector running as a separate process and taking two parameters, namely
i) a set of system processes
→P to be scanned, and
ii) a duration τ within which the scan must be performed.
Instrumentation Hardware counters were accessed using the Performance Application Pro-
gramming Interface (PAPI) [Muc+99] library, with calls proxied through an Erlang module
using Native Implemented Functions (NIF) [Erl]. The INTELT machines exposed a native
event type that counts misaligned atomic accesses (LOCK_CYCLES: SPLIT_LOCK_UC_LOCK_
DURATION [Int11]). Conversely, AMDT was found to lack such a combined event type. In
this case, one would have to measure misaligned accesses and atomic operations independ-
ently, which can lead to a higher rate of false positives.
The procedure for measuring a process’ event emission rate is to attach a counter to it,
sleep for a sample time φ, and read the number of events generated over that period of time.
This is repeated for each process in
→P. The choice of φ will affect the detector’s duty cycle.
Setting φ = τ/|→P| guarantees that each process will have been sampled once within each τ
period, but the sampling window will become narrower as the number of processes increases,
raising the frequency of library calls and consequently CPU usage. Setting a fixed φ produces
an even CPU usage, but leads to an unbounded reaction time.
Algorithm 4.5 implements the aforementioned sampling routine as a function named
instrument, which accepts a φ (SampleTime), a list of processes (Procs) and a list of hard-
ware event types (Events). The counters library is the proxy module to PAPI. This module
is used to define the event type to be monitored (Line 4), and to start (Line 8) and stop
(Line 10) counting events for a given process. The detector sleeps for the defined φ (Line 9)
between the starting and stopping of the event counter. As defined, the procedure performs
a separate sweep for each event in the Events set, and tabulates the result in a list. PAPI also
allows for multiple event types to be tracked simultaneously. The number of events that can
be tracked concurrently is limited by the hardware over which monitoring is taking place. If
this limit is exceeded, PAPI resorts to multiplexing [Muc+99].
Detection Feature The hypothesis regarding the infrequency of misaligned atomic accesses
was tested by sampling each process within virtualised and non-virtualised environments
present in the test bed over a minute during normal execution. Most processes produced
no events of the type under consideration, with the exception of certain graphical applica-
tions such as VNC, which produced intermittent spikes on the order of a few hundreds per
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Algorithm 4.5 Counting process events using PAPI.
1: ins trument (SampleTime , Procs , Events ) −>
2: l i s t s : f o l d l (
3: fun (E , EvAcc ) −>
4: % Set moni tor ing e v en t t ype ; 0 on s u c c e s s
5: CReads = case counters : p a p i _ i n i t ( [E] ) of
6: 0 −>
7: Samples = l i s t s : f o l d l (
8: % Monitor each p r o c e s s in s equence
9: fun (P , CntAcc ) −>
10: [ case counters : s t a r t _ c o u n t i n g ( l o c a l i t y : getID (P) ) of
11: 0 −> t imer : s l eep ( SampleTime ) , % Measure f o r φ
12: [ Cnt|_] = counters : s top_count ing () ,
13: Cnt ;
14: _ −> “−” % Error
15: end | CntAcc ]
16: end , [E] , Procs ) , % Reve r s e a f t e r t a i l r e c u r s i o n
17: [ l i s t s : r eve r se ( Samples ) | EvAcc ] ;
18: _ −>
19: EvAcc % Bad even t ; s k i p
20: end ,
21:
22: counters : pap i_c lo se () , % Clo s e l i b r a r y
23: CReads
24: end , [ ] , Events ) .
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second during use. The emission rate of the attack’s sender process was then measured using
the reference implementation of Wu et al. [WXW12], compiled with its defaults. This was
found to emit ≈ 1.4 × 106 events per second in both environments, with attacks for 64-byte
transmissions lasting 6± 2 seconds.
Efficiency Invoking PAPI functions via a NIF proxy is convenient, as the detector logic can
be completely defined as a high-level SAFEHAVEN agent using Erlang. This enables agents
and probes to be quickly prototyped, as they can make use of the full range of functions and
data structures made available by the framework.
The drawback of having a thin proxy is that every NIF call triggers a number of intermedi-
ate bridging operations, and converting to and from Erlang and C data structures introduces
a measurable overhead. Consequently, although the low-level components of the NIF func-
tions used by the probe defined in Algorithm 4.5 execute very quickly, the performance of
the probe as a whole is very low. This is because the NIF proxy is called with a very high
frequency, with each process triggering two NIF calls, and potentially hundreds of processes
being scanned every second.
In order to reduce the number of translations between the SAFEHAVEN proper and the
low-level NIF functions, one may opt to transfer the detector logic into the low-level layer,
which results in the probe described in Algorithm 4.6. This probe performs the process enu-
meration directly at the low-level layer by scanning the /proc/ directory. Communication
with SAFEHAVEN is reduced to two functions, namely initialisation (where the events of in-
terest are specified and the monitor is started) and reporting in the event that an offending
process is found. Unlike the Erlang-based detector, this approach places the tight loops and
polling operations within the native segment, resulting in a massive improvement in perform-
ance.
Figure 4.8 shows the detector’s CPU usage (measured directly using top) against vary-
ing φ using the compiled C probe. To fully characterise the detector’s overhead, the virtual
machine was pinned to a single vCPU. At φ = 10ms, overhead peaked at a measured 0.3%.
This is in contrast to the Erlang-based probe, which would reach an average of 25% utilisa-
tion. The performance measurements were further verified by executing the CPU-intensive
blackscholes computation from the PARSEC benchmark suite [Bie+08] in parallel with the
detector. This benchmark ran at full CPU utilisation, and thus directly competed for cycles
with the detector, as they both shared a single vCPU. As expected, the reduction in φ pro-
duced a proportional speed up in blackscholes’s execution (or, equally, a reduction in the
benchmark’s total execution time) that follows the direct measurement.
Figure 4.9 considers the quality of the detector, in that it describes how the detector’s
reaction time varied against the number of processes being monitored, where reaction time
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Algorithm 4.6 Shifting detector into native code.
1: s t a t i c in t even t_ se t ; // Event mask ; popu la ted dur ing s e tup
2: s t a t i c in t ev_cnt ; // S i z e o f e v e n t _ s e t
3:
4: in t scan ( in t threshold , in t sample_time_us , in t s l eep_ t ime_s ) {
5: DIR ∗d ;
6: in t foundpid = 0; // !0 => A t t a c k e r PID
7: long long va lues [ ev_cnt ] ;
8: i f ((d = opendir (“/ proc /”) ) ) { // Query proc d i r e c t l y
9: while ( ! foundpid ) { // Break on v i o l a t i o n
10: s t ruc t d i r e n t ∗ d i r ;
11: while ( ! foundpid && ( d i r = readd i r (d) ) != NULL) {
12: in t a t tachp id = a t o i ( di r−>d_name) ; // PID
13: i f ( a t t achp id > 0) { // S t a r t count ing e v e n t s
14: i f (( PAPI_attach ( event_set , a t t achp id ) == PAPI_OK) &&
( PAPI_ s ta r t ( even t_ se t ) == PAPI_OK) ) {
15: us leep ( sample_time_us ) ; // φ
16: PAPI_stop ( event_set , va lues ) ; // Stop and r e co rd
17: in t i t e r ; // Look f o r v i o l a t i o n
18: for ( i t e r = 0; i t e r < ev_cnt ; i t e r++) {
19: i f ( va lues [ i t e r ] > thresho ld ) {
20: foundpid = at tachp id ; break ;
21: }
22: }
23: PAPI_detach ( even t_ se t ) ; // Remove watches
24: }
25: }
26: i f ( ! foundpid && s leep_ t ime_s ) // S l e ep between s cans ?
27: s l eep ( s leep_ t ime_s ) ;
28: }
29: rewinddir (d) ;
30: }
31: }
32: c l o s e d i r (d) ;
33: return foundpid ;
34: }
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Figure 4.8: Detector overhead against φ.
was measured as the time elapsed between the start of an attack and its detection. The
reaction time was measured for 133 ≤ |→P| ≤ 200. The size of →P was raised by spawning
additional processes that periodically wrote to an array. The attack was started at random
points in time.
4.4.2.5 Mitigation
Once a potential attack is detected, it must be isolated. As the attack is machine-wide, co-
location must be broken through virtual machine or process migration. The following section
investigates the former, whereas the latter will be discussed in Section 4.4.3.
Figure 4.10 illustrates the worst case times taken to perform a single VM live migration
using pre-copy, hybrid and post-copy while it executed various workloads from the PARSEC
suite. Migrations were triggered at random points during the benchmark’s execution, with
6 readings per benchmark and migration mode. The host machines were left idle to reduce
additional noise. Solid bars represent the time taken for the VM to resume execution at the
target machine, and the shaded area denotes the time spent copying over the remainder of
the VM’s memory pages after it has been moved.
Pre-copy migration’s performance was significantly affected by the workload being ex-
ecuted, with canneal never converging. Hybrid migration fared better, as it always con-
verged and generated less overall traffic than pre-copy migration. Post-copy exhibited the
most consistent behaviour, both in terms of migration time as well as generated traffic.
To perform a post-copy migration in QEMU, one must first initiate a normal pre-copy migra-
tion and subsequently send a command to the virtualisation platforms to switch to post-copy
migration. During the course of the experiments, it was found that attempting to start a mi-
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Figure 4.9: Reaction time on varying
→P, τ = 1s and 2.5s.
Phase Parameters Min Max Geometric Mean Arithmetic Mean
Detect
τ = 1s 0.0148 3.16 0.54 0.72
τ = 2.5s 0.0272 2.69 1.20 1.46
Migrate Post-copy 1.2813 2.13 1.47 1.48
Detect &
Migrate
Post-copy & τ = 1s 1.296 5.29 2.01 2.20
Post-copy & τ = 2.5 1.309 4.82 2.67 2.93
Table 4.3: Summary of detection and mitigation times (s).
gration immediately in post-copy mode would occasionally trigger a race condition. This was
remedied by adding a one second delay before switching to post-copy. As will be seen in the
next chapter, this delay can be almost completely eliminated, yet this requires modifications
to the QEMU migration mechanisms.
Nevertheless, even with the added delay, VMs migrated using post-copy resumed execu-
tion at the target in at most 2.13 seconds, and 1.51 seconds on average. Total migration time
and data transferred were also consistently low, averaging 20 seconds and 2GB, respectively.
Table 4.3 summarises the results. Based on the detector’s reaction times and post-copy’s
switching time, and assuming that a target machine has already been identified, a channel
can be mitigated in around 1.3 seconds under ideal conditions, 5.3 seconds in the worst case,
and in just under 3 seconds on average.
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Figure 4.10: Comparison of pre-copy, hybrid and post-copy migration.
4.4.2.6 Conclusion
This section has demonstrated how hardware event counters can be used to detect an at-
tack efficiently, quickly and precisely, and how post-copy migration considerably narrows
an attacker’s time window. Additional improvements can be obtained by integrating event
counting with the scheduling policy, where the event monitor’s targets are changed on con-
text switching. This would eliminate the need to sweep through processes and avoids missing
events.
4.4.3 Moving Target Defence, Revisited
The following describes the use of SAFEHAVEN in implementing a passive and preventive
mitigation, specifically, a moving target defence.
4.4.3.1 Overview
The risk of an illicit channel being formed between a set of processes increases in proportion
to the time they spend co-located [Aza+14; MSR15; Zha+12b]. Similarly, the greater the
number of tenants sharing an infrastructure (the consolidation factor), the higher the odds of
being co-located with a malicious tenant. Consequently, a tenant’s security with respect to
illicit channels is inversely proportional to the cloud’s consolidation factor and inertia.
The moving target defence [Zha+12b] is based on the premise that an attacker co-located
with a victim within a confinement D requires a minimum amount of time α(D) to set up and
perform its attack. Attacks can thus be foiled by limiting continuous co-location with every
other process to at most α(D).
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The defence is notable in that it does not attempt to identify a specific attacker, being
driven entirely on the basis of co-location. The principle difficulty lies in choosing a minimum
value of α(D) which will guarantee the best level of security without any excess migrations.
4.4.3.2 Policy
Algorithm 4.7 General form of the moving target defence.
Require: A root locality R
for all T:L0,T:L1 ∈+ R. L0 6= L1 do
if ∃D∈+ R. τ(L0 D⇐⇒ L1) +H(T) ≥ α(D) then
Li ∈ {0, 1} y S. S∈+ R ∧ ¬L0 D⇐⇒ L1
Algorithm 4.7 describes the moving target defence as a generalisation of the formulation
given by Zhang et al. [Zha+12b]. The policy assumes the existence of three predicates,
namely
i) H(T), the time required to migrate a locality of type T,
ii) α(D), the time required to attack a process through D, and
iii) τ(P), the duration for which a supplied predicate P holds.
The remainder of this section attempts to establish practical approximations for the afore-
mentioned predicates.
4.4.3.3 Defining H()
H() must be able to predict the cost of a future migration. In addition, H() varies based on
the destination of a migration, thus requiring that the predicate be refined. As an estimate,
the next value of H() can be approximated using an exponential average [SGG05], expressed
as the following recurrence relation:
Hn+1(T y D) = hηn(T y D) + (1− h)Hn(T y D)
where ηn() is the measured duration of a migration, and 0 ≤ h ≤ 1 biases predictions towards
historical or current migration times. By convention [SGG05], schedulers take h = 0.5, yet it
may be constructive to consider other values of h in the case of highly unstable or fluctuating
migration times.
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4.4.3.4 Defining α()
A precise predicate for α() is difficult to define, as it would require a complete characterisa-
tion of the potential attacks that a system can face, with knowledge of the state of the art at
most bounding the predicate. In the absence of a perfect model, one must adopt a pragmatic
approach, whereby the duration of co-locations (and, by association, the migration rate) is
determined by the overhead that a tenant will bear, as this is ultimately the limiting factor.
4.4.3.5 Defining τ(⇐⇒ )
A tenant can determine the co-location times for processes within its domain, but is otherwise
oblivious to other tenants’ processes. In the absence of additional isolation guarantees from
the cloud provider, τ(⇐⇒ ) must be taken as the total time spent at a location, timed from the
point of entry, this being the worst-case value of co-location time.
4.4.3.6 Propagating resets
The hierarchical nature of confinements can be leveraged to improve the moving target de-
fence. Migrations at higher levels will break co-locations in their constituents. Thus, follow-
ing a migration, an agent can propagate a directive to its sub-localities, resetting their τ(⇐⇒ )
predicates. Propagation must be selective. For example, while process migration to another
machine will break locality at the OS and C level, VM migration only breaks cache and
machine-wide locality, and leaves the OS hierarchy intact (Section 3.5). Similarly, a lower
locality can request isolation from a higher-level parent to trigger a bulk migration action,
which can resolve multiple lower-level migration deadlines.
4.4.3.7 Implementation and Evaluation
Similarly to the previous case study, a two-tiered system of agents is used. Agents are given
a set of distinct locations which are guaranteed to be disjoint, which is necessary for the
mitigation to work, as otherwise migrations would not break co-location.
Table 4.4 lists the migration times measured when migrating containers and VMs through
each migration path (paths 1-7 in Figure 4.1) whilst executing various benchmarks from PAR-
SEC, with the hosts being otherwise idle. Migrations between targets sharing a core or not
sharing a core were evaluated separately. Given its consistent behaviour, and its rapid trans-
fer of control, only post-copy migration was considered when moving VMs. The timings for
Con migration were broken down into its phases. To keep Con migration independent from
the cloud provider, container images were transferred to their target using rsync. This was
by far the dominant factor in Con migration times, and can largely be eliminated through
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Cony vC vCy C Cony OS Cony OS VMy OS
Mig. Path 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
rsync Check Rest rsync Check Rest
B
en
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blackscholes 24.14 24.07 26.84 26.93 32,508 13,695 2,027 31,235 13,636 1,876 18,781
bodytrack 23.99 24.61 26.80 26.99 15,442 4,895 1,018 18,596 4,539 899 19,069
canneal 25.03 25.20 27.00 27.29 68,972 24,562 7,950 55,831 21,936 6,399 18,748
dedup 26.81 26.79 26.99 26.98 71,563 10,888 3,396 56,422 11,021 2,712 19,469
streamcluster 24.70 24.79 26.79 26.96 19,215 5,048 842 13,016 5,104 797 18,654
raytrace 24.30 24.85 26.92 26.96 66,881 18,668 4,804 53,223 17,057 4,255 18,841
x264 25.65 25.56 26.99 27.04 56,224 4,262 1,095 47,580 4,392 1,228 19,410
H0() (Geo.) 24.93 25.11 26.90 27.02 40,510 9,542 2,197 34,678 9,233 1,986 18,994
Table 4.4: Migration times for different isolation types and paths (ms).
shared storage. The initial value of H0() for each path was derived from the geometric mean
of the migration times.
Next, the relationship between performance and migration frequency was evaluated on
the system when running at capacity. On the first machine, three VMs were assigned bench-
marks to execute. A fourth was set as a migrating tenant, running each benchmark listed in
Table 4.4. A fifth VM served as a destination for cross-VM process migration, and was kept
idle. The second machine was configured with three tenants running benchmarks and two
idle VMs.
Table 4.5 lists the geometric means of the benchmarks’ running times, with the all
column denoting the time required for all of the migrating tenant’s benchmarks to complete.
Figure 4.11 shows the predicted and actual migration times for the first migration operations,
using the H0() values derived previously.
Network effects and thrashing on the NFS server introduced a significant degree of variab-
ility. In summary, it was found that migration operations generally had no discernible effect
on the neighbouring tenants at the frequencies investigated, although it is likely that this
would not hold for oversubscribed systems. Migrations at the C and vC level had no signi-
ficant effect on performance. Con and VM migration did not appear to affect neighbouring
tenants, but clearly affected their own execution. Migrating the VM every 30 seconds more
than doubled its benchmark’s running time (note that at this migration frequency, the VM
was involved in a migration operation for two-thirds of its running time).
4.4.3.8 Conclusion
This section has analysed the core components of a multi-level moving target defence, and
examined the cost of migration at each level. Lower-level migrations can be performed at
high frequency, but break the fewest co-locations, whereas the opposite holds at higher levels.
Restricting the moving target defence to a single level limits its ability to break co-location.
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Figure 4.11: Predictions of H() against measured migration times.
For example, while VM migration will break co-locations with other tenants, it cannot break
the OS-level co-locations formed within it. Process and container migration can break co-
location through every level, yet offline migration results in a significant downtime, rendering
its application to a moving target defence limited. The advent of live process migration will
thus help in making this mitigation pathway more viable.
4.4.4 Other Policies
The following are two examples of other policies and mechanisms that can be incorporated
within the SAFEHAVEN framework.
HomeAlone HomeAlone [Zha+11] uses a PRIME-PROBE attack to monitor cache utilisation,
and a trained classifier to recognize patterns indicative of shared locality. This can be used
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Local Remote
Dispatch (ms) Migrations all blackscholes canneal streamcluster blackscholes canneal streamcluster
No migration - 0 1,612 124 184 397 118 169 367
Cony vC (1)
500 2,930 1,475 122 168 385 117 153 368
400 3,601 1,463 120 168 385 117 154 369
300 5,230 1,567 121 166 383 117 153 369
200 7,889 1,590 122 170 384 118 153 369
Cony vC (2)
500 3,110 1,560 124 169 391 118 153 369
400 4,062 1,656 126 167 388 118 152 371
300 5,034 1,521 127 171 388 117 154 367
200 7,824 1,573 126 171 390 117 152 368
vCy C (3)
500 3,117 1,562 123 172 404 118 159 373
400 4,020 1,609 124 173 387 118 158 374
300 5,379 1,614 124 174 388 118 160 372
200 7,628 1,534 126 177 394 118 158 372
vCy C (4)
500 3,154 1,576 125 171 395 118 157 372
400 3,995 1,598 127 170 393 118 157 372
300 5,413 1,630 128 173 394 119 159 372
200 8,514 1,705 128 175 398 118 154 369
Cony OS (5)
210,000 14 2,886 124 167 380 119 153 369
180,000 18 3,565 124 165 380 118 152 369
Cony OS (6) 210,000 14 2,780 122 164 375 119 155 373
VMy OS (7)
120,000 17 2,028 120 179 392 121 176 375
90,000 23 2,025 122 170 384 120 162 392
60,000 39 2,282 121 162 389 122 173 390
30,000 125 3,770 121 169 384 124 177 394
Table 4.5: Effect of migration frequency on performance when running at capacity.
to implement a hypervisor-independent version of the isol() predicate described in Sec-
tion 4.4.2, or to detect adversarial behaviour.
Network Isolation Networks can harbour illicit channels [BT11; CBS04]. Isolation at this
level can be achieved via a combination of soft and hard isolation, with trusted machines
sharing network segments and traffic normalisers [Gor+12] monitoring communication at
the edges.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the use of migration, in its many forms, to dynamically reconfigure
a system at runtime. This was achieved using the SAFEHAVEN framework, through which an
efficient and timely mitigation against a system-wide covert-channel attack was implemented.
The application of SAFEHAVEN was also considered in the context of a moving target defence.
Several points of consideration emerged over the course of the investigation. The first
is that low reconfiguration costs are key to the viability of the approach, as they allow
migrations to be performed at a high frequency without severely impacting the workloads
being migrated. Cheap reconfiguration allows isolation to be procured temporarily and on-
demand, further improving utilisation rates by minimising the duration for which resources
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are reserved, which translates into lowered operating costs for tenants requesting isolation.
Similarly, the turnaround time of a migration method, or the time between the reception of a
request for isolation and its procurement, is critical for the soundness of the approach. This
is because, particularly in the case of reactive mitigations, the turnaround time determines
the length of the attack window following the detection of a potential attack.
The results in this chapter confirm an early hypothesis that directed the foray into the
use of a hierarchy of confinement granularities, namely that the time taken to migrate a
confinement grows with the size of the confinement. This, coupled with utilisation, acts as a
further incentive to isolate processes using the smallest confinements possible.
The benchmarks obtained for process migration may initially appear anomalous, as one
would expect process and container migration to be quicker than migrating their parent
virtual machine. Further investigation reveals that the lacklustre performance emerges from
the low throughput of transferring files, rather than the checkpoint and restore procedures
themselves. This is purely an implementation issue, and the transition to a full-featured
live migration mechanism for criu/p.haul is only a matter of time [Cri]. In addition, the
ability to track page faults from user-space [Arc16] can also be used to implement post-copy
migration for containers.
Finally, this chapter has dispelled the false intuition that virtual machines are too cumber-
some to take part in an illicit-channel mitigation strategy that is based on migration. While
this may be the case for pre-copy migration, with its potential for non-convergence and long
turnaround times, the same cannot be said for post-copy migration. On the contrary, post-
copy migration quickly transfers a virtual machine’s execution to a target machine, followed
by the remainder of its state. This allows machine-level co-locations to be broken quickly and
within a consistent time window. Nevertheless, the stock implementation of post-copy migra-
tion within QEMU has a few limitations with respect to the aims of SAFEHAVEN, key of which
is that an ongoing migration must be carried out fully before the virtual machine in question
can be migrated to another host. This limitation, and one approach to circumventing it, forms
the topic of the next chapter.
99
CHAPTER 4. THE SAFEHAVEN FRAMEWORK
100
CHAPTER 5
ABORTED POST-COPY MIGRATION
VIRTUAL MACHINES ARE CONVENIENT units of computational capacity, offeringstrong isolation guarantees and minimal barriers for adoption, yet their heft
is a double-edged sword. The stock implementation of post-copy within QEMU does
not allow ongoing migrations to be interrupted, limiting the frequency with which a
virtual machine can be migrated, and hindering the ability to procure isolation on a
short-term and temporary basis. This shortcoming is addressed through the imple-
mentation of two-way post-copy migration for QEMU, allowing partial and temporary
migrations to and from a target machine.
5.1 Introduction
Post-copy live migration is an excellent tool in procuring isolation, as it almost instantan-
eously separates a confinement from its co-located entities. This is particularly relevant when
migrating large confinements, notably virtual machines, where pre-copy migration would
leave a tenant requesting isolation co-located with its potential attackers until the migration
is completed, assuming that the migration ever converges.
While post-copy migration may solve the issue of urgency in handling isolation requests
for virtual machines, it does not entirely eliminate the complications brought about by the
virtual machines’ size. Granted, post-copy guarantees that pages will only be sent at most
once, yet one must still transfer the entire virtual machine once a migration is initiated.
A precise formulation of the problem is that post-copy migration, as implemented in QEMU,
lacks semantics for aborting a migration. Cancelling a pre-copy migration is straightforward,
as the virtual machine is still running in its entirety at the source machine throughout the
migration process. Consequently, cancelling a pre-copy simply entails tearing down the mi-
gration stream and discarding the transferred state. The version of QEMU used throughout
this work employed the same routine for cancelling a post-copy migration, which would nat-
urally corrupt both the source and destination virtual machine processes, being that neither
machine has a complete state.
The inability to abort ongoing post-copy migrations places two main limitations on the
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use of virtual machine migration in procuring isolation. First, if the destination is found to
be unsuitable during the course of a migration (for example, due to an unforeseen change
in the machine’s context traits), then one is committed to finishing the migration before the
virtual machine can be evicted.
Secondly, and more crucially, there are a number of scenarios where one would like to
migrate a virtual machine temporarily. For example, a tenant may only require isolation for
the duration of the execution of a single security-sensitive task. Similarly, when implementing
a moving target defence in a setting against attacks with very short setup times, one must be
able to migrate at a high frequency. More generally, there are sources of asymmetry between
machines in a cloud, including factors such as data locality and node capacity, that a tenant
may only need to leverage temporarily. Without the ability to perform a partial migration,
one would have to perform two full migrations in order to temporarily migrate a machine to
and from a target. This has the effect of placing a upper-bound on the frequency with which
migrations can be performed. For example, post-copy virtual machine migrations using the
setup described in the previous chapter took around 20 seconds to complete, leading to a
minimum 40 second round-trip time. This greatly discourages the use of migration at high
frequencies, or for short-lived tasks.
This chapter examines the notion of temporary virtual machine migration, whereby a
physical machine is dynamically leased to a virtual machine for a short period of time. This
is achieved by modifying the post-copy virtual machine live migration mechanisms of QEMU
to support aborted post-copy (or two-way) live migration (APC). While post-copy migration
allows a virtual machine to immediately resume its execution at a target, two-way post-copy
adds the ability to stop an ongoing migration at any point, migrating the remote state back
to its origin without losing the virtual machine’s progress. By only sending back the pages
that were transferred during the outgoing migration, APC allows partial virtual machine
migrations to be carried out at high frequencies.
The approach was evaluated by temporarily migrating virtual machines running intensive
workloads generated using the PARSEC benchmark suite. In addition, the approach was
used to take advantage of heterogeneity within a network of machines. In particular, APC
was used to demonstrate how one can improve the performance and security of software
implementations of AES operations by temporarily migrating to a machine with hardware
AES-NI extensions.
Chapter Outline
This chapter is structured as follows:
Section 5.2 explains the theory behind APC, and describes the extensions carried out to QEMU
to support it.
102
CHAPTER 5. ABORTED POST-COPY MIGRATION
Section 5.3 examines the performance of APC when migrating to machines with different
context and active traits.
Section 5.4 discusses several refinements that can be carried out on the method, and de-
scribes additional application scenarios as well as special considerations that must be
made when deploying APC.
Section 5.5 concludes this chapter.
5.2 Implementing Aborted Post-copy Migration
The task of dynamically migrating a virtual machine V hosted on a machine MSRC to a
destination MDST requires a system that, at a minimum, implements
i) a migration mechanism, and
ii) an interface over which migrations can be triggered.
The standard QEMU migration mechanisms are one-way, with a machine’s state flowing
from a source to a destination machine. In addition, migrations are triggered at the source
via the QMP protocol, the console-based monitor, or indirectly via libvirt.
Implementing two-way (or aborted) post-copy migration requires changes to the mech-
anism to allow for concurrent transmissions in opposite directions, and modifications to the
triggering mechanism, as the triggers initiating and aborting a migration are sent to different
host machines. The implementation of the mechanism and interface options for QEMU will be
described in this section.
5.2.1 Dissecting Post-Copy Virtual Machine Live Migration
The following section describes the low-level details of a standard, one-way post-copy migra-
tion of a virtual machine V within QEMU to a machine MDST, which are key to understanding
the modifications necessary to implement APC. While reference is made to specific internal
structures and processes of QEMU, the general approach is not inherently restricted to this
virtualisation platform.
5.2.1.1 Preparing the Target
Before a migration begins, a VM instance V¯ with a specification identical to V’s must first be
created at MDST [Qemb]. Unlike V, V¯ is started in a listening state, leaving its virtual CPUs
paused while waiting for an incoming migration stream. The task of creating an idle VM is
extremely lightweight, as no state is transferred or allocated.
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Figure 5.1: Serving a remote page fault during a post-copy migration.
The process of creating the idle VM at the target is performed automatically by a daemon
process when migration is triggered through libvirt. Nevertheless, in order to reduce any
confounding factors, MDST was created directly throughout the evaluation by having the
originating process invoke a script remotely.
5.2.1.2 One-Way Post-Copy
When migrating V to MDST, V opens a direct connection to V¯ on a known port, establishing
a migration stream [Kvma]. Pre-copy migration is fundamentally one-way, with a migration
thread on V pushing the VM’s memory contents onto the migration stream for reassembly by
V¯. Post-copy extends the migration process by introducing a back-channel from V¯ to V over
which page faults are announced to the source.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the data flow that takes place when the destination V¯ faults on a
page P during a post-copy migration. The fault is read by the postcopy/fault thread on
V¯ and forwarded to V over the back-channel, where it is consumed by the return path
thread and placed onto the priority queue. The migration thread on V drives the migration,
identifying memory pages to be sent and pushing them to V¯. The thread first services all
page requests on the priority queue. It then scans for and transmits batches of yet-unsent
dirty pages (the queue is serviced in favour of the scan, hence the term priority queue),
the addresses of which are indicated by the migration_bitmap structure. Once a page is
transmitted, its corresponding address is marked in the sentmap bitmap.
Automatically scanning for and sending as-yet unrequested pages carries a number of
advantages in a standard one-way migration, namely it ensures that the migration stream
remains saturated, and it generally reduces the number of remote page faults generated at
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MDST by increasing the likelihood that a requested page has already been transferred. In
addition, sending contiguous sequences of pages in bulk increases efficiency by reducing
signalling and header processing.
The advantage of scanning and sending dirty pages in anticipation is less clear-cut for
APC, as it has two main disadvantages. First, the priority queue is not pre-emptive, and
adding a page will not interrupt an ongoing batch transfer, introducing latency (by default,
batches are sent in 50ms iterations). Secondly, the scanning process is speculative, and will
potentially transfer pages that will not be used by the remote task during the temporary
migration. This makes anticipating transfers potentially wasteful, especially when the task
has a small working set
The post-copy migration mechanism was modified to better facilitate the analysis of the
impact of batch transfers. Specifically, on triggering a post-copy migration operation, one has
the ability to specify an additional mode parameter. This determines whether an outgoing
post-copy migration is to operate using Demand Paging with Scanning (DPwS) or Pure De-
mand Paging (PDP). In the latter case, the migration foregoes automatic migration_bitmap
scanning and bypasses the priority queue, instead servicing page requests immediately as
they arrive at V. In addition, a migration can be started immediately in post-copy mode,
avoiding the race condition encountered in Section 4.4.2.5.
5.2.2 Adding Cancel Semantics: Aborted Post-Copy Migration
Conceptually, a two-way migration involves stopping the original migration from V to V¯, and
performing a migration in reverse. While one may be tempted to simply cancel the original
migration and merge the modified V¯ back into V, the stock QEMU cancel operation shuts down
all the migration channels and unfreezes V while destroying V¯. This occurs when cancelling
both pre- and post-copy migrations, in the latter case corrupting V, as its state will be split
across machines.
Instead, two-way migration was implemented using a post-copy live migration in both dir-
ections. This was implemented as a separate migration protocol, which was termed bounce
mode (the analogy being that a VM is being bounced against a target physical machine, re-
turning to its original host). Using live migration on the return leg, as opposed to a simple
offline merging of pages, reduces downtime, particularly in the case of long bounce opera-
tions.
A bounce-mode migration is started immediately in post-copy mode. On receiving an
abort command, the ongoing migration is stalled, rather than cancelled, at a point just prior
to commencing cleanup. By stalling, V¯ pauses its execution, and V transfers its current
sentmap to V¯. Once received, V¯ initiates a post-copy migration back to V using the acquired
sentmap as its starting migration_bitmap, limiting transfers to the set of pages that were
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Figure 5.2: Temporarily migrating V from MSRC to MDST.
sent by V. On completion, the original migration is stopped and clean-up is performed. The
migration from V¯ to V is always carried out in DPwS, as the objective is to return back to the
origin as quickly as possible, and the set of pages to be returned is known.
While a QEMU migration would normally create a fresh VM process at its destination,
bouncing back will migrate V¯ into the original virtual machine V. This preserves the con-
tinuity of the V process on MSRC, with its process identifier persisting through the bounce
operation. V can be bounced or migrated freely following a completed bounce operation,
whereas V¯ will be left in an internal QEMU postmigrate state, and cannot be reused as
a migration target. Rather than modifying QEMU’s internal state machine and potentially
breaking compatibility with external tools and front-ends, a robust and pragmatic approach
was adopted, whereby the V¯ process was simply restarted after each completed bounce op-
eration.
The stock implementation of post-copy migration favours batching, both on the migration
stream as well as the return path. In the latter case, requests generated by page faults are
buffered and periodically flushed, adding a delay between a page fault and its placement onto
the remote priority queue. As the approach being considered focuses on leasing hardware
on a short-term basis, PDP was modified to eliminate buffering and transmit page faults
immediately.
5.2.3 Controlling Migrations
The second aspect of the approach concerns the triggering of bounce operations. As illustrated
by Figure 5.2, the state of a bounce operation is controlled by two signals, namely
i) a bounce_start() signal, received at V, that initiates an outgoing bounce operation,
and
ii) a bounce_return() signal, received at V¯, that bounces V back to its origin.
Bounce operations must be triggered by communicating with the QEMU virtualisation layer
of the VM in question. Figure 5.3 illustrates the two principal pathways for triggering bounce
operations. Bounce operations may either be triggered internally by a process within V, or
externally by a process outside V. The former is used to service a tenant VM’s request for
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Figure 5.3: Trigger interfaces and flows when triggering a bounce operation.
a specific machine trait, whereas the latter would typically be used by a cloud provider to
temporarily displace a VM.
QEMU does not employ paravirtualisation, and guests lack the ability of communicating dir-
ectly with their hypervisor via hypercalls [Kvma]. Instead, a character device driver backend
was developed, which acts as a device that is exposed to guests as a virtio serial port [Kvmb].
This allows guests to communicate with the virtualisation platform, and gives privileged pro-
cesses within a VM the ability to dynamically trigger bounce operations by writing requests
to a system file descriptor. These are then picked up and interpreted from within the QEMU
layer. Bounce directives also accept a trait parameter on which the hypervisor can base its
choice of migration target. Commands are interpreted asynchronously, as performing block-
ing or long-lived operations within the device backend can cause the entire virtual machine
to block.
The external triggering of operations is enabled by modifying the QEMU Machine Pro-
tocol (QMP) [Qema] specification, which accepts QEMU commands as JSON requests via a
defined interface (such as a UNIX socket). Concretely, the QMP specification was extended
to interpret bounce directives. Care must be exercised when triggering bounce operations
on V through QMP, as V¯ is effectively a separate machine, and existing QMP connections
will not be automatically transferred to the target following a migration. This issue does not
manifest itself in the case of internally-triggered migrations, as the backend automatically
re-establishes a connection to the VM’s tenant-facing virtio serial port following a migra-
tion, and the frontend remains unaltered from the perspective of processes within the VM.
Thus, if a process within V issues a bounce_start() to its bounce driver port, it will initiate
a migration operation to V¯. The backend will be changed transparently, and a subsequent
bounce_return() to the same port would be received by V¯’s hypervsior, bouncing the VM
back.
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5.3 Experiments
The performance of APC largely depends on the volume and access pattern of pages that
must be transferred. One could easily contrive an ideal use case, bouncing a VM running an
application with a minimal working set. While such applications exist, the strength of APC
lies in its versatility and generality. To that end, the evaluation centred on the bouncing of
heavy workloads, produced via the PARSEC [Bie+08] benchmark suite (Section 4.4.1.1).
The following section attempts to quantify the effects of APC while running intensive
workloads under various scenarios. In particular, it analyses the effects of bouncing a VM
to an idle machine (measuring the use case of obtaining temporary isolation, a context trait)
as well as an occupied target (to quantify more generic applications such as a moving target
defense). This is followed by an investigation into the use of APC to bounce a VM between
machines with different active traits, performing encryptions by temporarily migrating to a
machine with AES-NI [Gue10] extensions.
5.3.1 Baseline
As seen in Section 4.4.2.5, migrating VMT between two INTELT machines using an unmod-
ified DPwS migration takes ≈ 20 seconds. Memory ballooning, whereby a VM’s unallocated
memory is freed back to the base system, can lower migration times, but varies depending
on the workload. The following baseline can thus be established: in the absence of APC, a
2GB VM can be migrated temporarily using two full back-to-back post-copy migrations, with
a round-trip taking at least 40 seconds, and at most 4GB of memory being transferred.
5.3.2 Test Parameters
Tests are carried out on a single bouncing VM V, which is migrated temporarily from MSRC to
MDST. The tests described in this section contain various sources of variability, the foremost
being the
i) workload of V,
ii) number of additional VMs executing on MSRC and MDST, and their workloads,
iii) bounce period τ , which is the time between one outgoing bounce migration and the
next, and
iv) bounce duration δ, which is the time that V spends temporarily executing on MDST
within a single bounce operation.
A VM’s memory is partitioned into a number of ramblocks, the largest being the VM’s RAM
(524,288 pages) and video buffer (2,048 pages). In total, V has 527,025 4KiB pages that can
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Figure 5.4: Average outgoing memory transfer sizes when bouncing idle and loaded VMs in
PDP and DPwS mode.
be transferred using post-copy, requiring a bitmap of 65,880 bytes that must be exchanged
on initiating a bounce_return() operation (Section 5.2.1).
The VM’s RAM is by far the largest component of its state that will be demand paged.
Some minor savings may be had by reducing the VM’s video memory. Another possible
optimisation is to forego the migration of the networking device. In addition to reducing the
amount of memory to be transferred, this would avoid having to perform the device setup
and network announcement routines at the destination. This may be useful when bouncing
to perform very short-lived computations that do not make use of the network, but it would
also render the method application dependent. Consequently, this avenue was not pursued
in this work.
5.3.3 Characterising Workloads
The following experiments investigate the effects that different workloads have on the per-
formance of migration.
5.3.3.1 Activity and Inactivity
The first experiment seeks to establish a baseline between an active and inactive virtual
machine with respect to the amount of memory that is transferred during an outgoing bounce
operation.
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The transfer size for the inactive case was averaged over 30 bounces of a running but
otherwise idle VM. For the active case, all was executed once in the VM, which was bounced
periodically until the benchmark completed. As will be seen, larger values of δ incur longer
execution times. Consequently, the total number of bounce operations for a given δ varied
between 77 and 175. Both experiments were carried out with τ = 15s, and were repeated for
values of δ ∈ [1, 5] seconds. The VM executed alone and was rebooted between experiments.
Figure 5.4 illustrates the result of running the experiment in PDP and DPwS mode using
varying values of δ. As can be seen, the idle VM maintains a small memory footprint, only
consuming ≈ 300MB of its allocated 2GB. This leads to a complete migration in just over 3s
when in DPwS mode, as evidenced by the plateau in transfer sizes. Similarly, the VM’s very
low internal activity generates a negligible number of page faults at the temporary destination
in PDP, and little is transferred beyond an initial 20MB. In contrast, a loaded VM has a
much larger memory footprint, and more state must be transferred. DPwS saturates the
migration stream (≈ 110MB/s, which approaches the network’s nominal capacity) for the
duration of the bounce operation, and the volume of memory grows in direct proportion to
δ. While the precise value of δ beyond which the transfer plateaus varies depending on the
memory balloon size, growth in the transfer stage is effectively linear, and will take at most
≈ 20s for a 2GB VM. Conversely, throughput in PDP mode is significantly lower, capping at
≈ 12MB/s, or 11% of the saturated channel capacity. This figure embodies the drawbacks of
a pure demand-based migration strategy with no batching, whereby each page request has
an associated round-trip time. Given that this is well below the channel’s bandwidth, and
that the throughput is constant for each tested value of δ, we can deduce that this is a soft
limit set by the machinery of PDP, and that the benchmark is requesting pages at a higher
rate than that at which it can be served. This was further reinforced through the execution of
additional benchmarks, as well as by directly analysing the CPU consumption rates on both
machines during a bounce operation.
Note that the values cited in Figure 5.4 are for the outgoing migration, and the same
volume of pages must be sent back on performing bounce_return(). In terms of memory
transfers, PDP has the advantage of being more economical and only sending requested
pages, although some waste may still occur, as will be discussed in Section 5.4.1.1.
5.3.3.2 Locality and Page Spread
The comparatively poor throughput of PDP can be attributed to the large turnaround times
involved between submitting a fault and receiving the page, coupled with the relatively small
page size being used (4KB). Throughput can be improved through batching, provided that an
application’s memory access patterns are sufficiently local or regular. This section attempts
to empirically quantify the spatial locality of each benchmark, which aids in gauging the
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Figure 5.5: Percentage of pages in a PDP bounce migration that are not contiguous, for
bounce migrations triggered at 5 stages of a benchmark’s execution. τ = 10s, δ = 5s.
feasibility of batching and in interpreting subsequent evaluation results.
To characterise the spatial locality of a VM, a PDP bounce operation was triggered, and
the sequence S of n emitted pages was recorded, where S ≡ {P1, P2 . . . Pn}, and Pi is the ad-
dress of the ith page in the sequence. The number of instances where an interval of pages does
not contain pages with adjacent memory addresses were then counted. More formally, given a
distance I, a set of discontinuous pages D ≡ {i | Pi, Pj ∈ S ∧ ¬∃Pj . |Pi − Pj | = 1 ∧ |i− j| ≤ I}
is extracted. Finally, the discontinuity ratio |D|/n was computed for the identified sets.
Figure 5.5 illustrates the result of calculating the discontinuity ratio for each benchmark
using I ∈ {1, 8, 16, 32, 64}. The ratio is calculated using page sequences generated during
back-to-back bounce operations, with δ = 5s and τ = 10s. Ratios are shown for bounces at
five stages of each benchmark’s execution.
The initialisation and termination stages of a benchmark exhibit the highest spatial loc-
ality. Sequential spatial locality at the initial stages may be attributed to the benchmarks’
unpacking phase, whereas the final stages may be the product of reduced activity. Of note
is that each observed page sequence has at least 20% of its pages neighbouring others that
are adjacent in memory. Increasing the interval length to ±8 significantly lowers the discon-
tinuity ratio for localised workloads, yet the effect is less pronounced for benchmarks with
large working sets. Raising interval lengths further did not appreciably reduce discontinuity.
This would imply that discontinuities are primarily the result of page requests with sporadic
addresses, rather than a switch to a different sequential region of memory. Thus, while trans-
ferring both pages adjacent to a requested page should improve usable throughput, moving
to larger intervals may be counterproductive when migrating for very short durations.
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Benchmark
Running Time (s) TX (MB) RX Throughput (MB/s)
Base DPwS PDP DPwS PDP DPwS PDP
blackscholes 113 119 (×1.05) 160 (×1.42) 2003 548 939.2 923.2
bodytrack 95 100 (×1.05) 115 (×1.21) 1554 643 936.7 925.2
canneal 128 152 (×1.19) 229 (×1.79) 1536 1003 928.1 933.5
dedup 19 31 (×1.63) 79 (×4.16) 1987 823 922.1 939.1
raytrace 150 155 (×1.03) 239 (×1.59) 1551 943 937.7 934.0
streamcluster 340 399 (×1.17) 412 (×1.21) 483 149 864 920.6
Table 5.1: Remote execution of single benchmarks.
5.3.4 Migration to Idle Target
This section examines the migration scenario where the target physical machine is not hosting
any virtual machines, that is, when MDST is idle.
5.3.4.1 One-Shot Bounce Migration
The following experiment attempts to quantify the overhead of executing remotely during
a bounce migration. This is done by performing an outward bounce operation on a VM
shortly after a benchmark is started, and only returning once the benchmark completes. This
procedure was carried out for each benchmark in both bounce modes, and the execution
times and memory transfer sizes were recorded.
Table 5.1 lists the running times for each benchmark. The TX column refers to the volume
of data transferred during the outgoing leg of the operation. The RX column lists the through-
put of the return operation for the associated outgoing mode. Since return operations are
always performed in DPwS, identical throughput values are obtained for the return leg of
both PDP and DPwS bounces.
The triggering point of bounce_start() affects the workload’s total running time. An
early trigger, particularly in DPwS mode, can take advantage of memory ballooning, leading
to a VM being transferred before the test ramps up. Triggering later reduces the benefit
of ballooning, yet it leads to a greater fraction of the workload having executed prior to
bouncing. In the case of the benchmarks in Table 5.1, bounce_start() was triggered after
executing for ≈ 30% of the benchmarks’ base time.
With the exception of streamcluster, each benchmark’s memory footprint had ballooned
to the point of consuming the majority of the VM’s allocation, which resulted in large trans-
fers being performed in DPwS mode. In contrast, PDP migrations transferred an average of
25-50% of their DPwS equivalents. Since only the outgoing leg is being performed, and the
workloads execute for a significant amount of time, DPwS carries a distinct advantage over
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Figure 5.6: Iterated bounce migration to idle host for varying δ, τ = 20. Points denote the
total execution time (left axis), whereas bars denote the average transfer size of outgoing
bounce operations of the corresponding δ (right axis).
PDP in terms of running time. This is because once DPwS transfers the VM’s entire state,
there will no longer be any involvement from the source machine, and no further perform-
ance penalties will be incurred. Conversely, PDP leaves the migration channel active for the
duration of the bounce operation, and any remote page faults will cause a stall. This effect
becomes increasingly apparent when bouncing larger workloads for longer durations.
Most workloads only experienced a minor slowdown in DPwS mode. The dedup bench-
mark was heavily impacted by bouncing, being a short-lived computation with a large work-
ing set. The streamcluster workload is particular in that it produced the least amount of
network traffic, yet experienced the largest absolute slowdown (59s) out of the benchmarks
bounced using DPwS.
5.3.4.2 Iterated Bounce Migration
The following experiments evaluate the effect of performing back-to-back bounce operations
on a VM when running each benchmark separately. As before, the host and destination base
machines are otherwise idle, and the VM is relaunched between tests.
Figure 5.6 shows the total running times (shown as points) when bouncing with τ = 20s
using different values of δ. The outgoing transmission size for a given δ (shown as bars)
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is derived by taking the average transfer size of each bounce operation performed within
that run. The value of δ was kept constant throughout each individual execution of each
benchmark. The maximum tested δ (9s) was kept to just below half of the set τ (20s) to ensure
that a VM had returned to its source before another bounce operation is initiated. Note that
the VM is effectively in a state of constant migration when performing DPwS bounces with
δ = 9s. In contrast, a PDP bounce operation with the same δ will cause ≈ 100MBs of pages
to be transferred on the outgoing leg, which can be returned to the source machine in ≈ 1s
using a DPwS migration. This results in the VM being involved with a migration for roughly
half of its execution time.
Several factors have to be taken into consideration when comparing DPwS and PDP mi-
grations. As evidenced by the previous test, more work per unit time will be performed at the
destination using DPwS rather than PDP when bouncing workloads with non-trivial work-
ing sets using moderate values of δ. The exponential slowdown of canneal and raytrace’s
performance against δ in DPwS mode may be attributed to their locality model. The perform-
ance of the dedup benchmark is somewhat erratic due to its relatively short execution time,
where the choice of δ can change the execution time to a multiple of τ , thus changing the
total number of bounce operations performed in a run.
The performance impact of bouncing will always be bounded, as it will level off once the
migration completes. This can be observed for relatively low values of δ when bouncing the
streamcluster benchmark using DPwS. In this case, the working set is transferred within the
first five seconds of bounce_start(), and the performance impact plateaus. An intersection
with PDP’s running times can be observed around the δ = 8s mark, at which point the cost of
stalling on pages exceeds the cost of transferring the machine’s complete state via DPwS.
In summary, larger values of δ lead to slower execution times, up to the point where a
VM’s working set is migrated completely. This is primarily the result of two factors, namely
i) larger values of δ generally lead to larger outgoing memory transfers, which must be
sent back, and
ii) the longer a task executes remotely, the greater the odds of stalling on a page, particu-
larly in the case of PDP.
5.3.5 Migration with Co-Residency
APC is ultimately designed for deployment within a cloud infrastructure, where the source
and destination machines may host multiple, loaded virtual machines. This section evaluates
the behaviour of APC with co-resident VMs. This can guide the use of the method in other
contexts, such as in implementing a moving-target defence, or in temporarily balancing loads.
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Totals MSRC
Bounces Tx (GB) δ all blackscholes canneal streamcluster dedup
0 0 - 948 - - - -
0 0 - 1299 - 149.82 384.14 22.69
0 0 - 1337 121.93 - 366.21 22.51
0 0 - 1375 120.88 143.42 - 23.00
0 0 - 1099 120.52 146.45 381.97 -
PD
P
151 8.04 5 2287 - 149.45 382.09 22.21
139 7.57 5 2096 120.88 - 362.36 22.07
152 8.21 5 2296 121.36 143.83 - 22.55
138 9.91 5 2079 121.02 146.85 380.25 -
D
Pw
S
262 119.93 5 4031 - 149.38 379.69 21.32
250 112.42 5 3901 120.74 - 362.34 21.78
258 116.53 5 4032 122.60 143.80 - 21.91
217 123.49 5 3357 121.71 149.04 377.34 -
Table 5.2: Loaded source, idle destination, τ = 15s. Times are given in seconds.
5.3.5.1 Loaded Source, Idle Destination
The first test evaluated the case where MSRC is loaded and MDST is idle. For each test, three
VMs were launched concurrently with a designated bouncing VM at the source, and each VMs
was assigned a workload that it executes continuously in a loop. The co-located VMs did not
actively participate in any bounce operations, and merely served as loads. Each co-located
VM performed a warm-up round prior to the beginning of each test.
The test consisted of executing all within the bouncing VM and timing its overall ex-
ecution time when performing periodic bounce migrations in both modes with δ = 5s and
τ = 15s. The execution times of the co-located workloads were also recorded so as to examine
the global effects of APC.
Table 5.2 presents the results of bouncing a VM in APC and DPwS with an idle MDST
using δ = 5s and τ = 15s, as well as the base cases with no bounces. Each row represents a
separate test. Each column represents a separate VM, and the average time taken to execute
its associated benchmark. The all column lists the time taken to complete the bouncing
workload. As the other workloads will have executed several times before all terminated,
the geometric mean of the individual execution times was calculated. The bounces column
lists the number of bounces performed during that test’s execution, and Tx gives the total
data sent during the outgoing legs of each bounce migration.
The first observation is that simply adding parallel workloads on the source machine
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significantly impacts the performance of all, and, to a lesser extent, that of the individual
workloads. This was found to be, at least in part, the product of several intermittent and
intense write bursts to the NFS share, the effects of which are obscured when taking the mean
of the individual workloads but accumulate within the all benchmark. For the observed
runs, DPwS bounces caused the all benchmark to take almost twice as long to complete as
when bouncing using PDP, and to transfer around 14 times as much data. The extended
execution time also led to a greater number of bounce operations being performed, which
further slowed down the benchmark. PDP bounces effectively doubled the base execution
time of all. As discussed earlier, one must keep in mind that given the same δ, a VM bouncing
in DPwS mode will spend more time in flight than in PDP.
The effects of bouncing do not appear to spill over to the co-located workloads, which is
crucial in a cloud setting. This may not hold true in the case of highly-consolidated machines,
or if multiple tenants make heavy use of the network without quotas.
5.3.5.2 Loaded Source, Loaded Destination
The previous test was repeated, with the exception that the destination was no longer kept
idle. Four VMs were set to execute concurrently at MDST, with a benchmark assigned to each
VM. The bouncing VM executed all in PDP mode with δ ∈ [1, 10] seconds (Table 5.3), and in
DPwS mode with δ ∈ [1, 6] seconds (Table 5.4).
Introducing a second set of busy VMs onto the network exacerbated the bottleneck at the
NFS server that was observed in the previous test. Comparing with the previous results using
an idle destination, bouncing with δ = 5s increased the execution time of all by an average
of 38% for PDP, and 42% for DPwS. Tests where dedup did not execute were markedly faster
than other tests, which indicates some degree of interference.
5.3.6 Leveraging Active Traits: AES-NI
An interesting quirk of KVM acceleration is that it effectively leads to a virtual machine
having two cpuid registers, namely a virtualised register that is presented to the operat-
ing system, and the physical process-level register which is visible to the actual instruc-
tion stream [Kvma]. Consequently, instructions issued to a KVM vCPU will execute correctly,
provided that they form part of the physical core’s instruction set, even if QEMU reports that the
VM lacks the associated CPU feature (this behaviour has been discussed in Section 2.4.2.2
in the context of blocking clflush). Consequently, apart from bouncing for isolation, a VM
V running on MSRC can be temporarily migrated to MDST to leverage differences in the
machines’ active traits (Section 1.3.1), or instruction set extensions.
As a proof of concept, an investigation was carried out with MSRC as an AMDT machine
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Totals MSRC MDST
Bounces Tx (GB) δ all blackscholes canneal streamcluster dedup blackscholes canneal streamcluster dedup
0 0 - 948 - - - - - - - -
0 0 - 1742 - 150.21 376.99 27.76 121.02 171.79 392.55 28.38
0 0 - 2042 119.98 - 355.43 27.55 121.25 149.04 368.24 28.01
0 0 - 1892 119.77 140.35 - 25.08 120.39 143.57 368.97 25.04
0 0 - 1367 120.85 146.14 376.15 - 123.04 145.94 372.79 22.90
Pu
re
D
em
an
d
Pa
gi
n
g
147 3.81 1 2196 - 146.37 376.31 24.60 120.05 144.59 371.14 23.85
142 3.25 1 2125 119.77 - 357.34 24.89 119.59 142.28 370.46 24.28
161 3.74 1 2406 118.80 138.77 - 22.89 118.71 141.68 370.21 23.15
108 2.34 1 1609 121.39 146.43 377.21 - 121.74 146.23 373.06 22.60
151 5.77 2 2257 - 146.84 377.32 24.35 119.61 144.35 369.86 25.61
157 4.68 2 2363 118.93 - 355.80 23.34 119.80 143.11 370.24 23.81
161 5.01 2 2425 120.37 138.70 - 23.96 119.31 143.08 369.59 24.63
111 3.60 2 1668 121.10 145.75 378.50 - 120.31 148.19 373.83 22.82
160 6.28 3 2417 - 146.23 376.18 24.50 120.35 143.88 370.36 25.06
174 6.81 3 2626 119.85 - 356.33 24.48 120.21 143.56 371.72 25.22
180 7.39 3 2718 119.69 138.31 - 24.98 119.81 142.38 371.20 25.14
119 4.57 3 1793 121.01 146.05 376.27 - 121.53 145.80 373.97 23.08
185 8.75 4 2795 - 146.66 376.79 24.09 120.90 144.64 370.51 25.03
197 9.02 4 2971 119.39 - 355.77 24.13 120.42 143.13 371.00 23.80
193 9.30 4 2916 120.49 138.43 - 24.47 120.74 143.67 370.35 23.98
136 6.63 4 2044 121.80 145.98 378.76 - 122.00 147.84 374.91 23.02
201 10.49 5 3027 - 146.44 376.97 23.70 121.36 144.10 372.03 24.64
194 10.77 5 2914 119.49 - 355.20 23.64 120.42 144.80 371.80 23.42
241 12.49 5 3635 120.16 138.33 - 24.63 121.17 144.34 372.55 25.32
171 10.10 5 2577 121.01 144.65 378.10 - 121.30 147.04 376.91 23.28
239 15.30 6 3597 - 147.09 375.70 23.83 121.61 145.66 374.13 25.98
262 15.41 6 3952 119.16 - 354.72 23.26 121.08 144.70 373.89 24.55
230 14.72 6 3467 120.62 140.14 - 25.02 121.80 173.25 395.54 24.87
187 13.64 6 2812 121.64 147.43 376.58 - 121.70 149.02 376.46 23.28
280 19.71 7 4217 - 146.43 376.07 23.41 122.04 146.69 375.03 25.19
287 19.25 7 4328 119.82 - 356.69 24.31 120.94 144.45 375.57 24.45
232 17.44 7 3495 120.48 140.46 - 24.71 121.93 173.04 397.69 25.16
208 16.46 7 3132 121.39 146.29 377.69 - 121.78 152.85 376.65 22.98
312 24.68 8 4703 - 146.58 374.94 23.03 122.09 147.48 375.01 24.40
322 25.62 8 4871 120.54 - 357.69 24.11 121.56 146.19 374.10 24.15
311 24.84 8 4692 120.48 140.21 - 23.89 121.89 144.82 374.71 23.85
259 22.73 8 3908 121.19 145.60 376.69 - 122.46 149.46 377.87 23.13
375 32.04 9 5665 - 147.96 376.52 23.04 121.85 147.82 375.81 24.48
366 32.57 9 5535 120.48 - 356.26 24.48 122.36 173.76 397.53 24.55
376 32.69 9 5678 120.64 139.30 - 23.74 121.94 145.90 375.79 24.89
315 29.77 9 4754 121.29 146.57 376.80 - 122.51 169.05 377.84 23.27
449 45.55 10 6772 - 147.82 375.73 23.97 121.79 147.44 378.17 24.73
458 45.10 10 6918 120.51 - 356.31 23.98 122.27 147.08 376.42 24.38
454 44.50 10 6866 120.53 138.48 - 24.31 122.74 147.48 376.09 25.26
395 41.17 10 5962 121.78 146.02 375.84 - 123.72 149.29 379.62 22.92
Table 5.3: Loaded source and destination, PDP, τ = 15s. Times are given in seconds.
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Totals MSRC MDST
Bounces Tx (GB) δ all blackscholes canneal streamcluster dedup blackscholes canneal streamcluster dedup
0 0 - 948 - - - - - - - -
0 0 - 1742 - 150.21 376.99 27.76 121.02 171.79 392.55 28.38
0 0 - 2042 119.98 - 355.43 27.55 121.25 149.04 368.24 28.01
0 0 - 1892 119.77 140.35 - 25.08 120.39 143.57 368.97 25.04
0 0 - 1367 120.85 146.14 376.15 - 123.04 145.94 372.79 22.90
D
em
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168 25.17 1 2509 - 147.20 376.38 24.36 120.91 144.84 371.90 24.76
208 30.66 1 3104 119.16 - 354.33 25.52 120.51 146.76 371.83 25.83
178 26.11 1 2656 120.60 138.84 - 24.18 119.93 144.24 371.82 24.86
116 15.28 1 1730 121.16 147.75 379.26 - 121.12 146.79 374.96 23.06
205 41.38 2 3075 - 147.84 376.21 24.32 120.76 145.22 372.13 24.68
198 44.17 2 2959 119.83 - 356.45 23.93 120.55 144.81 370.44 24.66
206 45.92 2 3094 121.10 140.37 - 25.17 120.90 144.59 370.62 25.30
132 29.70 2 1980 121.10 147.14 376.76 - 121.65 147.67 375.77 22.42
227 67.91 3 3451 - 146.77 376.85 24.63 121.27 146.59 373.41 24.58
237 73.61 3 3582 120.57 - 356.14 24.11 120.62 146.53 372.23 24.98
241 75.10 3 3626 121.76 141.69 - 24.22 120.55 144.96 372.90 24.55
182 61.14 3 2732 121.95 147.40 378.45 - 121.79 148.45 375.27 22.75
283 114.63 4 4422 - 147.86 375.84 24.22 122.24 146.73 374.14 25.31
295 123.30 4 4564 120.17 - 356.70 25.11 120.82 147.94 372.79 25.44
293 118.38 4 4533 121.58 141.42 - 23.76 121.43 147.39 373.48 25.53
227 100.16 4 3558 121.52 147.75 377.07 - 121.99 148.57 377.77 23.10
333 159.39 5 5264 - 148.30 376.37 23.68 122.32 148.24 376.23 24.97
371 192.83 5 5956 120.27 - 380.29 24.90 122.23 148.68 374.80 26.20
370 180.86 5 5805 121.07 140.97 - 24.18 121.64 149.21 376.93 25.35
303 157.34 5 4827 122.40 148.15 376.88 - 122.06 150.83 379.49 23.06
459 248.06 6 7474 - 147.59 377.07 23.27 121.90 149.38 377.34 25.05
460 252.13 6 7339 120.21 - 357.70 24.27 122.55 147.75 375.68 25.12
463 255.21 6 7557 120.35 142.75 - 23.51 122.20 150.45 376.59 24.45
338 197.79 6 5684 122.64 148.48 376.39 - 123.05 151.26 380.68 23.16
Table 5.4: Loaded source and destination, DPwS, τ = 15s. Times are given in seconds.
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and MDST being an INTELT machine. The active traits under consideration were the AES-NI
CPU extensions [Gue10], which MSRC lacks. AES-NI operations are faster and more resilient
against side-channel attacks than their software-based equivalents [OST06]. As will be seen,
this difference in speed can add up when performing many cryptographic operations (such
as when implementing an MPC protocol [BSKR13]), to the point where it would be faster to
bounce to MDST and make use of its AES-NI capabilities rather than to use a software-based
implementation on MSRC.
5.3.6.1 Setup
The performance of AES was evaluated using the Gladman benchmarks within Intel’s AES-NI
reference implementation [Int16a]. These benchmarks measured the time taken to execute a
series of iterations of encryptions, with each iteration encrypting 160Kb of data using a 128-
bit key. The benchmark can be performed using either a pure assembly-based implementation
of the AES operators (referred to as ASM), or one that is AES-NI enabled (referred to as AES-
NI).
Simultaneous multi-threading was disabled for V so as to match the AMDT’s CPU hier-
archy. As with previous experiments, KVM acceleration was enabled. While QEMU virtual-
ises the cpuid register, KVM cuts through QEMU’s capability enforcement layer [Kvma]. Con-
sequently, a program can forego sanity checks on the vCPU’s capability model and blindly
issue AES-NI instructions. This was tested on the aforementioned machines, and it was found
that the INTELT architectures would interpret such commands correctly, whereas the AMDT
would generate an illegal instruction exception. Migrating from the AMDT to an INTELT
machine prior to dispatching the instructions results in their correct execution.
5.3.6.2 Experiments
The experiments measured the performance of AES encryption operations performed within
V when
i) hosted on an Intel machine,
ii) hosted on the AMD machine, and
iii) started on the AMD and bouncing to an Intel in PDP mode for the duration of the
workload’s execution.
Evaluations were carried out for cases (i) and (iii) using both the ASM and AES-NI imple-
mentations, whereas only ASM could be used for (ii).
Figure 5.7 illustrates the time taken to execute the benchmark for the aforementioned
scenarios while varying the number of encryption iterations. INTELT is newer and faster than
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Figure 5.7: Running times using a pure assembler-based implementation (ASM) and one
accelerated with AES-NI.
AMDT, leading to a corresponding improvement in the ASM running times. Using AES-NI
on the Intel machine halved the running time over ASM. As can be seen, the difference in
computing power is such that it can prove faster to bounce from the AMD machine to an Intel
machine and back than to execute directly on the AMD. Specifically, the ASM implementation
runs faster using bounce mode when performing over 20,000 benchmark iterations, whereas
using AES-NI will lead to a speed-up beyond 10,000 iterations.
5.3.6.3 Conclusion
This section has demonstrated an application of APC that takes advantage of asymmetries
in active traits, specifically AES-NI support. While this can increase both security and per-
formance, it is anticipated that APC will be of even greater use when leasing active traits
that have no adequate analogue at their machine of origin. For example, while a software
implementation of AES may approximate the characteristics of AES-NI, this may not be the
case for special hardware confinements such as SGX [BPH14].
Note that applying these mechanisms to a production environment would require addi-
tional safeguards to prevent a guest VM from attempting to run instructions on unsupported
hardware. The “off-label” use of CPU instructions can pose a security risk, potentially introdu-
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cing side-channels allowing machines to be fingerprinted, and can also complicate the saving
and loading of CPU states.
5.4 Discussion
The following section describes the issues affecting the performance of APC, and ways of
improving its performance. It also identifies possible additions and extensions to APC that
allow its use in additional scenarios.
5.4.1 Factors Affecting Performance
The following section describes the principle sources of inefficiency, and possible avenues of
improvement.
5.4.1.1 Crosstalk
While one may only be interested in bouncing a VM for the benefit of a single process within
it, all contained processes are ultimately participating in the migration. This is simultaneously
one of the approach’s greatest strengths and weaknesses, as migrating a whole VM avoids
having to decompose and decouple the internal workings of the hosted application, yet it
may also introduce crosstalk.
In this context, crosstalk refers to page faults generated by processes unrelated to the task
that instigated the bounce operation. The coarse-grained nature of VMs may be inadequate
for single environments that are executing multiple unrelated and intensive processes, and
one may have to resort to finer-grained container [Cri] migration (Section 4.2.3). A container-
based solution would serve to localise page faults, yet research in live container migration
is still ongoing, and deployment in a cloud setting would require the creation of additional
interfaces to coordinate deployment and confinement discovery.
5.4.1.2 Locality and Memory Size
Spatial locality and memory requirements may vary widely between applications, which com-
plicates batching transfers and pre-fetching pages during a migration [HDG09]. A direct way
of increasing performance is to simply improve the hardware. For example, DPwS is effect-
ively network-bound, and increasing bandwidth (such as by switching to a 10GbE network)
will translate to faster migration times. This is not as straightforward in the case of PDP, as
the turnaround time is primarily determined by latency, rather than bandwidth.
A more intrusive white-box approach can employ program analysis to provide hints as to
how memory will be used. One can subsequently perform a hybrid migration, transferring
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memory in anticipation of an imminent bounce operation. Analysis can also serve to identify
empty or new pages that can be skipped during migration [HSS15].
5.4.2 Limitations
Other than potential performance and capacity issues, which may be mitigated through
hardware and software, post-copy migration is inherently less reliable than pre-copy mi-
gration [Qemb]. During a post-copy migration, a virtual machine’s state is split between
the source and destination machines, with the latter hosting the most current updates to
memory. Failure of the destination machine or the network places the virtual machine in
an inconsistent state, as all the memory operations that occurred during migration will be
lost. If the destination terminates gracefully, then one could potentially rescue the VM by
aborting the post-copy operation (effectively bouncing back early), yet this would require
strong hardware guarantees. In contrast, pre-copy migration always maintains a consistent
version of the virtual machine on the source machine, and control is only transferred once
the machine’s memory contents are synchronised, greatly reducing the time window during
which a migration can be corrupted. Should the destination fail during migration, one would
simply keep executing at the source.
Post-copy operations can be made more robust by taking snapshots (or checkpointing [Cri;
Qemb]) prior to a migration, which would act as a backup. Alternatively, the source machine
can be kept frozen in memory, and a failing migration can be restarted. This solution would
require a notion of transactions and roll-backs, as operations will generally have side-effects,
and not all operations can simply be repeated.
5.4.3 Extensions
Temporary migration can potentially be applied to other contexts beyond the procurement of
isolation, such as in counteracting short-lived load imbalances, or in bringing computations
closer to their respective distributed data sources. The following is a brief overview of a
number of ways in which aborted post-copy can be improved, as well as extended to support
additional deployment scenarios.
5.4.3.1 Migrate-On-Write
The current implementation of aborted post-copy transfers any pages sent during the outgo-
ing operation back during the return leg, yet there is no need to return pages that were not
modified during the bounce operation. By tracking page writes at the destination throughout
a bounce operation and filtering out non-dirtied pages from the migration_bitmap, one can
avoid bouncing back read-only pages.
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5.4.3.2 Event Sources
In the current implementation, bounce operations are explicitly triggered either from within
the VM over the driver interface, or externally via QMP. The task of driving the migration,
or specifying event sources, will ultimately depend on the cloud provider’s specific use-case.
For example, a cloud provider may be able to stave off hardware obsolescence using
temporary migrations. Instead of upgrading its machines with every new CPU generation, a
cloud provider can mix a limited number of new machines into its existing network. Virtual
machines are then given a virtual representation of the new architecture, and calls making
use of the new features can be dynamically intercepted to transparently trigger a temporary
migration to the appropriate hardware. This would require the interception of the instruction
stream, either using traps, emulation [Qemb], or rewriting on loading (if the virtualisation
platform supports it [SXZ13]). This can prove cost-effective as a transitional technology, or
in the case of extensions that are infrequently used. Such asymmetries can be modelled as
capabilities [Lib], and could be integrated into existing VM management infrastructures.
Alternatively, code can be automatically transformed to trigger migration on the basis
of active traits, guarding code blocks via inlined commands to trigger migrations, or dy-
namically using introspection [FL12]. A heterogeneous cloud will produce variability at the
level of passive and active traits that can be leveraged, provided that the security policies
are sufficiently fine-grained. Automatically exploiting context traits is less straightforward,
as these are generally the subject of more abstract security requirements (for example, one
would have to specify the signature of a side-channel attack, or that a certain data source is
spatially sensitive).
5.4.3.3 Chained Post-copy
The current implementation of aborted post-copy always returns a bouncing VM back to its
original source. This limits the method’s ability to chain migrations, as a bounce migration’s
temporary state cannot simply be migrated to a third machine for further processing, rather
it must be returned and bounced anew.
Beyond improving the performance of operation pipelining, support for chained post-copy
can help redirect execution during hardware failure. In addition, it allows a more efficient
implementation of a moving target defence by avoiding unnecessary return migrations.
To implement chained post-copy, the migration_bitmap must be augmented to also track
the source of each page, allowing the correct machine to be polled once a page fault is
generated. Alternatively, faulting VMs can be modified to multi-cast their page requests to
each machine in the chain.
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5.4.3.4 Application to Moving Target Defence
Using the stock migration methods incorporated into SAFEHAVEN, a virtual machine VMT
could be migrated at maximum rate of around 3 times a minute (Section 4.4.3). This migra-
tion frequency may not be considered adequate in the case of very fast attacks.
Bounce migration enables an alternative approach to a moving target defence, where a
machine is bounced from a source machine MSRC to a destination MDST for a δ defined by
α(). Note that the current implementation does not support chained partial migration, mean-
ing that an aborted migration will always return to MSRC. Consequently, an implementation
of the moving target defence may want to vary MDST between bounce migrations, so as to
defend against attackers that can exploit intermittent and periodic co-location. Similarly, if
the virtual machine remains grounded on MSRC, it runs the risk of being compromised by a
co-located process on MSRC that performs an attack over a series of bounce operations. This
can be prevented either by demanding additional security guarantees on MSRC (such as only
scheduling the same tenants’ virtual machines), or by occasionally changing MSRC through a
full live migration.
With regards to the model, APC has the effect of altering h and consequently H(). This is
due to APC operations not having a typical or fixed length. The H() predicate for an outgoing
APC migration can be modelled as having zero cost, as control is transferred immediately to
the destination. Conversely, the H() value for the return leg varies based on the total amount
of state transmitted to the remote machine. If the bounce operation is being carried out
using DPwS, then one may assume that the connection is being saturated, and H() can be
approximated as a function of the total co-location time at the destination multiplied by the
maximum transfer rate. A similar approach can be adopted when operating in APC mode,
except that the average throughput value is less consistent, given that it depends on the
internal activity of the virtual machine.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter has explored the principle of temporary virtual machine migration, demon-
strating how the semantics of cancelling a post-copy migration can be modified to initiate
a migration in reverse, enabling short-lived computations to be performed on a remote ma-
chine without necessitating two full virtual machine migrations. This concept was actualised
into a concrete implementation, enabling two-way post-copy within QEMU, and evaluated us-
ing workloads provided by the PARSEC benchmarking suite. Finally, several extensions and
alternative scenarios to which the method can be applied were examined.
The performance of a temporary virtual machine migration operation was found to de-
pend on several factors, primarily the duration for which the virtual machine is displaced,
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and the mode in which the outgoing migration is performed. A workload undergoing a tem-
porary migration using Demand Paging with Scanning is affected in much the same way as
one that is migrated using a standard post-copy migration. The advantage of APC is that the
performance impact must only be borne for the duration of the computation, as the migra-
tion can be abbreviated at will. In contrast, a full migration would always run to completion,
needlessly impacting the virtual machine’s performance beyond the task’s execution, as well
as wasting computational capacity.
Temporary migration using Pure Demand Paging aims to reduce the performance impact
of migration by only transferring the minimum amount of memory that is requested by the
remote task. This frugality comes at the expense of low throughput, and one should at least
have an inkling of the workload’s behaviour and expected execution time prior to migrating
in this mode.
While SAFEHAVEN addresses spatial granularity through the use of fine-grained confine-
ments, aborted post-copy introduces temporal granularity for large structures, allowing vir-
tual machine migrations of varying lengths. Note that the methods described are not exclus-
ive to QEMU, and can be implemented within alternative virtualisation platforms that allow
page tracking, such as Xen [Bar+03b]. Similarly, there are no fundamental barriers to apply-
ing APC to process and container migration, especially since the page tracking extensions are
available in user-space [Arc16]. This would result in the ability to specify even finer-grained
isolation properties.
The primary appeal of the approach explored in this chapter is its ability to be applied to
arbitrary workloads without requiring decomposition and with a minimum of preparation.
The method can be deployed within a network with no additional infrastructural changes, as
it does not introduce any special requirements beyond those of a standard post-copy migra-
tion. Nevertheless, the suitability of the approach is ultimately determined by the provider’s
requirements and intended deployment scenarios, and additional factors such as real-time or
capacity constraints may have to be taken into consideration.
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CONCLUSION
THIS WORK IS BUILT UPON THREE intertwined lines of research, namely the mod-elling of co-location using a fine-grained hierarchical model, the implement-
ation of a migration framework and the evaluation of its migration mechanisms,
and the extension of virtual machine post-copy migration to allow temporary mi-
gration. This chapter is a retrospective look at the original research questions, and
the answers provided by this work.
6.1 Introduction
The following chapter is a review of the key concepts and results produced during the course
of this work, where a fine-grained model of isolation was realised into a framework for
dynamically controlling migration. It also provides an overview of similar work, as well as
alternative approaches to illicit channel mitigation.
Chapter Outline
This chapter is structured as follows:
Section 6.2 compares various aspects of the approach with other related work.
Section 6.3 revisits the stated aims of this work and describes how they were met.
Section 6.4 identifies several lines of future research.
Section 6.5 concludes this work.
6.2 Discussion
The following section provides a review of research that is similar and related to the work
presented in this document. In particular, it describes alternative approaches to modelling
systems and isolating entities. It also describes the security considerations that one must keep
in mind when deploying an isolation-based mitigation.
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6.2.1 Comparison to Other Formalisations
The following section discusses ambient and graph-based approaches to modelling systems.
6.2.1.1 Ambient Models
A seminal work in modelling hierarchical architectures was the calculus of mobile ambi-
ents [CG98], which extended process calculi with the ambient process construct. Ambients
specify boundaries within which other ambients exist and migrate. Several extensions to the
original calculus were subsequently defined, including the ability to define security zones to
detect confidentiality breaches [BCF02], as well as to model resource allocation through a
system of markers [Bar+03a]. An additional extension is the cloud calculus [Jar+12].
Ambients differ from the model explored in this work in a number of ways. For example,
the latter uses a graph model, as confinements can be directly co-located within several
different parent containments. This has the effect of requiring migration operations that
simultaneously affect multiple containments. Another feature is the absence of the open
operator, which in the ambient calculus is designed to destroy an ambient and release its
constituents into the parent ambient. Instead, confinements are introduced into and removed
from a hierarchy in a compound action staged through agents’ idle queues.
6.2.1.2 Graph Models
Graphs allow the definition of many-to-many relationships between a system’s entities. Graph
models for VM networks can be generated automatically [BGM11; Bro+10], and can then
be checked statically [BG11] to detect violations in operational correctness, failure resilience
and isolation. Additional work focuses on making the analysis of dynamic systems more ef-
ficient through incremental analysis [BVG14], where only changes, or deltas, are analysed.
The creation and application of deltas is event-driven, triggered using hooks to a hypervisor.
This line of research differs from that explored in this document in that its focus is on de-
tection, rather than the online reconfiguration aspects of mitigation. In addition, analysis is
confined to the virtual machine level, and does not focus on finer-grained isolation.
Other work has also looked into using graphical representations to assist in the modelling
of systems, and automatically translating them into process calculi [PB09]. Challenges in
dynamic monitoring include asynchronous updates, non-atomic actions, unordered events
and blocking behaviour introduced by instrumentation [BGM13]. Other approaches group
resources into colours within which data can be shared, and employ a system of roles that
can modify colour groupings and conflict rules [BKS14].
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6.2.2 Scheduler-Based mitigations
Scheduling policies can be exploited to form illicit channels [VRS14] or steal computational
resources [Var+12]. Setting a minimum time between deschedules can undermine certain
classes of side-channels by obscuring residual cache effects [VRS14]. The problem with such
an approach is that setting a long minimum quantum size and using a non-work conserving
schedulers can result in consistently decreased utilisation rates.
Efficiently choosing migration targets is non-trivial, as placement can be constrained by
several factors in addition to isolation requirements [Raj+09]. The problem can thus be
formulated as one of constraint satisfaction. Other approaches address placement as a bin-
packing problem to guarantee different degrees of isolation whilst upholding a system’s func-
tional constraints [Aza+14; Kra+10]. The approach is evaluated in terms of a competitive
ratio, comparing the cost of configurations produced by on-line scheduling against optimal
placement, where cost is the number of bins used. Heuristics can aid migration and place-
ment [CRC14]. Another approach uses leases and deadlines to reserve resources and priorit-
ise migrations [ARC11].
Scheduling using partial virtual machine migration has also been explored in the context
of consolidation [Bil+12], where virtual machines are migrated to a shared host during peri-
ods of inactivity to reduce power consumption. While similar in mechanism, this approach
has objectives that are diametrically opposite to those of this work, as it favours long-lived
migrations with low workloads.
6.2.3 Detection and Generation
One challenge of policy-based defences is to create policies. Methods have been developed
for detecting certain types of leaks through various techniques, including information flow
analysis [BKR09], abstract interpretation [Doy+13], and data tagging and tracking [Pri+14].
Program pre-partitioning and analysis can optimise the exchange of data and limit it to the
state required by the remote operation. The problem with pre-partitioning when compared
with a fully dynamic solution is that it is not as flexible, both in choosing its isolation target
and in responding to changes in the system’s configuration. One existing hybrid approach
attempts to optimise virtual machine migration by identifying regions of memory that do not
have to be transferred, with a proof of concept having been developed using a modified Java
Virtual Machine [HSS15].
6.2.4 Security
A co-resident attacker can potentially exploit a side-channel (for example, by analysing net-
work traffic or memory access patterns) to determine that a bounce operation is underway.
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This could potentially be used to infer some aspect of the victim’s internal state, either by
associating bounce triggers with specific points in the victim’s applications’ execution, or by
relating packet transmission frequencies during a bounce operation to the virtual machine’s
memory state. In addition, a cloud provider must carefully regulate bounce triggers to pre-
vent load imbalances.
Note that a cloud provider should never allow a tenant to directly specify its own migra-
tion destination, as this would create a significant security risk, and could itself aid in forming
illicit channels [Ris+09]. Adopting a declarative approach, whereby the cloud provider inter-
prets a tenant’s high-level isolation requests without exposing its internals, can help mitigate
such risks. A cloud provider may also have to consider rate-limiting migrations or placing
a minimum on the time that a virtual machine spends migrated. This can protect the cloud
provider from denial-of-service attacks, as well as prevent resource-stealing attacks [Var+12;
Zho+13].
6.3 Revisiting Claims
The following section revisits the original aims of this work, as stated in Section 1.3.3, and
details the way in which they were addressed.
6.3.1 Claim 1
The problem of illicit channels is fundamentally one of co-location, and can be modelled
as such.
Bar some unknown quantum phenomena, illicit channels appear to always require a me-
dium, and do not exhibit what Einstein once termed “spooky action at a distance”. This is
reinforced by the instances of illicit channels observed throughout the course of this work,
which to date follow causality as per classical computing. Even in the case of attacks that
cross air gaps, such as when measuring electromagnetic emanations, one is operating through
a medium, and physical co-location correlates with signal quality.
Modern architectures are hierarchical and vast, with different regions of their hierarchy
offering varying granularities of isolation. Isolated resources can thus be provisioned at a
finer granularity than dedicating machines to each tenant, which enables higher rates of
utilisation. The advantage of using a layered and hierarchical model is that it can describe
the cascading effects of migration, where movements at a higher granularity also affect its
constituent confinements. Conversely, migrations at finer granularities have a limited effect
on their parent confinements. In addition, it allows the creation of mitigations against attacks
that cross hierarchies and levels.
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6.3.2 Claim 2
Containments can be modified efficiently through scheduling and migration at various
granularities.
In the model explored in this work, reconfiguration operations were split into two categor-
ies, namely local and global migrations. The cost of migrations, particularly global migrations,
directly affects the viability of the approach explored in this work, as long migration times
will lower the quality of service and will delay the fulfilment of an isolation request. When
evaluating the impact on quality of service, one should keep in mind that non-migration
based mitigations carry their own costs. In particular, terminating processes in response to
detected attacks could severely degrade the quality of service when one considers that detect-
ors may produce false positives. In contrast, migration is a lenient and largely transparent
approach to restricting resource access, and detectors can afford to be more aggressive in
their classifications.
Decomposing systems into hierarchies of containments allowed mitigations to use the
cheapest migration necessary to isolate a confinement. On-demand isolation at the larger
end of the hierarchy was shown to be viable when aided by a number of technological de-
velopments. In the case of virtual machine migrations, post-copy live migration serves to
both guarantee convergence, and, crucially, make co-location breaks at the virtualisation
level effectively immediate. The use of container and process migration allowed a second in-
termediate level of provisioning, with tenants having the option of consolidating containers
amongst their own virtual machines. Finally, hardware counters and virtualised performance
monitoring units allowed the development of cheap and accurate detectors that served to
trigger migrations.
When studying the model and implementation, it transpired that process/container mi-
gration is, in principle, the most versatile dynamic isolation mechanism in the arsenal of
reconfiguration methods. This is because it can be used to break co-location at any level of
the hierarchy. From a practical standpoint, container migration is still under development, re-
quires some forethought in deployment, and cannot always be performed at will. In contrast,
virtual machines are robust and simple to deploy to, and do not require tenants to decom-
pose their systems to facilitate migration. In addition, they offer strong system-level isolation
guarantees between tenants, and are amenable to migration due to their use of virtualised
devices and in-built decoupling assumptions.
6.3.3 Claim 3
The impact of migrating large confinements such as virtual machines can be reduced
using partial or temporary migrations.
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While post-copy live migration remedies the sluggishness of pre-copy virtual machine
migration, it still involves the transfer of large volumes of state from one machine to another.
Performing a complete migration would be particularly wasteful if one only needs isolation
for the duration of a short security-sensitive computation.
This work has detailed the implementation of temporary virtual machine migration, where
a physical machine is dynamically leased to a virtual machine for a short period of time. This
was demonstrated by modifying the post-copy migration methods of QEMU to support two-
way, or aborted, live migration. This adds the ability to stop an ongoing migration at any
point and return the partial remote state back to its origin through a post-copy migration in
the reverse direction. This avoids transferring the entire virtual machine’s state, and allows
partial migrations to be carried out at high frequencies.
Two-way post-copy migration allows machines to be leased to tenants at a high frequency
on the basis of their traits. This was evaluated by temporarily migrating a tenant perform-
ing a series of encryption operations to a physical machine that supported the AES-NI CPU
extensions, an active trait that the original machine lacked. Using two-way post-copy could
promote alternative cloud topologies, where collections of machines are assigned one or
more idle machines, which are then multiplexed temporarily amongst tenants on a demand
basis. Mixing-in designated target machines at the rack level can help leverage high-speed
interconnects and keep migrations local, which translates into faster migrations.
6.4 Future Work
Future work will focus on the automated synthesis of runtime enforcement monitors from
properties expressed using the hierarchical model, and the integration of the model into
simulation frameworks. Extensions to the model can also be considered, such as the addition
of attributes to confinements to allow co-location to be queried on the basis of a specific
attribute, and the use of weights to denote channel capacities at each level.
A natural progression for work on the implementation of the approach is to further de-
velop and improve post-copy live migration at the process and container level, and to intro-
duce two-way migration at this granularity of confinements. In addition, the incorporation
of techniques to reduce the amount of state transferred during live migration, such as by
detecting duplicate or empty memory pages, should be pursued.
6.5 Concluding Remarks
Partitioning computational resources into finer-grained units of computation challenges the
notion that hard isolation is a necessarily wasteful and impractical response to illicit chan-
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nels. Adopting a correspondingly fine-grained approach to migration further reduces the
overheads of procuring hard isolation dynamically.
While future infrastructures may be faster and larger than contemporary deployments, it
is unlikely that the fine-grained approach to isolation explored in this work will be invalid-
ated solely through scale. Even if the cost of migration were somehow reduced to nil, one
would still opt for a deployment which maximises isolation whilst minimising waste, neces-
sitating fine-grained notions of partitioning. In addition, it has historically been the case that
workloads grew in tandem with technological and architectural advancements, and economy
in allocation will remain pertinent.
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